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TRADITION AND MODERNITY RECONSIDERED

Modernization is a term which became fashionable after World War II. It is useful despite its vagueness because it tends to evoke similar associations in contemporary readers. Their first impulse may be to think of "the modern" in terms of present-day technology with its jet-travel, space exploration, and nuclear power. But the common sense of the word "modern" encompasses the whole era since the eighteenth century when inventions like the steam engine and the spinning jenny provided the initial, technical basis for the industrialization of societies. The economic transformation of England coincided with the movement of independence in the American colonies and the creation of the nation-state in the French revolution. Accordingly, the word "modern" also evokes associations with the democratization of societies, especially the destruction of inherited privilege and the declaration of equal rights of citizenship.

These changes of the eighteenth century initiated a transformation of human societies which is comparable in magnitude only to the transformation of nomadic peoples into settled agriculturalists some 10,000 years earlier. Until 1750 the proportion of the world's active population engaged in agriculture was probably

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above 80 per cent. Two centuries later it was about 60 per cent, and in the industrialized countries of the world it had fallen below 50 per cent, reaching low figures like 10 to 20 per cent in countries that have a relatively long history of industrialization. In Great Britain, the country which pioneered in this respect, the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture reached a low of 5 per cent in 1950.[1]

Wherever it has occurred, the modernization of societies originated in social structures marked by inequalities based on kinship ties, hereditary privilege and established (frequently monarchical) authority. By virtue of their common emphasis on a hierarchy of inherited positions, pre-modern or traditional societies have certain elements in common. The destruction of these features of the old order and the consequent rise of equality are one hallmark of modernization; hence the latter process shows certain uniformities. These changes in the social and political order were apparent before the full consequences of the industrial revolution were understood. As a result, most (if not all) thinkers of the nineteenth century

> . . . exhibit the same burning sense of society's sudden, convulsive turn from a path it had followed for millennia. All manifest the same profound intuition of the disappearance of historic values—and, with them, age-old securities, as well as age-old tyrannies and inequalities—and the coming of new powers, new insecurities, and new tyrannies . . . .[2]

And, as Professor Nisbet adds, "sociology in Europe was developed almost wholly around the themes and antitheses cast up

[1]See Carlo M. Cipolla, *The Economic History of World Population* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 24–28. By focusing attention on the technical and economic effects of the process, Cipolla provides a comprehensive formulation of what is meant by industrialization. Nothing like that clarity can be achieved with regard to "modernization," which is more inclusive and refers, albeit vaguely, to the manifold social and political processes that have accompanied industrialization in most countries of Western civilization. The following discussion contains contributions towards a definition of "modernization."

[2]See Robert A. Nisbet, *Emile Durkheim* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 20.

by the two revolutions and their impact upon the old order."[1] We owe many insights to this intellectual tradition. Yet today there are indications that this perspective gave an oversimplified view of traditional societies, of modern societies, and of the transition from the one to the other. Oversimplification resulted from ideological interpretations of the contrast between tradition and modernity, and from undue generalizations of the European experience. Today, a more differentiated and balanced analysis of modernization should be possible; the following discussion is presented as a contribution to that end.

Its first part deals with an aspect of the history of ideas. The rise of industrial civilization in Europe engendered a new conception of society, invidious contrasts between tradition and modernity, and a theory of social change culminating in the work of Karl Marx and most recently in a revival of theories of social evolution. My effort will be to show how our conceptual vocabulary in studies of modernization developed. The second part offers a methodological critique of this intellectual tradition and proposes an alternative conceptualization of the contrast between tradition and modernity. In the third part I shall attempt to develop a comparative approach to the study of modernization and illustrate it by application to the field of social stratification.

PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE OF IDEAS ABOUT MODERN SOCIETY

A New Perspective

The sense that the late eighteenth century represents a hiatus in intellectual perspective as well as a new departure in the history of Western civilization is as common among scholars as is the related connotation of the term "modern" among people at large. Before the 17th and 18th centuries, the world of nature and of man was conceived as an emanation of Divine providence. Since then our thinking has been restructured in all fields of learning. As the idea

[1]*Ibid.*, p. 21 n.

of God became fused with that of Nature, the concept of the universe created at the beginning of time was gradually replaced by the idea of an infinitely various and endlessly active process of evolution. The idea was applied in parallel fashion to our understanding of the growth of knowledge, to a new conception of God as in Schelling's *Natur philosophie*, and to an ethical interpretation of world history as in Kant's view that "all the excellent natural faculties of mankind would forever remain undeveloped" if it were not for man's nature with its quarrelsomeness, its enviously competitive vanity, and its insatiable desire to possess or to rule.[4] Here was one of many schemes by which thinkers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries linked the fractious qualities of individual men with the concept of a self-contained regularity or lawfulness attributed to the social world. While Kant used a teleological construction in this respect, classical economists like Adam Smith asserted that man's propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another gave rise to actions obeying an impersonal law of supply and demand. By their actions in society individuals conform to a regularity or higher principle without intending to do so. Phrases like the "end of nature" or the "invisible hand" by which Kant and Smith referred to such a higher principle may be considered a survival of an earlier belief in Divine providence or a harbinger of later concepts of "society" and "economy." In any case, they helped to usher in a new view of the social world as an impersonal structure possessing attributes or principles of its own.

The following discussion presents an historical sketch of ideas about the new, industrial society in the making—with special emphasis upon the effects of that society on different social classes. My purpose is to show that the invidious contrast between tradition and modernity is the master-theme which underlies a great diversity of topics and influences our understanding of modern society to this day.

[4]Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *The Philosophy of Kant* (New York: Random House, 1949), p. 121. Note the relation of this view to the intellectual tradition traced in Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961), passim.

In his *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, first published in 1767, Adam Ferguson attributed the progress of a people to the subdivision of tasks (Adam Smith's division of labor) which at the same time improves the skills of the artisan, the profits of the manufacturer, and the enjoyment of consumers.

> Every craft may engross the whole of a man's attention, and has a mystery which must be studied . . . Nations of tradesmen come to consist of members, who beyond their one particular trade, are ignorant of all human affairs, and who may contribute to the preservation and enlargement of their commonwealth, without making its interest an object of their regard or attention.[5]

Ferguson's discussion formulates ways of looking at modern society which have become commonplace. The division of labor necessarily restricts the understanding of those who specialize. In so doing it also increases their productivity and the wealth of the country. Hence, private ends, a lack of conscious concern for public welfare, and public benefits go together. This laissez-faire doctrine is joined, as Marx already noted, with a theory of social action, at least in rudimentary form. By only attending to his business, each man is distinguished by his calling and has a place to which he is fitted. In Ferguson's view the differences among men are a direct outcome of the habits they acquire in practicing different arts: "Some employments are liberal, others mechanic. They require different talents, and inspire different sentiments."[6] In his assessment of these corrolaries of specialization, Ferguson combines the older conventional wisdom with insight into the emerging problems of modern society. The old division of society into a leisured, ruling minority and the bulk of a working population is reflected in his view that social rank depends on the work men do. Those who must eke out a mere subsistence are degraded by the "objects they pursue, and by the means they employ to attain it." Those who belong to the superior class are bound to no task and are free to follow the disposition of their mind and heart.

At the same time, Ferguson is well aware that increasing di-

[5]Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 5th ed. (London: T. Codell, 1782), pp. 302–3.
[6]*Ibid.*, pp. 308–9.

vision of labor exacts a price. The ends of society are best promoted by mechanical arts requiring little capacity and thriving best "under a total suppression of sentiment and reason."[7] Another Scotch philosopher, John Millar, points out that art and science improve with the division of labor, but produce in the worker, who is employed in a single manual operation, a "habitual vacancy of thought, unenlivened by many prospects, but such as are derived from future wages of their labor, or from the grateful returns of bodily repose and sleep."[8] The human cost of manual labor under modern conditions of production is thus a theme from the very beginning of industrial society.

It was argued that this human cost is inevitable. The burdens of the laboring classes under the new conditions are simply a new form of the ancient division of society into masters and servants. Attempts to relieve these burdens only decrease the wealth of a country and hence ultimately aggravate the lot of the workers themselves.[9] Yet this advocacy of the traditional rank-order under new conditions did not in the long run match the significance of another, much more critical body of opinion.

Conservative and Radical Critiques of Industry.

In many parts of Europe men of letters viewed the discrepancies between rich and poor with alarm and with a feeling that the destitution of the people represented a new phenomenon and an

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[8] See John Millar, "Social Consequences of the Division of Labor," reprinted in William C. Lehmann, *John Millar of Glasgow*, 1735–1801 (Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 380–82. This volume contains a reprint of Millar's *Origin of the Distinction of Ranks*, first published in 1771.

[9] Edmund Burke, "Thoughts and Details on Scarcity (1795)," in *Works* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1869), V, pp. 134–35. Burke himself used the laissez-faire doctrine to support his argument. The law of supply and demand governed the wages paid to labor and interference with that law would merely aggravate the condition of the poor. The traditional argument against the injustice of this system is exemplified by William Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), I, pp. 15–20.

increasing threat to the social order. The ideas of a growing bifurcation of society into two opposed classes, as well as the doctrine of pauperization, which are familiar to modern readers from the writings of Karl Marx, were in fact beliefs spelled out by many European writers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[10] Their sense of crisis is reflected in ideas about social rank which sought to take account of the changes occurring in industrializing societies. To exemplify these ideas, indicate something of their ubiquity, and show how strongly they have influenced modern social thought, I shall take examples from Germany, France, and the United States. These judgments about social ranks in a period of transition reflect both the experience and moral sense of men of different social ranks and the moral sense with which the writer himself regards the role of different groups in that transition.

The first example contrasts a conservative and a humanist critique of commercialization in late eighteenth-century Germany. In 1778 the publicist Justus Möser complained in an article on "genuine property" that in his day the German language had lost its capacity to designate an owner's inalienable relationship to his property.[11] At one time ownership of land included associated rights in addition to those of proprietorship, such as the right to hunt, to vote in the National Assembly, and others. These rights had been known by distinctive terms which gave a clue to the specific rights an owner enjoyed in perpetuity. He could sell or otherwise dispose of the land itself, but he could not divest himself of these rights any more than a purchaser of the land could acquire them. Möser's critique of the change of language is thus at the same time an indictment of moral decay resulting from an easy transfer of property. The relationship between an owner and his property is in his view a source of personal identification and social stability. These are ensured as long as ownership of land confers on the proprietor rights and privileges which give him status in the

[10] Cf. the survey of these opinions by Robert Michels, *Die Verelendungs theorie* (Leipzig: Alfred Kroener, 1928), passim.

[11] Justus Möser, *Sämtliche Werke* (Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1842), IV, pp. 158–62. I owe this reference to the article by Karl Mannheim, cited below.

community and can be obtained by inheritance only, not by purchase.

The humanist critique of commercialization looks at first glance very similar to that of Möser. Trading as well as the ownership and care of property undermine an individual's integrity, because his every act and thought turns on considerations of money and economic expediency. Man is ruled by that which should be at his service. In his novel, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, originally published in 1796, Goethe expresses this view when he writes:

> What can it avail me to manufacture good iron whilst my own breast is full of dross? Or to what purpose were it to understand the art of reducing landed estates to order, when my own thoughts are not in harmony?[12]

But Goethe's hero goes on to relate this anticommercial view to the conflicting personal values of the *Bürger* and the aristocrat. The latter, he claims, has polished manners in keeping with his lofty social position, but he does not cultivate his heart. The *Bürger* cannot make such pretensions. For him the decisive question is not "who he is," but what "discernment, knowledge, talents, or riches" he possesses.

> He must cultivate some individual talent, in order to be useful, and it is well understood that in his existence there can be no harmony, because in order to render one talent useful, he must abandon the exercise of every other.[13]

Thus, to Goethe's hero, the aristocrat has high social standing but a cold heart, the *Bürger* may gain distinction by his attainments, but only the artist is in a position to pursue the "harmonious cultivation of his nature."[14]

[12]Johann W. Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, trans. By R. Dillon Boylan (London: Bell and Doldy, 1867), p. 268. See also Baron Knigge, *Practical Philosophy of Social Life* (Lansingburgh: Perriman and Bliss, 1805), pp. 307–8.

[13]Goethe, *op. cit.*

[14]See Werner Wittich, "Der soziale Gehalt von Goethes Roman 'Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre'," in Melchior Palyi, ed., *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie, Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1923), II, pp. 278–306.

The resemblance between these views does not go beyond their common rejection of commerce. Möser looks backwards towards a society characterized by a rank-order of privilege and subordination based on land and the rights associated with landownership. He attributes to that society not merely stability, but ideal qualities of mind and feeling such that man's relations to his fellows are in harmony and his work an adequate outlet for his capabilities. Against this mythical image of the past, the commercialization of property appears as a decay of civilization. During the century and a half which followed, Möser's praise of inalienable, prescriptive rights was associated again and again not only with the benevolence of paternalistic rule but also with the warmth of personal relations and the sense of personal belonging, made possible by a closely knit, hierarchic community. Against this benign view of tradition Goethe's hero defines his own position by referring to the empty, cruel heart which goes together with the polished manners of the aristocrat. Bourgeois man stands forth by virtue of his *individual achievements*, which represent greater personal worth than the ease and poise which are an unearned, and hence unmerited, byproduct of inherited privilege. The *Bürger* may lack manners, but at least his individual attainments establish his personal worth. Yet like Ferguson and Millar, Goethe's hero decries the stultifying effects of specialization. The merit of achievement is only relative, for in the ordinary man it is the result of a one-sided development; all his other capacities are sacrificed so that he may be useful. This praise of man's protean capacities—here put as the artist's many-sided cultivation of his personality—has been associated ever since with the radical critique of bourgeois civilization. An emphasis on achievement as an attribute of that civilization entirely misses this inherent ambiguity of the value of individual striving and creativity.

The two opinions from late eighteenth century Germany reflect a provincial setting in which economic change was slow, but in which imaginative men witnessed more rapid changes taking place in England and France. The classic document portraying this response is Goethe's epic poem *Hermann und Dorothea* in which the upheavals of the French revolution are commented on from afar and in eloquent contrast to the well-being and content-

ment of an average, small-town *Bürger* family.[15] Under these circumstances reflections about the effects of commerce on the ranks of society tended to be abstract, whether they consisted of nostalgic references to the past or humanistic celebrations of personal values.

