

Democracy and democratization

Causes of democracy: the problem

Factors thought to promote democracy (Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 37-8)

- a high overall level of economic wealth
- a relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth
- a market economy
- a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history of society
- the absence of feudalism in society
- a strong bourgeoisie
- a strong middle class
- high levels of literacy and education
- an instrumental rather than consummatory culture
- Protestantism
- social pluralism and strong intermediate groups
- the development of political contestation before the expansion of political participation
- democratic authority structures within social groups, particularly those connected to politics
- low levels of civil violence
- low levels of political polarization and extremism
- political leaders committed to democracy
- experience as a British colony
- traditions of toleration and compromise
- occupation by a pro-democratic foreign power
- elite desire to emulate democratic nations
- traditions of respect for law and individual rights
- communal (ethnic, religious, racial) homogeneity
- communal (ethnic, racial, religious) heterogeneity
- consensus on political and social values
- absence of consensus on political and social values

Causes of Democracy: Main Schools of Thought

Theory	Variants	Advocates	Empirical assessment
1. Social cleavages	1a. Class structure 1b. Ethnic homogeneity 1c. Cross-cutting cleavages	Aristotle, Dahl, Lijphart, etc.	Mixed on economics, strong on ethnicity
2. Level of development	2a. Education, tolerances, etc. 2b. Specialization, cross-currents 2c. Urbanization, mobilization 2d. Communication, mobilization [2e. Patterns of development]	Lipset, Diamond, Pzeworski, Marx, etc.	Strong support; mechanisms less clear, and many caveats
3. Culture	3a. Mass values (trust, etc.) 3b. Civil society and associations 3c. Elite values	Tocqueville, Almond & Verba, Putnam, Inglehart	Mixed (though now in vogue)
4. Institutions	4a. Presidentialism 4b. Electoral rules	Hume, Linz, Valenzuela, etc.	Mixed; support for interaction effects
5. Leaders	5a. Socialization and selection 5b. "Grand gestures"	Machiavelli, Schmitter & O'Donnell, etc.	Mixed; support in times of crisis
[6. External influences]	6a. Direct (e.g., occupation) 6b. Indirect (e.g., diffusion)	Huntington, USAID, etc.	Strong for direct; mixed for indirect

Major correlates of democracy, 1998

	Democ	Ln (Pop)	Infant mo	Life expect	Ethnic*	Religious	Literac	ln(GDP pc	Top 10%	GINI**	Labor in ag	TV p.c	Radio
Democra	1.00												
Ln (Pop)	-0.27	1.00											
Infant mo	-0.55	0.16	1.00										
Life expe	0.47	-0.15	-0.91	1.00									
Ethnic*	-0.18	0.13	-0.04	0.03	1.00								
Religious	-0.10	-0.09	0.12	-0.15	0.20	1.00							
Literacy*	0.34	-0.08	-0.66	0.60	0.13	-0.07	1.00						
ln(GDP p	0.52	-0.12	-0.81	0.77	0.05	-0.09	0.57	1.00					
Top 10%	-0.18	-0.07	0.26	-0.30	0.04	-0.05	-0.17	-0.26	1.00				
GINI	-0.15	-0.08	0.36	-0.38	-0.03	0.02	-0.21	-0.26	0.88	1.00			
Labor in a	-0.49	0.17	0.83	-0.83	-0.05	0.10	-0.60	-0.84	0.33	0.33	1.00		
TV p.c.	0.28	-0.11	-0.43	0.42	0.05	-0.05	0.37	0.50	-0.49	-0.45	-0.47	1.00	
Radio p.c	0.32	-0.15	-0.41	0.40	-0.05	-0.08	0.30	0.47	-0.27	-0.21	-0.45	0.78	1.00


Democracy and class cleavages

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	-3.59	2.73	-1.31	0.19
Ln (Pop)	-0.23	0.11	-2.02	0.05
Ethnic*	-0.77	0.38	-2.02	0.05
Religious*	0.16	0.38	0.42	0.68
ln(GDP pc)	1.66	0.17	9.70	0.00
GINI**	0.00	0.02	0.19	0.85


	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	-3.56	3.35	-1.06	0.29
Ln (Pop)	-0.29	0.15	-1.99	0.05
Ethnic*	-0.89	0.44	-2.04	0.05
Religious*	0.27	0.45	0.60	0.55
ln(GDP pc)	1.82	0.21	8.86	0.00
Top 10%	0.27	2.61	0.10	0.92

***Any one group has 45-80% of population**


Lipset's relationship between development and democracy



There are two main clusters of outliers




There are two main clusters of outliers (2)



Leadership and democracy


The optimistic interpretation of Machiavelli



Source: Adapted from J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975)

Leadership and democracy

The pessimistic (and more plausible) interpretation of Machiavelli



Source: Adapted from Markus Fischer, *The Politics of Greatness* (1994)

Good leaders...

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...and bad

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