With the advance of commerce and industry during the first decades of the nineteenth century, critical reflections on the impact of these changes continued. Invidious contrasts between tradition and modernity, and between one-sided utility and individual creativity, were elaborated and reiterated, but with more direct attention to the nature of work. Across an interval of more than two generations one may compare the contrast between Möser and Goethe's hero in Germany with the contrast between de Bonald and Proudhon in France. According to Bonald, industry has increased the material wealth of the country, but it has also produced civic unrest and moral decay. Members of families employed in industry

> . . . work in isolation and frequently in different industries. They have no more acquaintance with their master than what he commands and what little he pays. Industry does not nourish all ages nor all sexes. True, it employs the child, but frequently at the expense of his education or before he is sufficiently strong for such work. On the other hand, when a man has reached old age and can no longer work, he is abandoned and has no other bread than that which his children may provide or public charity bestow . . . .
>
> The [industrial laborer] works in crowded and sedentary conditions, turns a crank, runs the shuttle, gathers the threads. He spends his life in cellars and garrets. He becomes a machine himself. He exercises his fingers but never his mind . . . . Everything debases the intelligence of the industrial worker . . . .[16]

[15]For documentation of the social and literary life of the period cf. W. H. Bruford, *Germany in the 18th Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1939), passim. The literary and philosophical response to the French revolution is analyzed in Alfred Stern, *Der Einfluss der französichen Revolution auf das deutsche Geistesleben* (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1928), but I know of no comparable summary treatment of the German response to English industrialization. Cf., however, Hans Freyer, *Die Bewertung der Wirtschaft im philosophischen Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1921), for some relevant materials.

[16]M. de Bonald, *Oevres Complètes* (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1864), II, pp. 238–39.

In this critique of industry emphasis on the incapacities resulting from specialization are related to the industrial worker and his family. To eke out a subsistence, members of the family are dispersed, they work in isolation, and have no human relationship with their employer. In addition, industry as a whole abuses the child and gives no care to the aged.

In all these respects agricultural work is superior. On the land the different classes work alongside each other and at the same tasks; hence there is no social isolation between them. Children and old people are cared for and productively employed at tasks commensurate with their capacities. Agricultural work is not only healthy in contrast with industrial, it also furthers the intelligence of the peasant or farm laborer. Cultivation of the land demands attention to varied tasks, furthers neighborly cooperation, and through contact with natural processes lifts thought "to that which endows the earth with fertility, gives us the seasons, makes the fruit ripen."[17] Where Möser emphasizes the social stability and moral worth achieved by inalienable property rights, Bonald emphasizes that similar values are inherent in the nature of agricultural work. For Bonald as for Möser, the material benefits of commerce and industry are not worth the price in human values they exact. For both, the traditional social order represents sociability, meaningful human relations, proper security, care for young and old, and man's opportunity to develop his capacities to the full. In all these respects industry is said to fail; its sole accomplishment is the increase of wealth.

This critique of industry is not very different at points from Proudhon's radical attack upon the new industrial order (1846). Proudhon also believes that specialization has a destructive effect upon the individual. Like Bonald he deplores the helplessness of industrial workers and feels that the advance of technology turns

[17]*Ibid.* Note in passing that this contrast between agricultural and industrial work is made in almost identical terms by John Millar, years earlier. The difference between Millar's liberalism and Bonald's conservatism seems to be reflected only in Millar's emphasis on the knowledge of the peasant and Bonald's greater stress on his religion. Cf. Lehmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 380–82. As Max Weber has pointed out, this emphasis on the piety of the peasant is a distinctly modern phenomenon, related to invidious contrasts between town and country. See Max Weber, *Economy and Society, op. cit.*, II, p. 470.

men into machines.[18] But their common critique of industry and praise of agriculture shows that Proudhon and Bonald see the same facts in entirely different terms. For example, both agree that agricultural work is many-sided, not one-sided and stultifying like industrial work. Yet Proudhon finds this praiseworthy as the foundation of individualism, not like Bonald as the foundation of neighborliness and cooperation. Proudhon sees the agricultural proprietor as the solitary man who tills the soil for his family and does not depend upon the assistance of others; "never have peasants been seen to form a society for the cultivation of their fields; never will they be seen do do so." This ability to maintain his family by his own efforts makes the peasant into the ideal anarchist. By contrast Proudhon emphasizes that certain industries "require the combined employment of a large number of workers" involving subordination and mutual dependence. "The producer is no longer, as in the fields, a sovereign and free father of a family; it is a collectivity."[19] Thus, for Proudhon, industry is the locus of an enforced collectivism, mutual dependence, and subordination, whereas agriculture enhances freedom and individualism. He favors agriculture, because he rejects the "hierarchy of capacities" as a "principle and law" of social organization.[20] By contrast, Bonald accepts inequalities among men as a fact of nature which is merely recognized by society. For him the distinction between industry and agriculture turns on the question of which activity furthers the community, not the individual; and in this respect industry enhances human isolation, while agriculture promotes human solidarity.

Clearly, both writers structure the evidence to suit their purpose. For Proudhon neighborly assistance disappears from the agricultural community, because he searches for a personification of the individualism which is his ideal; for Bonald the harshness of the peasant's struggle with nature, and the human abuse which is endemic in close neighborly relations, disappear in the roseate

[18]P. J. Proudhon, *A System of Economic Contradictions or The Philosophy of Misery* (Boston: Benjamin R. Tucker, 1888), I, p. 138.

[19]P. J. Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution in the 19th Century* (London: Freedom Press, 1923), p. 215. This work was written in 1851.

[20]Proudhon, *Philosophy of Misery*, p. 132.

image of the community modelled on the familial pattern. Much the same is true of the two views of industry. For Proudhon the *relative* freedom of the industrial worker does not exist, and he ignores the fundamental subordination of the farm laborer in agriculture. Bonald, on the other hand, sees the worker's freedom only in its negative side, as human isolation in contrast to a benign solidarity in agriculture. One man idealizes agriculture as the bulwark of traditional society; the other, however, mistakenly, as the principal means of leveling social differences, decreasing mutual dependence, and enhancing individual freedom. Transparent as they are, such ideological constructions have had a profound influence upon the contrast of tradition and modernity down to the present.

To these examples I wish to add a brief reference to similar arguments on this side of the Atlantic. They will show something of the persistence of the intellectual tradition I am characterizing, even under quite divergent conditions. In the United States conservative views like those of Bonald had been openly expressed during the first decades following the Declaration of Independence. During the 1830's the public disclosure of these views became politically inexpedient, even among New England conservatives.[21] At the same time, the belief in inequality became a matter of deep conviction in the Southern states. In this regional context, conservative views became linked with an attack on Northern industrialism, on the one hand, and a defense of slavery, on the other. In his *Sociology for the South*, George Fitzhugh denounced men of property who are masters without the feelings and sympathies of masters, engaged in the selfish struggle to better their pecuniary condition and hence without time or inclination to cultivate the heart or the head.[22] Fitzhugh reiterates the theme which is already familiar to us: that the division of labor may make men more efficient, but also confines the worker to some monotonous employment and makes him an easy prey of the capitalist,

[21]Cf. Norman Jacobson, *The Concept of Equality in the Assumptions of the Propaganda of Massachusetts Conservatives*, 1790–1840, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of Wisconsin, 1951).

[22]George Fitzhugh, *Sociology for the South* (Richmond: A. Morris, 1854), pp. 233, 235.

who considers him solely in monetary terms.[23] In this setting the standard argument against the division of labor, which Marx emphasized so much, is used in a defense of slavery! For Fitzhugh contrasts the moral destitution of the free laborer, hated by his employer for the demands he makes and by his fellow workers because he competes for employment, with the moral attainments and domestic tranquillity of the South, which is founded upon the parental affection of the masters and child-like obedience of the slaves.[24]

This view is strangely echoed by Orestes A. Brownson, a New England cleric and radical Christian who had identified himself with the workers in the 1830's, and later became converted to Catholicism. Brownson contrasts the moral degradation imposed on both employers and workers with the benign features of paternalism:

> Between the master and the slave, between the lord and the serf, there often grow up pleasant personal relations and attachments; there is personal intercourse, kindness, affability, protection on the one side, respect and gratitude on the other, which partially compensates for the superiority of the one and the inferiority of the other; but the modern system of wages allows very little of all this: the capitalist and the workman belong to different species, and have little personal intercourse. The agent or man of business pays the workman his wages, and there ends the responsibility of the employer. The laborer has no further claim on him and he may want and starve, or sicken and die, it is his own affair, with which the employer has nothing to do. Hence the relation between the two classes becomes mercenary, hard and a matter of arithmetic.[25]

This language is not essentially different from that of the *Communist Manifesto*; it culminates in the contrasting images of exploiters and exploited, of haughty indifference, on the one hand, and injured hostility, on the other. Brownson even uses Marx's

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 161.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 106–7, 253–54. A major analysis of this Southern ideology in historical perspective is contained in W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954), passim.

[25] Orestes A. Brownson, *Works* (Detroit: T. Nourse, 1884), V, pp. 116–17. This passage was written in 1857, after the author's conversion to Catholicism.

symbol of the worker as an appendage to the machine, though the phrase may have been common among social critics of the mid-nineteenth century.

The examples I have cited suggest that from the late eighteenth century on men of letters were made deeply anxious by what they considered the moral crisis in human relations, brought on by the coming of industry. Karl Mannheim has pointed out that critics like Möser and Goethe or Bonald and Proudhon were deeply divided in their political views but nonetheless based their opposition to industrial society on grounds that are similar to quite a striking extent.[26] Industry depends upon the division of labor and as that division progresses men cease to be masters of the machines they use and instead become their victimes. As labor becomes more monotonous, workers are increasingly deprived of the opportunity to develop and apply their human faculties. More generally, the specialized development of one capacity in the interest of productivity and commercial success entails the atrophy of many or most other capacities. Industrial man appears as the counterimage of Renaissance man, and that at all levels of the social structure. At the same time, commercialization loosens the ties which bind men to each other. Freedom from paternal rule and the hierarchy of rank is obtained for the individual, but only at the price of fraternity. The ties among men lose their basis in sentiment and the sense of moral obligation and come to depend on economic interest alone. As equals men compete with one another rather than cooperate and as employers and workers they strike bargains solely in terms of material advantage.

These themes have been standbys of social thought for almost two centuries.[27] They owe their profound emotional appeal to the

[26] Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in *Essays in Sociology and Social Psychology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 74–164.

[27] Different meanings of "alienation" as the common theme of anti-industrial sentiment are examined in Lewis Feuer's essay on this concept in Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich, eds., *Sociology on Trial* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 127–47. That men of opposite political persuasion have come to employ this concept is analyzed sociologically by René König, "Zur Soziologie der Zwanziger Jahre," in Leonhard Reinisch, ed., *Die Zeit ohne Eigenschaften* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1961), pp. 82–118.

invidious linkage between the transition to an industrial society and the decline of the two ideas of individual creativity and human fraternity. Obviously, conservatives attribute both of these values to a largely symbolic, hierarchic order of the past, but implicitly (and sometimes explicitly also) radical critics of industrial society use the same clichés. By their incorporation in the work of Karl Marx these clichés have become a dominant influence on modern thought because of the unique way in which Marx combined the sense of moral crisis described above with his claim that his approach represented a scientific study of society. Reflections on Marx's theories are legion; here they will be pursued only to the extent that the reader can form an independent judgment of the differences between the presentation which follows and the most influential treatment of social classes in the process of modernization.

The Marxian Perspective

"The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles." The *Communist Manifesto* begins with this sentence, yet Marx's work as a whole does not contain a sustained analysis of social classes. The third volume of his lifework, *Das Kapital*, breaks off after four paragraphs of a chapter which was to be devoted to this topic. The paradox has often been commented on, but it is more apparent than real. Probably Marx had said what he had to say about social classes, since it is not difficult to summarize his views.[28]

For Marx classes are but the agents of social change, their ultimate determinant is the organization of production. His reasons for this assumption go back to early philosophical considerations. Today these would be considered existentialist in the sense of inferences derived from basic exigencies of human experience. Men cannot live without work; they also propagate their kind and

[28]The following account is based in part on Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Karl Marx's Theory of Social Classes," in *Class, Status and Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 6–11.

hence enter into the social relations of the family. Men use tools to satisfy their needs; as needs are satisfied, new needs arise and techniques of production are improved. The proliferation of needs and improved techniques put a premium on cooperation based on some division of labor, for divided labor increases productivity. How labor is divided depends on the organization of production, specifically on the distribution of property in the means of production. It is, therefore, the position the individual occupies in the organization of production, which indicates to which social class he belongs.

In the unfinished chapter on class, Marx distinguishes between wage-laborers, capitalists, and landlords which form the three great classes of capitalist society, and he emphasizes the "infinite distinctions of interest and position which the social division of labor creates *among* workers as *among* capitalists and landowners."[29] In a complex society, individuals are distinguished from one another in a great many ways, even when they belong to the same class. Thus, individuals who depend entirely upon wage-labor may still differ greatly in terms of income, consumption patterns, educational attainment, or occupation. Efforts to ascertain class membership by grouping people in terms of their similar share in the distribution of material goods, skills, and prestige symbols, only produces statistical artifacts in Marx's view. For him "class" refers to a process of group formation in which people are united despite the "infinite distinctions of interest and position" which divide them.[30] To be sure, a shared position in the organization of production is the necessary condition of a social class. But only the experienced gained in making a living, and particularly the experience of economic and political conflict, would prompt workers, capitalists, or landowners to develop a consciousness of class and become united in action. Marx specified

[29]See Thomas B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, eds., *Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (London: Watts and Co., 1956), p. 179. My italics.

[30]Cf. T. H. Marshall's definition of class as "a force that unites into groups people who differ from one another, by overriding the differences between them." See his *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1964), p. 164.

a number of conditions that would facilitate the process. Where communication of ideas among individuals in the same class position is easy, repeated economic conflicts will lead to a growth of solidarity and a sense of historic opportunities. Profound dissatisfactions arise from an inability to control the economic structure in which the ruling class curtails the economic advance of the group and subjects it to exploitation. In Marx's view a social class becomes an agent of historical change when these dissatisfactions lead to the formation of political organizations. A fully developed class is a politically organized group, capable of overcoming in action the distinctions of interest and rank that divide it.

This interpretation of social class was based in the first instance on Marx's detailed observations of the English labor movement which he himself systematized in the following words:

> Large-scale industry assembles in one place a crowd of people who are unknown to each other. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of their wages, this common interest which they have against their employer, brings them together again in the same idea of resistance—*combination*. Thus combination has always a double aim, that of putting an end to competition among themselves, to enable them to compete as a whole with the capitalist. If the original aim of resistance was that of maintaining wages, to the extent that the capitalists, in their turn, unite with the aim of repressive measures, the combinations, at first isolated, became organized into groups, and in face of the unity of the capitalists, the maintenance of the combination becomes more important than upholding the level of wages. This is so true that English economists have been astonished to observe the workers sacrificing a substantial part of their wages in favour of the associations, which in the eyes of the economists were only established to defend wages. In this struggle—a veritable civil war—all the elements for a future battle are brought together and developed. Once arrived at this point the association takes on a political character.[31]

This conception of class as a group gradually emerging to self-consciousness and political organization was at once analysis and projection. Analysis in so far as Marx systematized his observations of emerging working-class movements in England from the

[31]Bottomore and Rubel, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–87.

late eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century.[32] Projection in so far as Marx generalized from this analysis, both with regard to the formation of classes in the past (for example, that of the bourgeoisie under feudalism) and with regard to the development of a revolutionary working class in the future. The latter views applied not only in England but in all countries undergoing a capitalist development such as England had experienced since the eighteenth century. We should understand what gave Marx confidence in predicting that the struggle he analyzed would eventuate in a revolutionary overthrow and reconstitution of society.

The first point to be mentioned is Marx's acceptance and dramatic elaboration of the ideas briefly described above. Like Ferguson, Millar, Möser, Goethe, Bonald, Proudhon, Fitzhugh, Brownson, and a host of others, Marx was deeply impressed by the moral crisis which capitalism had wrought in man's relation with his fellows and his work. To cite Marx's views on alienation at this point would be to repeat many of the moral reflections cited earlier (albeit in more Hegelian language) and what has been elaborated in a thousand ways by critics of modern society since his day.[33] But Marx's elaboration of widely shared beliefs assumed special significance. The reason is, I believe, that for him the mounting alienation of men was part of an economic process in which repeated and severe depressions together with the capitalists' restrictive practices would create an ever-increasing discrepancy between the forces and the organization of production, or, in

[32]A recent massive study by E. K. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), passim, enables us to appreciate this Marxian perspective in that it describes the movements Marx observed with the benefit of another hundred years of scholarship. However, the author faithfully reproduces Marx's own blindness to the strongly conservative elements that were an enduring part of working-class agitation (by treating these elements as a passing phase) as well as to the mounting gradualism of the labor movement (by terminating his study in the 1830s).

[33]A convenient compilation of relevant quotations from Marx is contained in Bottomore and Rubel, *op. cit.*, Part III, Chap. 4. To my knowledge the most comprehensive analysis of this complex of ideas is that of Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

simpler language, between the economy's capacity to satisfy human needs and the satisfaction of needs which is actually achieved. Marx's economic analysis seeks to support this interpretation, and in view of the importance he attached to it he had no reason to feel that he had neglected the analysis of social class. His analysis is distinguished from the many other writers who developed similar themes by the belief that he had proved man's alienation to be a symptom of the *final* phase of "pre-history."

Secondly, Marx welcomed the technical and economic changes which were revolutionizing the old order but, he saw the difference between then and now in a very special way. Earlier epochs were marked by "manifold gradations of social rank," but the modern era tends towards a simplified antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat. While this prediction has not stood the test of time, it is of a piece with his view that all previous history is pre-history. Never before had the social world been stripped of all its traditional practices and religious beliefs; only now had it been revealed as it really is, capable of a rational ordering by men who have come within reach of satisfying all their desires. Eventually, the classless, communist society of the future would establish both a true fraternity among men and on that basis an opportunity for each to develop and apply his capacities. Though he refused to speculate about this new order, Marx was emphatic that world history was nearing its decisive turning point. In his view man's productive potential had become so great that the deprivations of inequality and hence the substitute gratifications of religious beliefs had become obsolete. For the same reasons human relations have become transparent so that the social order is now capable of being "consciously regulated by freely associated men in accordance with a settled plan."[34] Marx believed that this equalitarian society of the future would bring about a complete break with the

[34]Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: The Modern Library, 1936), p. 92. Marx attributed religious beliefs and ideologies which disguise the "actual" relations of men in society to the conflicts of interest engendered by its class structure. It was therefore logical for him to anticipate that the advent of a classless society would coincide with the "end of ideology," since then the "need" for ideology would disappear. Cf. the earlier discussion in Chapter 2, pp. 35–40.

past, leading to a cessation of class struggles and freeing men from being at the mercy of circumstances not of their own choosing. For the first time in history men had the opportunity to establish a rationally planned society. To cope with this world historical turning point, Marx devoted his life work to an analysis of those cumulative conditions, endemic in the capitalist organization of production, which would bring about the final revolutionary struggle.

The third point to be noted is the famous paradox of Marx's determinism. On the one hand, he predicted that the contradictions inherent in capitalism would inevitably produce a class-conscious proletariat and a proletarian revolution. On the other, he assigned to class-consciousness, to political action, and to his own scientific theory a major role in bringing the inevitable about. The paradox is "resolved" once it is remembered that for Marx the eventual revolution as well as the subjective actions and ideas which help bring it about, are consequences of the mounting contradictions between the potential for productivity and the actuality of exploitation. Marx "explains" the eventual political maturity of the proletariat, the constructive role of "bourgeois ideologists" as well as his own scientific theory as creative responses to contradictions which are the product of capitalism.

For Marx "all hitherto existing societies" encompass the "pre-history" of class struggles as contrasted with the classless society of the future. All his attention is focused on analyzing the last phase of that pre-history. Accurate, scientific understanding of this phase is indispensable for guiding political action, but capitalism also jeopardizes all constructive and undistorted use of intelligence. Between these two positions there is a fundamental ambivalence. Marx wants to know, accurately and dispassionately, but since his own theory of the socio-historical foundation of knowledge casts doubt upon the possibility of a science of society, he also wants to make sure that the knowledge gained will play a constructive role in human affairs. Science "shows" that alienation must get worse, and the worse alienation gets, the more it will function as the historical precipitant of the truth which will make men free. Accordingly, his lifelong work on economic theory, cast in a scientific mold, and his moral vision of an ultimate revolt against alienation,

support each other. In his view a moral and world-historical crisis is upon us because we face the prospect of immiseration—relative deprivation and the loss of fraternity and creativity—just when an era of plenty has become possible. Marx's confidence in the contribution of his own theory was greatly reinforced by this coincidence—as he saw it—of a moral and an historical crisis. But at the same time we should note that this combination of a moral concern, a world-historical perspective, and a scientific stance greatly reinforced the invidious contrast between tradition and modernity as the foundation of a scholarly understanding of modernization.

Critique of an Intellectual Tradition

The interpretations of modernization which I have reviewed, established an intellectual tradition which has remained predominant down to the present. By their frequent reformulations of the contrast between tradition and modernity, such writers as Ferdinand Toennies, Emile Durkheim, and, among American sociologists, Charles Cooley, Robert Park, Robert Redfield, and Talcott Parsons have strongly reinforced that tradition. For all their diversity, these and related writers have the idea in common that "traditional society" and "modern society" constitute two systems of interrelated variables. The tendency is (1) to treat societies as "natural systems," (2) to search for the "independent variables" which—if altered initially—will cause changes in the related, but dependent variables in the process of transition from one type to the other, (3) to conceive of the transition as one of declining tradition and rising modernity, and, finally, (4) to assume that social change consists of a process that is internal to the society changing.

Marx was probably the most prominent expositor of this approach. England was the first country to industrialize. In Marx's view she exemplified the "laws of capitalist development" which he had analyzed in *Capital*. Writing in 1867, in his preface to the first edition of that work, Marx declared England to be the classic ground of the capitalist mode of production. He explained his analytic procedure in the following terms:

> The physicist either observes physical phenomena where they occur in their most typical form and most free from disturbing influence, or, wherever possible, he makes experiments under conditions that assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its normality. In this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode. Up to the present time, their classic ground is England. That is the reason why England is used as the chief illustration in the development of my theoretical ideas. If, however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders at the conditions of the English industrial and agricultural laborers, or in optimist fashion comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly tell him, *"De te fabula narratur!"*
>
> Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.[5]

Marx made these predictions on the assumption that the same organization of production generates everywhere the same or similar transformations of social classes and the political structure. As an empirical proposition, this assumption is misleading because it treats societies as if they were entirely self-contained structures, each evolving in terms of given, internal tendencies. Actually, once industrialization had been initiated in England, the technical innovations and the institutions of the economically advanced country could be used as a model to move ahead more rapidly than England had while mitigating or even avoiding the problems encountered by the pioneering country. I shall consider this possibility in more detail below; Marx himself also noted it but did not think it significant. Instead, he declared that his analysis of the advanced country could help to "shorten the birth-pangs" of similar developments in other countries. By making social change in the long run entirely dependent upon the economic structure, Marx precluded recognition of the importance which international emulation and governmental initiative, na-

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13 (from the preface to the first edition).

tionalism and the diffusion of ideas could have in countries that followed in the wake of English industrialization. It is a measure of the surpassing influence of the intellectual and ideological tradition culminating in Marx that basically similar assumptions still inform many recent and empirical studies of "development." Some of these studies will here be considered in brief review in order to substantiate this statement.

Studies of social change typically operate with a "before-and-after" model of the society under consideration. The earlier and the later social structure are distinguished by two sets of dichotomous attributes, and one has great difficulty in resisting the view that each set constitutes a generalizable system of interrelated variables. On that assumption societies can be classified according to the degree to which they exhibit one set of attributes rather than another, resulting in a rank-ordering of countries in terms of their relative modernization. An example of this procedure appears in Daniel Lerner's well-known study *The Passing of Traditional Society*.

The great merit of Lerner's study consists in its candid use of Western modernization as a model of global applicability. For Marx, England, as the country that is "more developed industrially," exemplified universal "laws of capitalist development"; for Lerner, Western modernization exhibits "certain components and sequences whose relevance is global."[36] He recognizes that the "North Atlantic area" developed first and rather gradually, while other countries came later and sought to develop more rapidly, but like Marx before him he dismisses this as a secondary consideration. As Lerner sees it, the central proposition is that in the process of modernization, then as now, four sectors or dimensions are systematically related to one another, namely urbanization, literacy, media participation, and political participation.[37] The author appears to regard the following statement as central to his purpose:

> The book seeks to explain *why* and show *how* individuals and their institutions modernize together. It denies a unique role to "human nature" or to "social determinism." Having no taste for beating dead horses, we do not even acknowledge these as issues, but go directly to a "behavioral" perspective. To wit: social change operates through persons and places. Either individuals or their environments modernize together or modernization leads elsewhere than intended. *If new institutions* of political, economic, cultural behavior *are to change in compatible ways, then inner coherence must be provided* by the *personality matrix* which governs individual behavior. We conceive modernity as a participant style of life; we identify its distinctive personality mechanism as empathy. Modernizing individuals and institutions, like chicken and egg, reproduce these traits in each other.[38]

This vigorous assertion of a behavioral perspective rejects a psychological as well as a social determinism, but is still beholden to the conventional contrast between tradition and modernity.[39]

Professor Lerner puts the case in a conditional form which is hard to reconcile with his emphasis on behaviorism. He says in effect that either new institutions change in compatible ways (meaning, presumably, ways similar to the Western model), or modernization leads elsewhere than intended (meaning, presumably, in directions differing from the Western model). He believes that the high association between urbanization, literacy, media participation, and political participation in modern societies points to an underlying, systemic coherence (which Lerner calls "the participant style of life") such that societies can be ranked in accordance with their degree of tradition, transition, or modernity. Yet I do not believe there is any assurance that once

[36] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 46. The reasoning in this work (originally published in 1958) is paralleled at many points by that contained in Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge University Press, 1961). For a critical evaluation of the latter cf. Walt W. Rostow, ed., *The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth* (*Proceedings of a Conference by the International Economic Association*) (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963).

[37] Lerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 65–68. Cf. also the 1964 preface to the paperback edition.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 78. My italics.

[39] Cf. the discussion of the "system" of modernity in *ibid.*, pp. 54–65. See also David Riesman's comment on p. 13 of his introduction.

initiated economic growth will be self-sustaining or that new institutions will change in "compatible ways." Professor Lerner himself asserts that "traditional societies exhibit extremely variant "growth" patterns; some are more urban than literate, others more media participant than urban."[40] Such "deviations from the regression line" are due to the fact that "people don't do what, on any rational course of behavior, they should do"[41]—hardly a consistent, behaviorist position. And although Professor Lerner recognizes that in the emerging nations people have not done what according to his model they should have done, he still considers his model validated by events.[42]

In recent years Lerner's work has been followed by a whole series of studies which compile attribute-checklists on which the countries of the world are ranked by the degree to which they approximate the characteristics of Western industrial societies.[43]

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. vii (1964 preface).

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. vii–x. The fact that Lerner chooses to ignore what he so clearly recognizes was explained by David Riesman in his introduction to the original edition by "the general belief that there must be a way—a way out of poverty and the psychic constriction of the 'Traditionals'—which links the author of this volume with his own national tradition.—But this very American belief that there is a way is a dream. And Professor Lerner, as a student of communications, understands that it is dreams that inspire not only new wants but new solutions—as well as violent gestures toward modernity. What seems required from his perspective is an allopathic rationing of dreams, enough to spark the religion of progress, of advance without inciting to riot." To which Riesman adds the observation that "the emotional and political fluency of newly-liberated illiterates can be quite terrifying," and that "a movie image of life in America . . . is a radical 'theory' when it appears on the screens of Cairo, Ankara or Teheran." *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[43] See Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1950), Chap. II and the references cited there. Cf. also Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (1963), pp. 253–64; by the same author, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Security Programs," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXX (1965), pp. 537–50; but also the critical contribution by Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "Dynamic Inferences from Static Data," *ibid.*, pp. 625–27. Meanwhile massive studies along similar lines are underway. See A. S. Banks and R. B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963); and Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker, et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

Such an approach rests on an application of evolutionary theory to very short time-periods despite earlier warnings that this is highly questionable even from the standpoint of evolutionism.[44] If the earlier and the later social structure constitute two generalizable systems of interrelated variables, it may be logical to infer that the transition from one to the other is characterized by admixtures of attributes from both, and over time by a decline of attributes from the first and a rise of attributes from the second. Yet attribute-checklists of the relative modernization of countries do not easily avoid the implication that change once initiated must run its course along the lines indicated by the "Western model," and that in the transition to modernity all aspects of the social structure change in some more or less integrated and simultaneous fashion. Only on these assumptions is it reasonable to ignore the timing and sequence of modernization of countries in their several and distinct aspects.[45]

Just this timing and sequence can make a crucial difference for the success or failure of the effort to modernize.[46] In his introduction to Lerner's book, David Riesman notes that the transitional individual is defined as one who attends to the mass media, but cannot read, to which he appends the disturbing question: "What will a society look like which is dominated by such 'post-literate' types?"[46] This question points to the possibility of a "transition" of long duration, a contradiction in terms which arises from evolutionist assumptions and leads to a questionable nomenclature about "developing" or "transitional" societies which may never

[44] See Margaret Mead, *Continuities in Cultural Evolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 7. The author cites Boas's acceptance of evolution on a planetary scale, but also his rejection of the application of evolutionary concepts to a few centuries since short-run changes can go in any direction—a position accepted by most modern evolutionists.

[45] Despite cautionary comments, the tendency is to substitute a "horizontal" compilation for the "vertical" dimension of history. Cf. Raymond Grew and Sylvia L. Thrupp, "Horizontal History in Search of Vertical Dimensions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VIII (January 1966), pp. 258–64.

[46] David Riesman in Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

become developed enough to be called modern. Related questions are raised as efforts at modernization in these so-called developing countries have led, or are leading, to changes of sequence and timing as compared with the Western model. For example, in many European countries the franchise was extended rather slowly, while in many newly independent countries universal suffrage has been adopted all at once.[47] Such a difference is ignored where countries are merely ranked at one point in time in terms of the degree to which the franchise has been extended to the adult members of their populations. The matter is not necessarily improved by the addition of another index, say that of literacy, because such data—even if they were reliable—would not reveal the level of education attained by the population. More generally, checklists of attributes of modernization are not likely to yield reliable inference, if—without regard to sequence and timing—their several items are interpreted as indices of approximation to the Western model.[48]

Nevertheless, comparative studies of modernization necessarily rely on the Western experience when they *construct* developmental sequences. This practice becomes hazardous only when past experience is used to extrapolate to the future of "industrializing"

[47]In the countries of Western Europe that extension was relatively gradual during the nineteenth century; the establishment of universal suffrage dates only from the first World War or the early 1920s. See Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting, and Political Participation," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, II (1961), pp. 132–52. By contrast, a compilation shows that of thirty-nine nations that have become independent and joined the United Nations between 1946 and 1962 only seven do not have universal suffrage. The restrictions usually refer to members of Buddhist religious orders, whose rules do not permit them to vote, and to members of the armed forces.

[48]Sometimes, as in statistics on economic growth and democratic trends, data of current trends from one country are superimposed onto the past trend data of another, more advanced country, but the similarity of current with past trends does not resolve the question of sequence and timing. Note the critical analysis of this approach by Simon Kuznets, "Underdeveloped Countries and the Pre-industrial Phase in the Advanced Countries," in Otto Feinstein, ed., *Two Worlds of Change* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1964), pp. 1–21.

societies. In their book, *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, Clark Kerr and his associates explicitly emphasize that the "logic of industrialism" they have constructed involves abstractions on the assumption that the "transition stage of industrialization" has passed. Indeed, they emphasize that tendencies *deductively* arrived at (albeit by illustrative reference to the experience of "developed" societies) are not likely to be fully realized in the *actual* course of history. Yet, throughout the volume phrases recur which betray a confusion between these two levels of analysis. On the same page tendencies are alternately called logically constructed and inherent (33–34), emphasis on the contrast between abstraction and history is followed by the assertion that "the empire of industrialism will embrace the whole world" (46), industrialization is called an "invincible process," while the uncertainties of the future are relegated to variations of length and difficulty in the transition or to the several types of past industrializations (19–20, 47 ff.). Perhaps the most arresting feature of this deterministic view of the future is that the "industrialism" of the whole world is predicated, not on the organization of production as in Marx, but on the initiating or manipulating actions of five different elites whose capacity to "industrialize" whole societies is simply assumed. Exceptions, delays, and what not are seen as deviations which "cannot prevent the transformation in the long run,"[49] while neither the possibility of failure nor that of unprecendented types of industrialization is given serious consideration. Seldom has social change been interpreted in so managerial a fashion, while all contingencies of action are treated as mere historical variations which cannot alter the "logic of industrialism." Though the recognition of alternate routes to industrialization is a distinct improvement over the unilinear evolutionism of the study by Lerner, the authors abandon the gain they have made when they predict one system of industrialism for all societies in much the same way as Marx predicted the end of class struggles and of history for the socialist society of the future.

[49]Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 49, and passim.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO TRADITION AND MODERNITY

The studies cited above may suffice as examples of the persistent influence of an intellectual tradition which originated with the emergence of industrial society in Western Europe. Necessarily, studies of social change rely on historical experience. But Western modernization has been accompanied throughout by a particular intellectual construction of that experience, prompted by moral or reforming impulses often presented in the guise of scientific generalizations. Theories of social evolution have had a particularly important influence in this respect in that they tend to use historical experience to construct contrasting ideal types of tradition and modernity and then use that contrast to make contingent generalizations about the transition from one to the other. In this section, I turn to a critical assessment of evolutionism and to the proposal of an alternative.

Ideal Types Are Not Generalizations

At a minimum, considerations of change involve two terminal conditions so that the word "change" refers to the differences observed before and after a given interval of time. Without knowing in what respects a later social structure differs from an earlier one, we would not know what changes to look for and explain. Accordingly, we are obliged to characterize the earlier (pre-modern) and later (modern) social structure by two lists of mutually disjunctive attributes.

The abstract formulation of such contrasts can be as seriously misleading, however, as the moral evaluations reviewed earlier. The point may be illustrated by using Talcott Parsons' contrast between universalism and particularism as attributes of modernity and tradition, respectively. In Europe traditional society, though particularistic in many respects, involved a major element of universalism through the Christian faith and the institutions of the Catholic church; in China traditional society involved other universalist elements through Confucianism and the examination

system; even in India, where Hindu religion and the caste system fostered an extreme particularism, the basic cultural themes of that particularism spread throughout the sub-continent. Evidently, "particularism" characterizes traditional societies only in some respects, while in others it is combined with a "universalism" which may be as different as Catholicism, Confucianism, or the ideas of reincarnation. Hence, the disjunctive characterization of "tradition" and "modernity" by such abstract terms as "particularism" and "universalism" exaggerates and simplifies the evidence, as Max Weber pointed out in his discussion of the ideal type. Such characterization says nothing about the strength or generality with which any one attribute is present. Also, the use of one or several abstract terms to characterize either tradition or modernity tends to mistake labelling for analysis, since apparently societies vary not only in the degree but also in the kind of their universalism or particularism. At this abstract level it is quite probable that no society is without some elements from both ends of the continuum, leading some writers to use phrases such as "the modernity of tradition" or "the tradition of the new."[30]

These problems are compounded when we turn from the contrast between social structures "before and after" to a consideration of change from the one to the other. In this respect we can be guided by Max Weber's own discussion of this problem:

> *Developmental* sequences too can be constructed into ideal types and these constructs can have quite considerable heuristic value. But this quite particularly gives rise to the danger that the ideal type and reality will be confused with one another.[31]

Accordingly, ideal-typical constructs of development must be sharply distinguished from the actual sequence of change, but this distinction is "uncommonly difficult" to maintain. For in *constructing* a developmental sequence we will use illustrative ma-

[30]The first phrase occurs several times in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), passim. The second is the title of a book by Harold Rosenberg.

[31]Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), p. 101.

terials in order to make clear what we mean and hence may confuse the sequence of types with a course of events.

> The series of types which results from the selected conceptual criteria appears then as an historical sequence unrolling with the necessity of a law. The logical classification of analytical consepts on the one hand and the empirical arrangements of the events thus conceptualized in space, time, and causal relationship, an the other, appear to be so bound up together that there is an almost irresistible temptation to do violence to reality in order to prove the real validity of the construct.[52]

The hazards referred to by Weber have not gone unnoticed. Following the tradition of Maine, Durkheim, and Toennies, Robert Redfield compared four contemporary communities in Yucatan. He emphasized that his method was not to be recommended to those wishing to raise questions

> as to whether changes in any of the characters are related to or conditioned by changes in any of the others, and as to how they are interrelated . . . .

But while Redfield clearly stated that he had not answered such questions, he nevertheless supposed that

> there is some natural or interdependent relation among some or all of the characters in that change with regard to certain of them tends to bring about or carry with it change with respect to others of them . . . .[53]

In thus seeing his problem as one of causal "relations among variables" Redfield unwittingly disregards his own warning concerning the disjunction between ideal types and historical sequences. We should try to understand why this confusion is as widespread as Weber already suggested.

In operating with a "before-and-after" model of the society under consideration, one has difficulty in resisting the view that the two sets of attributes characterizing the earlier and the later social structure constitute generalizable systems of empirically interrelated variables. But in adopting this view, we entirely ignore

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 102–3.

[53] Robert Redfield, *The Folkculture of Yucatan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 343–44.

that the specification of a list of attributes is ideal-typical and hence simplifies and exaggerates the evidence. If we are to avoid mistaking ideal types for accurate descriptions, we must take care to treat the clusters of attributes as *hypothetically*, not as actually, correlated. We need these clusters to distinguish between social structures, we illustrate them by historical examples, but these are still abstractions, constructs that should be used as tools of analysis. Redfield, for example, suggested that the relative isolation and the occupational homogeneity of communities coexisted in many instances and was perhaps causally related. No doubt there are many isolated communities with relatively little division of labor, but degree of isolation and occupational differentiation are correlated very imperfectly, and over time communities have varied independently in both dimensions. If one wishes to get away from the artificiality of ideal types one can visualize two overlapping frequency distributions in which either isolation or occupational heterogeneity are treated as the dependent variable. Such distributions would approximate historical reality more closely, whereas the ideal type of an isolated and homogeneous community is best employed as a *suggestion* for the investigation of isolated communities with considerable division of labor, or non-isolated communities that are relatively homogeneous.[54]

That these cautions are often ignored may be illustrated by reference to two related and quite common lines of reasoning. One of these has to do with the notion of "prerequisites." Beginning with the contrast between tradition and modernity (in one of its many versions) the analyst takes all the basic traits of modernity to be prerequisites of modernity, a procedure which implies that regardless of time and place all countries must somehow create all the conditions characteristic of modernity before they can hope to be successful in their drive for modernization. But

> Obviously, some of the factors listed are not prerequisites at all, but rather something that developed in the course of industrial development. Moreover, what can be reasonably regarded as a prerequisite in some historical cases can be much more naturally seen as a product of industrialization in others. The line between what is a precondition

[54] Cf. the related discussion above in Chapter 5.

> of, and what is a response to industrial development seems to be a rather flexible one."

Such a distinction could be made only if the specific processes of industrialization are analyzed. However, causes and consequences tend to become confused, if instead a uniform process is assumed such that countries entering upon industrialization at a later time will repeat in all essentials the previous industrialization of some other country.[56]

Another line of reasoning involves an undue generalization of a limited historical experience (rather than working back from present characteristics to necessary prerequisites). For example, the decline of kinship ties and the concomitant rise of individualism were aspects of Western modernization. Today we are learning how many meanings and exceptions were in fact compatible with this overall tendency, though these are quite properly ignored when we construct an ideal typical sequence. But, rather than using that sequence as an analytical tool to show how and why actual historical developments deviate from it, we use it to make contingent predictions about the future of "developing" societies. To be sure, no one is likely to say simply that these societies will develop; he states instead that they will not develop unless kinship ties decline. There are at least three things wrong with this procedure: (a) it ignores the exaggerations and simplifications which went into the ideal type in the first place, and hence blinds us to the role which kinship ties and collectivism played in the modernization of Western Europe; (b) it also blinds us to the possible ways in which kinship ties and collectivism might be, or might be made, compatible with the modernization of other areas (tacitly we have misused the ideal type as a generalization); (c) it diverts attention

[55]Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 33. My indebtedness to Gerschenkron will be evident throughout; in several respects my analysis represents a sociological extension of points first suggested by him in the context of economic history.

[56]*Ibid.*, p. 40 Cf. also Gerschenkron's critical discussion of Rostow along similar lines in Rostow, ed., *The Economics of Take-Off, op. cit.*, pp. 166–67. See also for a related discussion Albert O Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development." *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIII (1965), pp. 385–93.

from the very real possibility that modernization may never arrive at modernity, so that terms like "development" or "transition" are misnomers when applied to societies whose future condition may not be markedly different from the present.

These critical consideration do not stand alone. Several writers have examined the assumptions of the intellectual tradition which I have characterized and have also found it wanting. Elkan and Fallers have examined specific local developments, like the mobility of wage labor in Uganda, and shown in what respects this experience differs from the mobilization of a work-force in early industrial England.[57] In his discussion of the changing craft traditions in India, Milton Singer has questioned the assumption of a uniform recapitulation of the process of industrialization, and the tendency to employ the concept of "tradition" as a generalization rather than an ideal type.[58] Similar questions have been raised and systematized by Neil Smelser, who distinguishes clearly between ideal-typical constructs of, and generalizations about, social change, and who emphasizes that the latter are difficult to achieve. Even if the "vicious circle of poverty" is broken, subsequent changes of the social structure will vary with the pre-industrial conditions of the country, the particular impetus to develop, the path which modernization takes, the significant differences that persist in developed economies, and finally with the impact and timing of dramatic events.[59] As Wilbert Moore has pointed out in a similar context:

> The manner in which history prevents its own replication creates difficulties in generalizations that will unite historical and contemporary experience and deal with the diversity that optional paths of change introduce .... In addition to minimum, required sequences and results, what is needed, and is mostly not at hand, is the construc-

[57]Walter Elkan and Lloyd A. Fallers, "The Mobility of Labor," in Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman, eds., *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), pp. 238–57.

[58]Milton Singer, "Changing Craft Traditions in India," in Moore and Feldman, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 268–76.

[59]Neil J. Smelser, *The Sociology of Economic Life* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 105–6.

tion of limited-alternative or typological sequences where total generalization is improper.[60]

Strictures of this kind are of rather recent date, though Gerschenkron had already expressed them in 1952. They have not replaced the dominant, evolutionary approach to the comparative study of modernization.

The impetus to generalize even where generalization is improper, derives not only from the intellectual tradition I have traced. It derives also from the desire to put policy directives on a "scientific" basis, and from the indispensability of ideal types in studies of social change. The fact that time and again the distinction between tradition and modernity has been oversimplified does *not* mean that we can dispense with that contrast entirely. Studies of social change are not possible without a "before-and-after" model of the social structure in question.

The Contrast Restated

The contrasts between pre-modern and modern social structures may be formulated along the several dimensions that are conventionally distinguished in the analysis of social structures. The problem of the causal interrelation among these dimensions is one of empirical research which cannot be replaced by logical deductions, as long as the evidence argues against the assumption of one uniform process of modernization. Nor is it proper to turn the two attribute-checklists by which we may distinguish tradition from modernity into two systems to which certain properties are imputed. For in this way a set of separate or separable attributes is transformed into the structural propensities of a collective entity. Such reification is closely related to the moralism and scientism

[60]Wilbert Moore, *The Impact of Industry* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 19. Cf. also the same writer's earlier monograph on *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), Chap. V. Similar critiques of evolutionism are contained in the writings of S. N. Eisenstadt, esp. in two recent essays "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *American Sociological Review,* XXIX (1964), pp. 375–86; and "Social Transformation in Modernization," *ibid.*, XXX (1965), pp. 659–73.

that has characterized many reactions to industrialization, as we have seen.

Smelser has suggested the concept of "structural differentiation" as a basic analytical tool for the study of modernization. He sees the transition between tradition and modernity as involving changes in several spheres of life. In technology there is a change from simple techniques to the application of scientific knowledge, and in agriculture from subsistence farming to the commercial production of agricultural goods. In industry human and animal power are replaced by power-driven machinery. And with industrilization the population shifts increasingly from the farm and the village to the city and the economic enterprises located in it. These processes of change consist of, or are accompanied by, structural differentiation in he sense that in each case an earlier structure that combines sveral economic functions is eventually replaced by a later one characterized by greater specialization, or by a greater division of labor as the older writers called it.[61] Smelser is careful to point out that, while these processes may occur jointly, it is also true that each has occurred independently of the others. He emphasizes that structural differentiation in such other realms as the family, religion, and stratification is not simply a consequence of "industrialization" alone; it has occurred in "pre-industrial" areas, for example as a result of colonialism.[62] In this way, "structural differentiation" provides us with a summary designation of the contrast between "tradition" and "modernity" without prejudging the systemic character of either term. The designation allows us to investigate the causal relation between different processes of structural differentiation.

Such investigations are needed, if we are to employ the indispensable, ideal-typical contrasts between "before" and "after" without imparting a spurious, deductive simplicity to the transition from one to the other.[63] A case in point is the cultural ramifications of changes in economic institutions which are properly

[61]See Smelser, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–2, 106.

[62]*Ibid.*, p. 112.

[63]Cf., for example, the analysis of changes in industrial organization by H. Freudenberger and F. Redlich, "The Industrial Development of Europe: Reality, Symbols, Images," *Kyklos*, XVII (1964), pp. 372–401.

conceived as instances of structural differentiation. The German historian Otto Brunner has shown that in the pre-modern societies of Europe the facts of economic life were typically incorporated in treatises on estate or household management, in which instructions concerning agriculture and the keeping of accounts occurred side by side with advice on the rearing of children, marital relations, the proper treatment of servants, and related matters. Technical and economic considerations were very much a part of the moral approach to human relations. This juxtaposition belongs to a world in which the household or estate typically constituted a unit of production, consumption, and social life, whereas the separation of morals from economics belongs to a society in which the family household is typically separated from the place of work.[64] In this case, the change in economic institutions and in intellectual outlook may be considered related instances of "structural differentiation," but it should be clear that this relationship is complex and requires detailed investigation.

Such investigations can help us avoid the ambiguities which remain at the abstract level, because terms like differentiation are not as neutral and unequivocal as one would wish. Following Durkheim, Smelser notes that modernization involves a "contrapuntal interplay" between differentiation "which is divisive of established society, and integration which unites differentiated structures on a new basis."[65] Here certain cautions are needed to avoid the value-implications of the evolutionary model. A traditional economy is characterized by little differentiation between economic and familial activities *within* more or less self-sufficient households or estates. *Within* the family and the community a high degree of integration exists in the sense, say, that the authority of social rank and religious norms are accepted without question. But we must take care not to commit the romantic fallacy so prominent in the intellectual tradition I have surveyed.

[64]The characterization of pre-modern treatises on economics is contained in Otto Brunner, *Neue Wege der Sozialgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1956), pp. 33–61. Cf. also the analysis by Peter Laslett, *The World We have Lost* (London: Methuen and Co., 1965), passim.
[65]Smelser, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

First, high integration and lack of differentiation *within* the family and community go together with much fragmentation *among* them. Second, within families and communities everyday life is one of "proud and cruel publicity," as Huizinga puts it. Since all activities occur within the household or estate personal interdependence is not only benign but also extremely coercive; it fosters sentimental attachments but also the most intense personal hatreds; it encourages fraternity but also mutual surveillance and suspicion. When structural differentiation is divisive of the established family households, not only their group solidarity and stable norms (integration of established society) are disrupted, but also their lack of privacy, their personalized cruelties and oppressions from which no member of the household could previously escape. This disruption of the household as one form of integration goes hand in hand with integration between households through increased interdependence. It is also accompanied by increased differentiation *within* these structures—increased privacy and freedom from personal coercion. A modern economy is characterized, therefore, by the separation of family household and workplace (structural differentiation) and by increased interdependence of the family with the market or of workers in the factory (integration on a new basis). Only assiduous attention to the liabilities and assets of each structure can avoid the ideological implications of the ideal-typical contrast between tradition and modernity. Otherwise, we merely nurse the discontents of industrial society by contrasting the liabilities of the present with the assets of the past.

To avoid this pitfall, it is useful to summarize the preceding discussion in explicit contrast to the received conventions of sociology. Social structures may be distinguished by the solidarities they achieve. Typically, traditional societies achieve intense solidarity in relatively small groups isolated from one another by poor communication and a backward technology. These groups create for their individual participants an intensity of emotional attachment and rejection which modern men find hard to appreciate and which they would probably find personally intolerable. Typically, modern societies achieve little solidarity in relatively small groups

and by virtue of advanced communication and technology these groups tend to be highly interdependent at an impersonal level. In this setting individual participants experience an intensity of emotional attachment and rejection at two levels which hardly exist in the traditional society, namely in the nuclear family at its best and its worst, and at the national level where personal loyalties alternate between being taken for granted in ordinary times and moving up to fever pitch during national crises or other direct confrontations with alien ways of life.

Analogous considerations apply to the invidious personification of modernity and tradition. We saw that the stultifying effects of the division of labor became a major theme of social philosophers from the beginning of industrialization. Generations of writers have reiterated the theme with different contrasting images of man ranging from "the aristocrat" and "the medieval craftsman" to the several versions of "the Renaissance man" of protean capacities who has been the daydream of intellectuals from Goethe's Wilhelm Meister and Baudelaire's Dandy to Herbert Marcuse's "Multi-dimensional Man."[66] This romantic utopia of intellectuals in an era of industrialization must be taken seriously indeed, since the ideal images of a culture affect the changing social structure. But the idea of unlimited creativity by "the individual" or "the people" is as much a chimera as is that of a womb-like security and warmth in human relations attributed to a bygone age. These are projections of the discontents of intellectuals with a civilization that induces in them an intense ambivalence between elitism and populism—a point to which I return in the following discussion.

The contrast between tradition and modernity may be recast accordingly. It is probably true that traditional societies are characterized by universally accepted cultural norms. But this goes together with the subservience of men of letters to the church and to private patrons, and with the prevalence of illiteracy in the general population. It is, therefore, not accidental that terms like

[66]See Cesar Grana, *Bohemian Versus Bourgeois* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), passim, for a sympathetic analysis of this imagery. Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1964) appeared too late to be included in Grana's concluding analysis.

"ideology," and "intellectuals" originated in Europe during the eighteenth century, when traditional beliefs were challenged, men of letters were emancipated from their previous subservience and literacy increased along with printed materials and a market for literary products. The universal cultural norms of traditional society also go together with a low level of productivity and communication and with a consequent fragmentation of the social structure in economic, legal, and political terms. One implication of this fragmentation is the prevalence of force and fraud and of jurisdictional disputes among a large number of solidary groups which depend for their cohesion not only on common norms but also on the imperatives of self-help and defense.[67] In each of these solidary groups and in the polity as a whole, society tends to be divided sharply between rulers and ruled. Those of gentle birth have a disproportionate share of the wealth, privileged access to positions of formal authority, enjoy sociability, leisure, and culture, whereas the bulk of the population lives in the drudgery of physical labor and in poverty, without access to literacy, culture, or positions of influence, and without recognized means of airing their grievances. In this setting the term "society" is applied only with difficulty, since the people themselves live in fragmented subordination, while their rulers constitute "the society" because they are the persons worthy of note in the country. These attributes

[67]It may well be the present-day absence of a need for self-help and defense which makes the closely knit solidarity of such groups appear oppressive to a modern observer, especially if he discounts the romanticism of past interpretations. By the same token, it may be the absence of that need for self-help and defense which weakens the solidarity of groups in modern societies and allows for the development of individualism. The older pattern often arose from the imposition of taxes in return for privileges, which necessitated the organization of communities for self-help and defense; Max Weber discussed this device under the concept of "liturgy." Cf. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 312–13. A society like the Russian in which this older pattern was preserved up to the present may well engender customs and attitudes markedly different from those that are familiar to us today. For an insightful discussion of these customs and attitudes see Wright W. Miller, *Russians as People* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1961), Chap. 5.

may suffice as a contrast-conception for a reformulation of modernity.

It is probably true that modern societies are characterized by relatively few cultural norms that are universally accepted, and this goes together with a relative emancipation of men of letters and a nearly universal literacy in the general population. Structural differentiation in technology and communications has led to high levels of productivity and a high degree of impersonal interdependence. Associated with this interdependence are the attributes of the nation state which were noted earlier. The adjudication of legal disputes, the collection of revenue, the control of currency, military recruitment, the postal system, the construction of public facilities, and others have been removed from the political struggle among competing jurisdictions and have become the functions of a national government. Another and related characteristic of modern society is the process of fundamental democratization by which "those classes which formerly only played a passive part in political life," have been stirred into action.[48] The old division between rulers and ruled is no longer clear-cut, since the ruled have the vote, and the rulers are subject to formal controls at many points. Status distinctions no longer coincide with hereditary privileges. In this setting the term "society" is appropriately applied to all people in a country who constitute that society by virtue of their interdependence and equality as citizens.

The foregoing discussion has attempted to "de-ideologize" the conventional contrast of tradition and modernity. At this general level the contrast holds good for many societies that have undergone a process of modernization. Most "traditional societies" lack means of rapid communication so that the bulk of the population lives in relatively small enclaves isolated from one another. However, if one goes beyond such generalities, one is obliged also to go beyond the simple contrast discussed here. What is true of *all* traditional societies is by the same token not very illuminating about any one of them. For example, a key-feature of the European experience was the tie-in of universal cultural norms

[48]See Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1941), p. 44.

[49]See above pp. 230–34.

with the organization of the Church and hence with the enduring, if rather unstable balancing of centralizing and decentralizing tendencies of government which culminated in the development of representative institutions.[49] In countries like Russia and Japan universal cultural norms came to prevail in a manner that is quite different from this Western-European pattern. The study of social change in these societies would, therefore, require a more specific conceptualization of the contrast between tradition and modernity, in order to be analytically useful. The general contrast here discussed should be only the beginning of analysis, though often it has been mistaken for analysis itself.

Another limitation becomes apparent when one applies these concepts to colonial and post-colonial societies. Can any colonial society be said to have the characteristics of "tradition"? Does it have universally accepted norms? And since the prevailing norms surely do not apply to the subject population, in what sense can one in fact speak of one society? To contrast the past and present social structure one should take account of at least two traditions: the native tradition and the tradition of a dual society created by the colonizing country. Analogous questions apply to the European frontier settlements abroad, as in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but here the native populations were not strong enough to create the problem of a dual society, while the imported culture of the European settlers already represented a major break with the medieval tradition. The point of these comments is to suggest that several models of change are needed and are preferable to any attempt of forcing all types of change into the Procrustes bed of the European experience.

That ideal types of social change are of limited applicability, makes them more, not less useful. Once the weakness of the most general formulation as well as the limitations of the Western-European model are observed, it is then appropriate also to recognize the utility of focussing attention on the area in which the breakthrough to modernity was achieved first. The following analysis attempts to spell out the implications of this breakthrough and to interpret the process of modernization in the light of the foregoing discussion.

MODERNIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Theoretical Orientation

As European societies approached the "modern era," men of letters came to think about differences of social rank with an awareness of a new society in the making. Although political and ideological rather than scholarly, these ideas about modern society have strongly influenced the concepts with which social scientists have approached the study of modernization. At this point it is useful to state the common denominator of this intellectual tradition in terms of three related tenets.

A. The industrial revolution in England and the contemporary political revolution in France had a profound cultural impact, frequently leading men of letters to formulate pervasive and invidious contrasts between the old and the new social order. As a result "tradition" and "modernity" came to be conceived in mutually exclusive terms, not only as a conceptual aid but also as a generalized, descriptive statement about the two, contrasting types of society. Related to this approach is a conception of each type of society as a social system, characterized by the functional interdependence of its component parts and a balance of forces among them. Hence, "traditional" and "modern" societies appear as two types of societies, each with its own, built-in tendency towards self-maintenance or equilibrium.

B. From the vantage-point of Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, both revolutions and much of the social change that followed appeared as phenomena that were internal to the societies changing. This mode of explanation goes back to influences emanating from Plato and characteristic of Western philosophy down to the present.[7] In the late eighteenth century

[7]For the link between the theological conception of emanation with theories of social evolution and functionalism cf. Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being, op. cit.*; Karl Loewith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); and the comprehensive historical treatment in Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), passim. The intellectual tradition discussed in these works has been criticized very effectively by Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), passim. Gellner's analysis corroborates the present discussion at several points.

this intellectual tradition was reflected in interpretations of the growth of commerce and industry. Specifically, many writers of the period considered the division of labor a major factor in promoting social change. To a man like Ferguson that growth depended ultimately on the subdivision of tasks, which determines the ideas and actions of men, provides the basis for the difference between social classes, and gives rise to political actions.

The view that social change is the product of internal social forces has a certain basis in historical fact, difficult as it is to separate facts from reflections upon them. Most observers of early industrialization thought economic change the primary factor, whether they believed that governmental measures reflect that change, as the radicals did, or that these measures were needed to avert its worst consequences, as the conservatives did. In England, the work of the classical economists enhanced this consensus, because opposition to mercantilist policies argued for less regulation of economic affairs and hence for a secondary role of government. As governmental controls over the economy were reduced, as guild regulations were abandoned, as labor mobility increased along with population, trade, and manufacture, it became very plausible to consider that society and economy possess a "momentum" of their own, while government merely responds to the impact of social forces. At this time, office holding was still a form of property ownership so that the idea of authority as an adjunct of ownership partly described the society. In addition, the industrial revolution first occurred in England; among the continental countries England (along with Holland) lacked an absolutist tradition with its basis in a standing army, and she was also characterized by a more permeable upper class than the countries of the Continent. It was indeed a unique constellation of circumstances which gave new emphasis to the old view that social change is internal to the society changing, that social change originates in the division of labor, and that, consequently, government or the state are products of the social structure. It may be suggested that this intellectual perspective unduly generalizes from a very limited phase of the English experience.

Accordingly, both the intellectual tradition of Europe and the specific historical constellation at the end of the eighteenth century encouraged explanations of social change which emphasize the

continuity and interconnectedness of changes *within* society, a tendency which was reinforced when modern nationalism came into its own. As a result a certain lawfulness was attributed to the social structure, while the relative autonomy of government and the impact of external factors upon every society were ignored or minimized. Paradoxically, this perspective also prevailed during a period of absolutist regimes, of European overseas expansion and of worldwide industrialization, when societies were increasingly subject to influences from abroad in contrast to the relative integrity of national societies in Western Europe. This cultural and historical background may help to account for the prominence of explanations which attribute change to a society's internal functional differentiation, such as the increasing division of labor, an observation that can alert us to the limitations of this intellectual perspective without questioning its analytic utility in the proper context.

C. The third tenet asserts that ultimately industrialization will have the same effects wherever it occurs. This follows, or appears to follow, from a combination of assumptions rather loosely linked with the preceding points. Where the causes of social change are conceived as intrinsic to a society, industrialization (and, more vaguely, modernization) is considered to have certain necessary and sufficient prerequisites without which it cannot occur. Conversely, once these prerequisites are given, industrialization becomes inevitable. The same reasoning is applied to the consequences of the process. Once industrialization is under way, it has certain inevitable results. In the long run, modernity will drive out tradition and fully industrialized societies will become more and more alike.

The three tenets mentioned here are closely related. Their common basis is the conception of society as a structure arising from a fixed set of preconditions and characterized by mutually reinforcing attributes which make the change of the structure appear as an inevitable modification of interrelated variables. This conception of society is closely related to the theory of social evolution, though that theory is not of direct concern to the present discussion. But the three assumptions of social system, internal differentiation, and developmental inevitability form a coherent

approach to the study of industrialization from which the approach to be discussed below will now be distinguished.

A. Against the view that tradition and modernity are mutually exclusive, I wish to maintain that even the two revolutions of the eighteenth century are best understood as culminations of specific European continuities, i.e. that "modern" elements were evident long before the modern era. (By the same token the European tradition, and English society particularly, had distinctive attributes not found in other civilizations.) The point may be illustrated with regard to the bases of social action. Kinship ties, religious beliefs, linguistic affiliations, territorial communalism, and others are typical forms of association in a traditional social order. None of these ties or associations have disappeared even in the most highly industrialized societies; to this day the relative decline of "traditional" and the relative ascendance of "modern" solidarities remain or recur as social and political issues. But some of the old ties or associations were weakened by the ascendance of Christianity, others by the Renaissance and Reformation, and others still in the course of the struggles between absolutist rulers and the estates. It may be recalled that Max Weber's lifework documents the proposition that Christian doctrine and the revival of Roman law militated against familial and communal ties as foci of loyalty which compete effectively with the universal claims of legal procedure and the Christian faith. The ethical universalism of the Puritans and its subsequent secularization were later links in this chain of preconditions. By these prior developments in Western Europe men were freed very gradually for such alternative solidarities as those of the nuclear family, social class and national citizenship. In my view there was indeed a breakthrough to a new historical era, but this was the result of continuities reaching back to classical antiquity, which came to a head in a specific time and place owing to the very particular conditions of English society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This element of continuity was neglected by men of letters who interpreted the emerging industrial society in terms of a cultural conflict between tradition and modernity. However, in other respects continuity was emphasized.

B. Against the conception of change as intrinsic I wish to

maintain that following the breakthrough in England and France every subsequent process of modernization has combined intrinsic changes with responses to extrinsic stimuli,[7] and has involved government intervention as a prominent feature of that process. The modernization of societies is *not* to be understood primarily as a result of internal changes in which governments play at best a secondary role. The great lacunae of the interpretations here opposed is their failure to account for the diffusion of ideas and techniques, the prominent role of government, and the rising tide of nationalism, all of which have accompanied the process of industrialization throughout.

The point is a general one. All complex societies have an internal structure and an external setting. Likewise, all complex societies possess a formal structure of governmental authority which differs from, and is relatively independent of, the group formations arising from the social and economic organization of society. For analytic purposes it is legitimate to separate these dimensions and to neglect one or another of them, if this seems indicated by the problem under consideration. But in the comparative study of modernization, and especially one that focuses attention on problems of social stratification, such neglect seems inadvisable. The influence of modernization on the means of communication is international in scope, so that we should attend to the external setting of societies, even where our primary focus is on changes internal to their social structures. Moreover, the secondary or dependent role of government resulted from very particular historical circumstances, as noted earlier, and should not be considered a general, theoretical proposition. The facts are that intellectuals have played a major role in helping to transform the social structure of backward societies and have done so more often than not in reference to prior economic and political developments abroad. Likewise, government officials have played a major role in

[7]So, of course, did the initial development of England, depending as it did on intense competition with Holland. The point that social structures cannot be understood by exclusive attention to their internal developments is a general one. See Otto Hintze, "Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung," in *Staat und Verfassung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 52–83. The essay was published originally in 1906.

the development of economic resources, or have supported and implemented an institutional framework in which such a development became easier. To be sure, these are possibilities, not certainties. But to neglect the rather independent role of intellectuals or governmental officials in the process of modernization is to subscribe to the Marxian view that the international setting, the political structure and the cultural development of a society depend in the long run on its organization of production.

C. Against the concept of industrialization as a largely uniform process of structural change I wish to emphasize the importance of diffusion and of government "intervention" for an understanding of this process. England was the first country to industrialize and in Marx's view she exemplified the "laws of capitalist development." We saw that, in his preface to the first edition of *Capital*, Marx had declared England to be the classic ground of the capitalist mode of production. England was more developed industrially than other countries. As they enter upon the path of industrialization, these other countries will undergo developments comparable to those of England because of the tendencies inherent in the capitalist organization of production. Marx made this prediction on the assumption that the same organization of production generates everywhere the same or similar transformations of social classes and the political structure. As an empirical proposition, this assumption is misleading. Once industrialization had been initiated in England, the technical innovations and the institutions of the economically advanced country were used as a model in order to move ahead more rapidly than England had; and also as a warning so as to mitigate or even avoid the problems encountered by the pioneering country. Marx himself noted this possibility, but did not consider it seriously. He declared that his analysis of the advanced country could only help to "shorten the birthpangs" of similar developments in other countries, for the capitalist mode of production is governed by the same laws or inevitable tendencies wherever it occurs.

Again, the point is a general one. Industrialization itself has intensified the communication of techniques and ideas across national frontiers. Taken out of their original context, these techniques and ideas are adapted so as to satisfy desires and achieve

ends in the receiving country. Certainly, such adaptation is affected at every point by the resources and economic structure of the country, but Marx tended to make necessities out of contingencies. He did not give full weight to the historical traditions which affect the social structure of every country and with it the capacity of a people to develop its opportunities. Nor did he consider that this structure is modified materially by the international transmission of techniques and ideas and by attempts to control the process and repercussions of industrialization politically. Against the view that industrialization has the same effects wherever it occurs, I wish to maintain the importance of timing and sequence as crucial variables. Once industrialization has occurred anywhere, this fact alone alters the international environment of all other societies. There is a sense in which it is true to say that because of timing and sequence industrialization cannot occur in the same way twice.

Accordingly, studies of modernization should be guided by two considerations which have been neglected in the past. Although it is true that certain consequences follow from an increasing division of labor, these are embedded in the *particular* transition from a pre-industrial to an industrial structure which distinguishes one society from another. The social structure of a country's "transitional phase" should, therefore, be a primary focus of analysis rather than be dismissed as a survival of the past. In addition, modernization, once it has occurred anywhere, alters the conditions of all subsequent efforts at modernization so that "the late arrivals cannot repeat the earlier sequences of industrial development."[72] Both considerations, the significance of the transition and the demonstration effects of "earlier sequences" preclude an evolutionary interpretation of the process of modernization.

The reorientation I propose considers the industrialization and democratization of Western Europe a singular historic breakthrough, culminating a century-long and specifically European development. But modernization brings about special discontinuities by virtue of its expansive tendencies so that the relation between the intrinsic structure and external setting of societies

[72]See Milton Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

assumes special significance. Thus, the internal, historically developed structure of a country and the emulation induced by economic and political developments abroad affect each country's process of modernization.

Towards a Definition of Modernization

My objective is to define the term so that it refers to change during a specific historical period. I want to show that throughout the designated period the process of change has certain overall characteristics. At the same time I emphasize the distinction between "modernization" and "modernity." Many attributes of modernization like widespread literacy or modern medicine have appeared, or have been adopted, in isolation from the other attributes of a modern society. Hence, modernization in some sphere of life *may* occur without resulting in "modernity." Uncertainty concerning their future existed in the past history of all presently industrialized countries, just as it exists at present in the so-called developing countries. Recognition of this uncertainty provides a better basis for the comparative study of modernization than the alternative assumption that industrialization has the same prerequisites and results wherever it occurs.

In thus preferring uncertainty to a generalizing, systemic analysis we deal in effect with two approaches to the study of social change. The *retrospective* approach employs a "before-and-after" model of society, i.e. some variant of the contrast between tradition and modernity. Such models are indespensable aids in an analysis of social change, which can start from a knowledge of past changes, though with the cautions suggested earlier. The *prospective* approach cannot employ such a model directly, because it seeks to deal with future contingencies. This second approach may still employ the available "before-and-after" models, but its emphasis will be on the diversity of modern societies in the search for clues to the process of transformation. This is the approach I adopt for the remainder of this discussion.

By "modernization" I refer to a type of social change which *originated* in the industrial revolution of England, 1760–1830, and

in the political revolution in France, 1789–1794. One can set the inception of the changes here considered differently, and this is in fact advisable for certain purposes. The expansion of Europe, for example, antedated the late eighteenth century; some aspects of modernization like the diffusion of modern weapons can be traced back to the fifteenth century.[73] Also, particular antecedents of modernization can be traced back very far, as in the instance of printing or of representative institutions or ideas of equality, and many others. Nevertheless, there are reasons of scale which make it advisable to separate the transformations of European societies and their world-wide repercussions since the eighteenth century from earlier economic and political changes. Reference was made at the beginning to the massive transformation of agriculture: the changes leading to a declining proportion of the labor force engaged in agricultural production were initiated in the eighteenth century. Similarly, the fundamental elitism of societies prior to the eighteenth century has been replaced, albeit gradually, by a "functional democratization" (Mannheim), and this change may again be traced to beginnings in the eighteenth century. Also, the distinction between rulers and ruled had coincided roughly with the distinction between the literate and the illiterate. That distinction was beginning to break down in the course of the eighteenth century with the slow spread of both literacy and printed matter.[74] These three transformations of the economic, political, and social order may suffice as an indication that it is useful to treat the eighteenth century as a breakthrough to a new historical era, at any rate in studies of modernization.

The economic and political "breakthrough" which occurred in England and France at the end of the eighteenth century, put every other country of the world into a position of "backwardness." Indeed, the same may be said of the two pioneering countries. The economic transformation of England provided a "model" for France, while the political revolution of France in-

[73]Carlo Cipolla, *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion*, 1400–1700 (Longon: Collins, 1965), passim.

[74]The changes in literacy and the availability of printed matter are surveyed for England in Raymond Williams. *The Long Revolution* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), pp. 156–72.

stantly became a major focus of political debate in England. Ever since the world has been divided into advanced and follower societies. With reference to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries it is appropriate to have this formulation refer to England and France as the "advanced" countries and all others as follower societies, though even then the statement would have omitted earlier pioneering countries such as Holland or Spain. But since that time the process has ramified much further. Follower societies of the past such as Russia or China have become advanced societies, which are taken as models by the satellite dependencies of Eastern Europe or by some African and Asian countries that have won their independence since World War II. Each of the countries that have come to play the role of "pioneer" with regard to some follower society has a history of externally induced changes, though with the success of modernization the emphasis on this extrinsic dimension may become less salient than it was at an earlier time. Accordingly, a basic element in the definition of modernization is that it refers to a type of social change since the eighteenth century, which consists in the economic or political advance of some pioneering society and subsequent changes in follower societies.[75]

This distinction implies a shift in intellectual perspective. The traditional posture of sociological theory conceives of change as slow, gradual, continuous and intrinsic to the societies changing. This view is more or less appropriate as long as we confine ourselves to the enduring characteristics of a social structure which may aid or hinder the modernization of society. As suggested earlier, it is quite appropriate to the interpretation of change in

[75]The terms of that distinction do not stay put. Before the "modern" period England was a "follower" society while Holland and Sweden were "advanced," especially in the production of cannons. Cf. Cipolla, *Guns and Sails, op. cit.*, pp. 36–37, 52–54, 87 n. In the twentieth century the Russian revolution, the fascist regimes, and the Chinese revolution have added their own modifications of this distinction. Singer, *op. cit.*, pp. 261–62 refers to the same distinction by speaking of "early" and "late" arrivals, but I wish to emphasize the sense of pioneering or backwardness that has animated people in "advanced" and "follower" societies. These terms refer to the evaluations of the participants rather than to my own assessment of "progress" or "backwardness."

European civilization, and this was the intent of Max Weber's question concerning the combination of circumstances to which the rationalism of Western civilization can be attributed. However, once the two eighteenth century revolutions had occurred, subsequent social changes were characterized by a precipitous increase in the speed and intensity of communication. Ideas and techniques have passed from "advanced" to "follower" societies, and to a lesser extent from "follower" to "advanced" societies. Within a relatively short historical period there are few societies which have remained immune from these external impacts upon their social structures.[76]

Diffusion of ideas and techniques may be a byproduct of expansion by "advanced" societies, but it occurs even in the absence of expansion because of the economic and political breakthrough in eighteenth century Europe. As Gerschenkron has pointed out, leading strata of "follower" societies respond to this breakthrough by introducing the most modern, capital-intensive technology, in order to close the "gap" as rapidly as possible.[77] This tendency is part of a larger context:

> . . . one way of defining the degree of backwardwardness is precisely in terms of absence, in a more backward country [or "follower" society as I have termed it here], of factors which in a more advanced country serve as prerequisites of development. Accordingly, one of the ways of approaching the problem is by asking what substitutions and what patterns of substitutions for the lacking factors occurred in the process of industrialization in condition of backwardness.[78]

Such substitutions are believed to represent shortcuts to "modern-

[76]There are those who consider societies closed systems. They would counter this diffusionist argument with the contention that societies are not passive recipients of external stimuli, but select among them in accordance with the dictates of their internal structure. This interpretation is an extension of the equilibrium model and as such a secular version of the original, theological belief in "pre-established harmony." That older view was as compatible with the existence of evil in a divinely created world as the functionalist interpretation is compatible with the existence of conflict and change. Neither view is compatible with the possibility of a self-perpetuating disequilibrium, or cumulative causation as Myrdal has called it.

[77]Gerschenkron, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 44, and passim.

[78]*Ibid.*, p. 46.

ity." They are part of the effort to avoid the difficulties encountered in the modernization of the "advanced" country. This idea of the "advantages of backwardness" did not originate with Leo Trotsky (as has sometimes been supposed) but was expressed already in the late seventeenth century.[79] All aspects of modernity are up for adoption simultaneously, and it depends upon available resources, the balance of forces in the "follower" society, and the relative ease of transfer which aspects will be given priority. The fact that such items as medication, printed matter, educational innovations, political practices like the franchise are more easily transferred than advanced technology requiring heavy capital investment is another aspect of the divergence of processes of modernization.

Many writers have observed that in this setting of "follower societies" governments play, or attempt to play, a decisive role. The special utility of this perspective for comparative studies of modernization is evident from a recent, comprehensive analysis of English, French, and German industrialization since the eighteenth century. In that context, David Landes states that for the governments of Europe "industrialization was, from the start, a political imperative."[80] Governments may be more or less successful in meeting the imperatives confronting them, and their attempts to do so will be affected throughout by the structural attributes of their societies. Generally speaking, governments attempt to play a larger role in the modernization of relatively backward than of relatively advanced societies. Since this generalization applies to "follower societies" since the eighteenth century, and since most societies of the world are (or have been) in that category, the proposition is perhaps only another aspect of modernization, i.e. of the distinction between the two types of

[79]Cf. the analysis of this complex of ideas in the work of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716), especially the interesting contacts between Leibniz and Peter the Great with regard to the modernization of Russia, in Dieter Groh, *Russland und das Selbstverständniß* Europas (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1961), pp. 32–43.

[80]David Landes, "Technological Change and Development in Western Europe, 1750–1914," in H. J. Habbakuk and M. Postan, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe; The Industrial Revolution and After* (Cambridge University Press, 1965), Vol. VI, Part I, p. 366.

societies. The difference can be of strategic importance for modernization, since "follower societies" are by definition lacking in some of the elements of modernity found in "advanced societies." Where governments manage to provide "functional equivalents" or "substitutes" for these missing elements, they may succeed in reducing the backwardness of their societies, but this presupposes a relatively effective government which is an attribute of modernity or advance.[81]

Here again a major shift in intellectual perspective is implied. The view that government is an integral part of the social structure, but may have the capacity of altering it significantly, is not in the mainstream of social theory. The opposite view is more common that formal government and its actions are epiphenomena, the product of forces arising from the social and economic structure of society. This view is related to the "emanationist" and "evolutionary" intellectual tradition, and was reinforced as noted earlier, by a particular historical constellation in early nineteenth century Europe. Writers of otherwise incompatible political views agreed that government is an epiphenomenon, and this uncommon agreement still influences modern social thought. Yet in studies of modernization it is more useful to consider social structure and government, or society and the state, as interdependent, but also relatively autonomous, spheres of thought and action.[82]

The gap created between advanced and follower societies and the efforts to close it by a more or less *ad hoc* adoption of items of modernity produce obstacles standing in the way of successful modernization.[83] In his discussion of the "new states" that have come into being since World War II, E. A. Shils has characterized these obstacles as a series of internal, structural cleavages:

[81]Note the frequency with which "political unity" appears as an index of modernity in the several lists of attributes presented in Marius Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes Towards Modernization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 18–19, 20–24, and passim.

[82]For a discussion of this point see above, pp. 15–29.

[83]On the "ad hoc diffusion" of items of modernity cf. the illuminating discussion by Theodore H. von Laue, "Imperial Russia at the Turn of the Century," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, III (1961), pp. 353–67; and Mary C. Wright, "Revolution from Without?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IV (1962), pp. 247–52.

> It is the gap between the few, very rich and the mass of the poor, between the educated and the uneducated, between the townsman and the villager, between the cosmopolitan or national and the local, between the modern and the traditional, between the rulers and the ruled.[84]

Though such tensions exist in "advanced" states as well, they are far more pronounced not only in the "new states" of today but also in the follower societies of the past which can be ranked, albeit roughly, by their degree of backwardness.[85] The analogy between "backward" or "underdeveloped" social structures then and now should not be pressed too much, since the Continental countries possessed many cultural and economic attributes that were relatively favorable to modernization. But it is also true that during the nineteenth century there was a gradient of backwardness within Europe such that the countries to the East paralleled the "gaps" found in the "new states" of today more closely than the countries of Western Europe.[86]

The analogies or parallels noted here are especially close at the cultural level. For the "gap" created by advanced societies puts a premium on ideas and techniques which follower societies may use in order to "come up from behind." Educated minorities are, thereby, placed in a position of strategic importance, while the always existing gulf between the educated and the uneducated widens still further. In a world marked by gradations of backwardness the comparative study of modernization must attend to the "reference society" that becomes the focus of attention in the follower society, especially for the educated minority that seeks to utilize advanced ideas and techniques in order to "catch up."[87] Here one can see at a glance that a focus on the distinction between advanced and follower societies, and on the communications-effects of modernization, necessarily gives prominence to the role of intellectuals and of education, whereas ideas about

[84]Edward A. Shils, "Political Development in the New States," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, II (1960), p. 281.

[85]Gerschenkron, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–44.

[86]Cf. Landes, *op. cit.*, pp. 354, 358.

[87]The concept "reference society" has been chosen in analogy to Robert Merton's "reference groups." Cf. Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 225 ff.

social change focusing on the internal division of labor necessarily made much of standard social classes like workers and capitalists. It is as typical of backward countries to invest heavily in education in order to "bridge the gap," as it is for an intelligentsia to develop and engage in an intensified search for a way out of the backwardness of their country.[88] A typical part of this search consists in the ambivalent job of preserving or strengthening the indigenous character of the native culture while attempting to close the gap created by the advanced development of the "reference society or societies."[89]

Four aspects of the process of modernization have been distinguished in the preceding discussion:

a. Reasons of scale suggest that since the eighteenth century the external setting of societies, and especially the "gap" created by the early industrialization of England and the early democratization of France, have imparted to the "degree of backwardness" the special significance of a "challenge" to modernization.

b. In their endeavor to bridge this "gap" leading strata of follower societies typically search for substitutes to the factors which were conditions of development in the advanced countries. Within the limitations imposed by nature and history all aspects of modernity (as developed abroad) are up for adoption simultaneously, and the problem is which of the adoptable items represents a shortcut to modernity. Since the achievement of "modernity" is not assured, it is part of this process that the adoption of items of modernization may militate against "modernity," or may be irrelevant to it.

c. This common setting of follower societies in turn imparts special importance to government. Typically, governments attempt to play a major role in modernization at the same time that

[88]Cf. the succinct overview of the "intelligentsia" by Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither War Nor Peace* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1960), pp. 164–87. See above, pp. 231 ff.

[89]The most sensitive analysis of this bifurcation I have found in the literature is the study by Joseph Levenson, *Modern China and its Confucian Past* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1964), passim. Cf. also Cipolla, *Guns and Sails, op. cit.*, pp. 116–26.

they seek to overcome the sources of their own instability which arise from the special tensions created by backwardness.[90]

d. The division of the world into advanced and follower societies, together with the relative ease of communication, put a premium on education as a means to modernization which is more readily available than the capital required for modern technology. Education and modern communications also encourage the development of an intelligentsia and a cultural product which—as Wilhelm Riehl noted as early as 1850—is in excess of what the country can use or pay for.[91] This recurrent phenomenon is reflected in a mushrooming of efforts to overcome the backwardness of the country by attempts to reconcile the strength evidenced by the advanced society with the values inherent in native traditions.

Comparative Aspects of Social Stratification

This concluding section outlines a program of comparative study dealing with stratification in relation to modernization. In the past that study has contrasted tradition and modernity in "either-or" terms and emphasized changes internal to the society studied and largely determined by the division of labor. The present analysis emphasizes the continuity of social change insofar as the contrast between a social structure then and now is an artifact of conceptualization. But modernization may have a disrupting effect on changing patterns of stratification, due to the hiatus between advanced and follower societies. Governmental intervention is another possible source of discontinuity, since authority structures are relatively autonomous. In other words: although social change is a continuous process, it is often affected by factors conventionally considered extrinsic to the social structure. In a

[90]Cf. the analysis of these tensions by Edward A. Shils, "Political Development in the New States," cited above.

[91]Cf. the chapter on "Die Proletarier der Geistesarbeit" in Wilhelm Riehl, *Die Bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart: J. G. Cottasche Buchhandlung, 1930), esp. pp. 312–13.

process of modernization relations among groups are exposed to such "extrinsic" influences, although other aspects of the social structure (e.g. the family) may be less affected in this manner. Typically, the modernization of societies is accompanied by a nation-wide redefinition of rights and duties. Individuals and groups respond not only to the actions and beliefs of others, but also to the images of such group-relations derived from prior developments in their reference-society. The following discussion attempts to show that these general points bear directly on the study of social stratification.

The simplified contrast between tradition and modernity shows us that medieval society was ruled by a landowning aristocracy and capitalist society by a bourgeoisie owning the means of production. If one conceives of the transition from tradition to modernity as the decline of one set of attributes and the rise of another, one gets the simple picture of a declining aristocracy and a rising bourgeoisie. Possibly Marx has contributed more than anyone else to this conception. His interpretation of the bourgeoisie as the collective, historical agent which "created" the revolutionizing effect of modern industry, has produced a tendency to read a "rising bourgeoisie" back into the last thousand years of European history.[92] The broad effect of this tendency has been to make the merchants of pre-eighteenth-century Europe into direct precursors of nineteenth-century industrial entrepreneurs and to fasten upon them a corresponding degree of striving and social protest, when in fact they fit quite well into the social structure of feudal Europe. The effect is also to antedate the decline of the aristocracy by some centuries in order to provide room for the rising bourgeoisie.[93] But the changes of social stratification in the course of industrialization do not present the simple picture of a declining aristocracy and a rising bourgeoisie. In most European countries the social and political pre-eminence of pre-industrial

[92]For a vigorous critique of this tendency cf. J. H. Hexter, *Reappraisals in History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), passim. Note also the cautionary comments regarding the problem of historical continuity in Gerschenkron, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–39.

[93]For a more balanced assessment of the European bourgeoisie, cf. Otto Brunner, *Neue Wege der Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 80–115.

ruling groups continued even when their economic fortunes declined, and the subordinate social and political role of the "middle classes" continued even when their economic fortunes rose. In Europe this pattern applies rather generally to the period of transition to an industrial society. Here is how Joseph Schumpeter puts the case with reference to England, while pointing out that in modified form the same applies elsewhere:

> The aristocratic element continued to rule the roost *right to the end of the period of intact and vital capitalism*. No doubt that element—though nowhere so effectively as in England—currently absorbed the brains from other strata that drifted into politics; it made itself the representative of bourgeois interests and fought the battles of the bourgeoisie; it had to surrender its last legal privileges; but with these qualifications, and for ends no longer its own, it continued to man the political engine, to manage the state, to govern. The economically operative part of the bourgeois strata did not offer much opposition to this. On the whole, that kind of division of labor suited them and they liked it.[94]

In the modernization of Europe, aristocracies retained political dominance long after the economic foundations of their high status had been impaired and after alternative and more productive economic pursuits had brought bourgeois strata to social and economic prominence. The "capacity to rule" obviously varied among the several aristocracies, as did the degree to which other strata of the population tended to accept their own subordinate position. In Europe, these legacies were eroded eventually, but only after the transition to an industrial society was affected by the general pattern to which Schumpeter refers. This pattern of a continued political dominance by traditional ruling groups even under conditions of rapid modernization reflects an earlier condi-

[94]Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), pp: 136–37. See also pp. 12–13 for a more generalized statement. Substantially the same observations were made by Frederick Engels in 1892, but the political primacy of the aristocracy and the secondary role of the bourgeoisie appeared to him only as a "survival" which would disappear eventually. See Frederic Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1905), pp. xxxii–xxxiv. For an empirical study cf. W. L. Guttsman, *The British Political Elite* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

tion of the social structure, when families of high social and economic status had privileged access to official positions while all those below the line of gentility were excluded. Pre-modern European societies were characterized by a vast number of status-differences and clashes of interest of all kinds, but by only "one body of persons capable of concerted action over the whole area of society."[95] That is, a tiny, possessing minority of the well-born was capable of concerted action and hence constituted a class, while the whole mass of unorganized and, under these conditions, unorganizable persons were set apart by their common lack of access to positions of privilege. Accordingly, European societies conformed at one time to a pattern in which class and authority were more or less synonymous terms, but this identity diminished in the course of modernization and was replaced eventually by the principle of separation between office and family status.[96]

This equalization of access to public employment is an aspect of modernization which makes sense of the assumptions we bring to this field of study. In modern sociology government employment is not considered a basis, or an index, of social stratification. Rather, government employment (even in high positions) is seen as a dependent variable, for example when we examine the distribution of public officials by social origin. Yet this perspective presupposes the separation of government office from the claims a family can make by virtue of its social status and economic position. These assumptions were less applicable in an earlier phase of European societies, and today they are less applicable in the follower societies that are economically backward. There, governments play, or attempt to play, a major role in the process of modernization, as we have seen. Under these conditions government employment provides one of the major bases of social mobility, economic security, and relative well-being. In fact, in economically backward countries the government is one of the major economic enterprises. Hence, government officials partake of the

[95]Cf. Peter Laslett, *The World We Have Lost, op. cit.*, p. 22 and passim.

[96]Cf. Ernest Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 1–6 and passim.

prestige of ruling, even if their positions are humble. And in view of the power at the disposal of government, access to government office and influence upon the exercise of authority are major points of contention—in the personalized sense characteristic of societies in which interaction is kinship-oriented.[97] While this importance of government employment is associated with economic backwardness and the weakness of middle strata in the occupational hierarchy, it can also divert resources from uses which might overcome these conditions. In the absence of viable economic alternatives government employment itself becomes a major basis of social stratification,[98] although these new polities frequently institutionalize plebiscitarian, equalitarian principles in the political sphere. This identification of class with authority differs fundamentally from the elitism of medieval European societies, in which only a privileged minority had access to positions of authority.

The preceding sketch suggests several perspectives for the comparative study of ruling classes in the process of modernization. Within the European context it focuses attention on the continued importance of traditional ruling groups throughout the period of modernization. In this respect, further study would have to differentiate between the relatively accommodating development in England and the much more conflict-ridden development of other, follower societies. At the same time, I have suggested that the modernization of Western societies generally shows a gradual separation between governmental office and family status. The continuity between tradition and modernity remains a characteristic of social change throughout, for even the increasing differentiation between office and family in Western Civilization reveals

[97]Cf. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105 ff. Cf. my article "Bureaucracy" in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1968 edition.

[98]Cf., for example, the statement that "In Egypt the middle class has been weak in numbers and influence, and civil servants have comprised a large proportion of it." Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 46.

a variety of historically conditioned patterns. There is no reason to assume that future developments elsewhere will be more uniform. The comparative study of ruling groups in the process of modernization can thus combine the three themes, mentioned above: the continuity of change, the effect of extrinsic influences on the changing role of ruling strata, and the relative separation between government and social structure. The same themes may be combined in the study of other social groups.

The patterns of action and reaction which characterize a society's changing structure come most readily into focus as one moves from the top to the bottom ranks of the social hierarchy. Here one may use the simplified contrast between tradition and modernity as a point of departure, because the rise of political participation by the lower strata is a characteristic feature of modernization. In medieval Europe lower strata fragmented in household enterprises of a patriarchal type existed side by side with a ruling class characterized by wealth, high status and high office. Karl Marx has analyzed this condition effectively with regard to the French peasantry:

> The small peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another, instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants . . . . Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. The small holding, the peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family . . . . Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power, that protects them against the other classes and sends them the rain and the sunshine from above. The political influence of the small peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself.[99]

Probably, Marx would have agreed that this analysis of peasants in nineteenth century France applied *mutatis mutandis* to the small craftsmen of the towns, to the manorial estates as well as to the independent peasant freeholds in medieval Europe. The family-based enterprise fragmented the lower strata into as many units of patriarchal household rule over family, servants, and apprentices. On the other hand, the heads of households would join with others in guilds, exercise authority in official capacities, join in the deliberation of representative assemblies, and thus constitute a "class" or "classes" in the sense of groups capable of concerted action.

In this setting "fundamental democratization" refers to the whole process of class-formation by which the fragmentation of the lower strata is gradually overcome, not only to the extension of the franchise. Geographic mobility increases, literacy rises along with the diffusion of newspapers, patriarchial rule and household enterprises decline as conditions of work lead to an aggregation of large masses of people in economic enterprises providing opportunities for easy communication.[100] As Marx noted, these conditions gave rise to trade unions, political organizations, and a heightened class-consciousness due to repeated conflicts with employers. He was too preoccupied with "industry" to note that other groups than workers and other means of communication than direct contact at the place of work might come into play.[101] He was also too committed to an evolutionary perspective with its emphasis on the eventual decline of the aristocracy to note the importance of the beliefs which upheld the legitimacy of the traditional "ruling class" even in an industrializing society. Large

[99] *Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, n. d.), p. 109

[100] See John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1848), pp. 322–23.

[101] Cf. the analysis of growing class consciousness among workers in Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, n. d.), pp. 145–46; but note also the evidence adduced by David Mitrany, *Marx against the Peasants* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1951), passim.

masses of people at the bottom of the social hierarchy retained their loyalty to the established order, even in the face of the physical and psychological deprivations so suddenly imposed upon them.[102]

This loyalty is evident in the numerous references to the real and imaginary rights enjoyed under the old order. Populist protest based on such references meant, among other things, the demand for equality of citizenship. That equality was proclaimed by the legal order and by the appeals to national solidarity in an era of well-publicized empire-building, but in practice it was denied by the restriction of the franchise, the dominant ideology of class-relations, and the partisan implementation of the law. The rising awareness of the working class in this process of "fundamental democratization" reflects an experience of *political alienation*, a sense of not having a recognized position in the civic community of an emerging industrial society. During the nineteenth century nationalism was so powerful in part because it could appeal directly to this longing of the common people for civic respectability, a longing which was intensified by acute awareness of development in other countries. When this quest was frustrated and as ideas of the rights of labor spread during the nineteenth century, people turned to the socialist alternative of building a new civic community to which they too could belong.[103] This general interpretation of working-class agitation in Europe may be contrasted with the problems encountered today under conditions of greater economic backwardness and greater advance abroad.[104]

[102]To discount such beliefs because they disappeared eventually is no more plausible than to make the aristocracy's role decline in advance of its eventual demise. Cf. the discussion of the "traditionalism of labor" in my book *Work and Authority in Industry* (2nd ed.; Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974), pp. 34 ff.

[103]For a fuller statement of this interpretation see above, pp. 61–74.

[104]As always, the contrast is not absolute. During the nineteenth century, as one went eastwards in Europe, one encountered certain parallels to the "underdeveloped syndrome" of today, namely an increased importance of government and rather weakly developed middle strata. Cf. the illuminating statement by David Landes: "The farther east one goes in Europe, the more the bourgeoisie takes on the appearance of a foreign excrescence on manorial society, a group apart scorned by the nobility and feared or hated by (or unknown to) a peasantry still personally bound to the local *seigneur*." See Landes, *op.cit.*, p. 358.

In employing the English development as the prototype of later developments in other countries, Marx mistook the exception for the rule, a consideration which applies to his analysis of an emerging working class. As English workers attained a level of group-consciousness in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they became aware of England's per-eminent position as a worldpower. In follower societies the lower strata rise to an awareness of the relative backwardness of their society. Also, early working-class agitation in England occurred in an anti-mercantilist context which militated against protective legislation during a transitional period of greatly intensified deprivations. In follower societies the greater reliance on government makes social legislation a natural concomitant of early industrialization.[105] In England the work-force in the early factories was separated effectively from the land, and population increase in the countryside as well as the city roughly corresponded to the increasing demand for labor. In many follower societies the work-force retains its familial and economic ties to the land and population increase in city and country is well in advance of the demand for labor.[106]

These contrasts vary with the degree of industrialization achieved locally and the degree of governmental control over internal migration, to mention just two relevant considerations. The permanent separation of workers from their ties to the land obviously facilitates the growth of class consciousness and of political organization in Marx's sense of the word. On the other hand,

[105]The debate concerning the deprivations of early English industrialization continues. But whatever its final resolution in terms of the changing standard of living, there is probably less disagreement on the psychological repercussions. The separation of the worker's home from his place of work, the novelty of a discipline which previously had been associated with the pauper's workhouse, the brutalization of work conditions for women and children merely by the shift away from home, and related matters constitute the impressive circumstantial evidence. Note also that the statement in the text makes sense of Germany's pioneering in the field of social legislation as an attribute of an early follower society.

[106]Cf. Landes, *op. cit.*, pp. 344–47 for a summary analysis of the labor supply problem in the English industrial revolution in terms of the current state of research. These findings can be contrasted readily with comparative materials on various follower societies contained in Wilbert Moore and Arnold Feldman, eds., *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas*, *op. cit.*, passim.

a continuation of these ties may result either in a weak commitment to industry (and hence weak group solidarity), and/or in the emergence of segmental peasant-worker alliances in urban and national politics. Where this latter alternative exists, one can begin to appreciate how important it is to consider such phenomena in their own right, rather than treat them as transitions that are expected to disappear with increasing modernization. We do not know after all what forms modernization might take where separation between town and countryside fails to occur, at least for a considerable period of time.[107]

Having considered ruling and lower strata, I wish finally to turn to a brief analysis of education and intellectuals, again using the guidelines of the preceding discussion. In the case of England, education had been a privilege associated with high status until, in the course of religious controversies, several sectarian groups instituted private school systems so as to preserve the integrity of their beliefs. The idea of making education available beyond these narrow circles immediately raised the question of danger to the social order because workers and peasants would learn to read and write. This apprehension is quite understandable when one considers that the basic dividing line between those who officially ranked as "gentlemen" and the vast majority of the people was identical with the division between the literate and the illiterate. Still, the social mobilization of the population due to commerce and industry undermined the old hierarchy of ranks. The effort of ensuring that people would retain their old regard for rank led to the gradual spread of education with a strong emphasis on religion. This spread of education was not unlike the parallel problem of military conscription: both were aspects of a "fundamental democratization" which gave unprecedented political importance to people who could read and—in times of emergency—had guns.[108]

[107]Note that Marx and others with him considered that separation as a prerequisite of capitalist development. Cf. the discussion of the distinctive position of workers in African countries by Lloyd A. Fallers, "Equality, Modernity and Democracy in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States, op. cit.*, pp. 187–90. See also Richard D. Lambert, "The Impact of Urban Society upon Village Life" in Roy Turner, ed., *India's Urban Future* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 117–40.

[108]In these respects there are of course striking differences between France and England which can be considered symptomatic of the radical and the conservative approach to education and conscription. For a comparative treatment of these issues cf. Ernest Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, op. cit.*, Chaps. 2, 5.

These issues are transformed in follower societies which seek to achieve the benefits of an industrial society, but by a speedier and less costly transition than occurred in England. In these societies popular and higher education seem to provide the easiest shortcut to industrialization. By this means the skill level of the population is raised while the highly educated increase their capacity of learning advanced techniques from abroad. For these reasons governments in follower societies usually push education, even though in so doing they also jeopardize their own political stability. They may attempt to avert such dangers through restrictions of the franchise, censorship, control of associations, etc.; one can differentiate between follower societies of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in terms of degrees and types of control over a mobilized population.

Such contrasts in the role of education are paralleled by contrasts in the role of intellectuals. Many educated persons engage in intellectual pursuits from time to time, but the term "intellectuals" is usually (if vaguely) restricted to those persons who engage in such pursuits on a full-time basis and as free professionals rather than "hired hands."[109] Intellectual pursuits occur in all complex societies, but "intellectuals" as a distinct social group emerged as a concomitant of modernization. In Western Europe men of letters underwent a process of emancipation from their previous subservience to the Church and to private patrons, because industrialization created a mass public and a market for intellectual prod-

[109]The circularity of this statement is unavoidable. In a general sense pursuits engaging the intellect refer to the creation and maintenance (transmission) of cultural values, but each of these terms (cultural values, creation, maintenance, transmission) is the subject of constant debate, and that debate itself is an important intellectual pursuit. Since this debate involves the pejorative as well as appreciative use of these terms, and by that token the endeavor of speakers to "belong" to the positive side of the cultural process (in however marginal a fashion), no one set of defining terms will be wholly satisfactory. In view of this difficulty the most reasonable alternative is to set up a typology of intellectual pursuits and leave the group of persons called "intellectuals" undefined. For one such attempt cf. Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intellegenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1949), pp. 1–24, 81–101.

ucts. The whole process was one of great complexity, but it can be simplified for present purposes. Intellectuals tended to respond to their emancipation by a new cultural elitism, and to the new mass-public by responses which vacillated between a populist identification with the people and a strong apprehension concerning the threat of mass-culture to humanistic values.[110] These responses were quite incongruent with the dominant materialism of advanced industrial societies, so that intellectuals experienced a social and moral isolation. During the nineteenth century the great economic and political successes of advanced European societies reinforced, rather than assuaged, the isolation of those intellectuals who took no direct part in that success and questioned the cultural and personal worth of those who did. To the extent that this estrangement resulted from the emancipation and consequent elitism of intellectuals, as well as from their ambivalent reaction to a mass public, it must be considered a concomitant of modernization.[111]

The response of intellectuals briefly sketched here was largely internal to the most advanced societies of Europe. But the breakthrough achieved by the industrial and political revolutions of England and France made other countries into follower societies. The economic advance of England and the events of the French revolution were witnessed from afar by men who rejected the backwardness and autocracy of their own country. Under these conditions cultural life tends to become polarized between

[110]Cf. the case study of this process in England by Leo Lowenthal and Marjorie Fiske, "The Debate over Art and Popular Culture," in Mirra Komarovsky, ed., *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 33–112.

[111]I avoid the term "alienation" because misuse has made it worthless. For a scholarly treatment of this intellectual response to "bourgeois society" in nineteenth-century Europe cf. Karl Loewith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, passim. Cf. also the analysis of the social distance between "intellectuals" and "practical men" in Joseph Schumpeter, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–55 as well as the unusual acceptance of that distance by at least one great artist, William Faulkner, who speaks of writers "steadily occupied by trying to do the impossible" while keeping "out of the way of the practical and busy people who carry the burden of America." See Faulkner's speech on the occasion of receiving the National Book Award in *The New York Times Book Review* (February 6, 1955), p. 2.

those who would see their country progress by imitating the "more advanced countries," and those who denounce that advance as alien and evil and emphasize instead the well-springs of strength existing among their own people and in their native culture. Both reactions were typified by the Westernizers and Slavophils of Tsarist Russia, but the general pattern has occurred again and again. It has been a mainspring of nationalism and of movements for national independence. In this setting intellectuals do not remain estranged witnesses of a development carried forward by others; they tend to turn into leaders of the drive towards modernization.[112]

This discussion has endeavored to provide a framework for the comparative study of modernization and inequality. Such studies have been influenced for loo long by a stereotype derived from the Marxian tradition. According to this stereotype, history is divided into epochs, characterized by a predominant mode of production and, based upon it, a class structure consisting of a ruling and an oppressed class. Each epoch is further characterized by a typical sequence of changes in the relations between the two major classes. In the early phase the dominant mode of production is established by a class in its period of revolutionary ascendance. For a time this class is progressive. Its economic interests are identical with technical progress and human welfare, and hence, on the side of liberating ideas and institutions. Eventually however, such an ascending class becomes a ruling class. From a champion of progress in its period of ascendance the class has turned into a champion of reaction in its period of dominance. Increasingly, the ruling class resists changes which would endanger its entrenched position. But meanwhile, within the structure of the old society, a new class has been formed from the ranks of the oppressed, who have no such vested interests and who in due time will overthrow that old structure in order to make way for the material progress which has become technically possible. Within the European context this grandiose simplification ap-

[112]See Edward A. Shils, "Intellectuals, Public Opinion and Economic Development," *World Politics*, Vol. 10 (1958), pp. 232–55.

peared to account for the feudal powers of resistance, the progressive, rising bourgeoisie and its gradual transformation into a reactionary ruling class, and finally the class of the oppressed proletariat which has a world to win and nothing to lose but its chains.

It is quite true, of course, that Marx modified this scheme to allow for leads and lags in interpreting the actual historical developments of his time. These modifications may have appeared all the more persuasive because of the passionate moral and intellectual conviction with which Marx adhered to the basic assumptions of the scheme itself. This conviction, I have suggested, was part of the European intellectuals' response to the crisis in human relations brought about by the rise of an industrial society, a response which suggested an "either-or" confrontation between tradition and modernity with its many ramifications.

A critical awareness of this intellectual heritage can assist the reorientation needed in the comparative study of stratification. It prompts us to recognize that the contrast between tradition and modernity is itself part of the evidence we should consider. This intellectual response to the rise of industry has been an aid or hindrance (as the case may be) in each country's modernization, typically marked by the emancipation of men of letters and by the manner in which they assessed their country's backwardness relative to the advances of their reference-societies. Once the unwanted legacies of this intellectual response are discounted, as I have attempted to do in this essay, a rather different approach to the study of modernization emerges.

The division of history into epochs, like the distinction between tradition and modernity, is a construct of definite, but limited utility. These constructs will vary with the purpose of inquiry. While we have found it useful to consider late eighteenth-century Europe as an historical turning point, it is recognized that the process of modernization which reached a crescendo since then, is coextensive with the era of European expansion since the late 15th century, or the "Vasco da Gama era" as Carlo Cipolla has called it. If we want to explain this historical breakthrough in Europe, our emphasis will be on the continuity of intra-societal changes. If we

wish to include in our account the worldwide repercussions of this breakthrough and hence the differential process of modernization, our emphasis will be on the confluence of intrinsic and extrinsic changes of social structures. Both emphases are relevant for the comparative study of stratification.

Within this broad context the rise of new social structures as of technical innovations appears as a multifaceted process, not exclusively identifiable with any one social group. Typically, the pioneers of innovation seek the protection of ruling groups rather than defy them, provided of course that such groups exist and can provide protection. The outcome of this process varies with the pressure for innovation and the degree to which given ruling groups themselves participate in innovation or feel jeopardized by it. At any rate, the emphasis upon the continuity of ruling groups in the era of modernization is a first corollary following from the rejection of the "either-or" image of tradition and modernity.

A second corollary involves what Karl Mannheim has called the "fundamental democratization" of modern society. The contrast between the monopoly of rule by a tiny minority of notables and the principle of universal suffrage in modern nation-states is striking and unquestioned. But the growth of citizenship which occurs in the transition from one to the other, involves highly diverse developments in which the relative rights and obligations of social classes are redefined, as the political process interacts (more or less autonomously) with the changing organization of production. In the era of modernization this interaction can be understood best if proper attention is given to the international setting as well as the internal differentiation of social structures.

In the end it may appear—from a mid-twentieth-century viewpoint—that the growth of citizenship and the nation-state is a more significant dimension of modernization than the distributive inequalities underlying the formation of social classes. In that perspective Marx's theory of social classes under capitalism appears as a sweeping projection of certain temporary patterns of early nineteenth-century England. Not the least argument favoring this conclusion is the growth of the welfare state in the industrialized societies of the world, which in one way or another provides a

pattern of accommodation among competing social groups as well as a model to be emulated by the political and intellectual leaders of follower societies.[113] My object has been to provide a framework which can encompass these contemporary developments as well as the modernization processes of the past.

[113]Cf. Gaston Rimlinger, *Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America and Russia* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971).

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