work has tended to buttress theories of innate racial inequality but in the main, Tucker writes, "obscure academics lacking any major scientific achievements and notable primarily for their contributions to a string of racist and neo-Nazi causes" (p. 210).

Daniel J. Kevles
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

"Die Schwarzen waren unsere Freunde": Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der amerikanischen Gesellschaft, 1942–1946 ("The blacks were our friends": German prisoners of war in American society, 1942–1946). By Matthias Reiß. (Paderborn, Ger.: Schöningh, 2002. 371 pp. €40.90, ISBN 3-506-74479-8.) In German.

This book focuses on the multiple ironies generated by the presence during World War II of increasing numbers of German prisoners of war (POWs) in the racial structure of a United States segregated by law and custom. As conquered enemies, representing a regime that came close to incorporating absolute evil, the Germans stood in principle beneath even the lowest rungs of the American order. Germans were also, particularly in the South, widely used for the kinds of agricultural labor associated with blacks and organized on "black" lines, in large work gangs. On the other hand, as clearly identifiable members of the dominant ethnic community, they were regularly treated as "whites" in situations involving segregated facilities such as restaurants, toilets, and railroad cars. According to Matthias Reiss, German prisoners eventually were so readily accepted by the American civil population that the POW camps increasingly became a means less of protecting Americans from their enemies than of keeping the two groups apart, preventing the Germans from utilizing fully the privileges that accrued to them because of their skin color.

Reiss concedes that more than racial issues were involved in this process. He makes the case that, in contrast to 1917, the U.S. war against Germany did not possess a strong, popular ideological dimension. That made it easier to integrate German POWs into the American racial structure—particularly by comparison with their Japanese counterparts, defined as "others" in both racial and ideological terms throughout the conflict. Black Americans by and large took the same approach to German prisoners as their white fellow countrymen did, fraternizing with them at every opportunity. Germans for their part, despite the racist and totalitarian doctrines of National Socialism, responded with similar interest and curiosity—hence the book's title.

Reiss's limited focus on race, however, leads him to overlook other factors no less important to the acculturation of German POWs. Above all, they had nowhere to go. Escaping from a work site often involved little more than walking away, but the sheer size of the United States rendered that activity pointless. The big cities were far away, and even there disappearing proved difficult. A few nights outdoors were usually enough to bring fugitives into the open, seeking a ride back to custody.

The physical circumstances of captivity in turn created among the POWs a widespread mentality of compliance, of making the best of things until they should be able to return to their own society. Those prisoners who maintained a hostile distance were usually restricted, by choice or compulsion, in their contacts with American civilians. The normative behaviors of the rest appealed to most Americans who had any encounters with the POWs. They appeared as hard working, polite, deferential—qualities appreciated in all young men but associated especially closely with appropriate black behavior. German POWs' whiteness, in short, was not entirely a matter of pigment. It was to a significant degree a construction, combining the skin color of the dominant group and the submissive behavior of the subordinate one.

Dennis E. Showalter
Colorado College
Colorado Springs, Colorado

The GI War against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific during World War II. By Peter Schrijvers. (New York: New York University Press, 2002. xvi, 320 pp. $45.00, ISBN 0-8147-9816-0.)

barbarity that characterized the war against Japan. Beyond the physical and mental tribulations, the harsh environment, and the "acrimony springing from cultural and racial competition" (p. 220) lay the psychological mechanisms triggered by combat itself. Warfare corrodes the human spirit, and as Schrijvers suggests "every new step on the path of barbarization could be justified as nothing more than retaliation in kind" (p. 221). Add to this the impersonal dimension of industrial violence, and "amidst the numbing escalation of destruction from land, sea, and air it took time for the extraordinary fury of the atomic bombs to stand out" (p. 260).

Schrijvers provides a deep and rich texture of the overall context and experience of total warfare as expressed by those Americans who participated in the defining process. *The GI War against Japan* does what first-rate history is supposed to do; it evokes the spirit of the age and the impressions of the ordinary men and women who lived through it. If, as Schrijvers reminds us, modern industrial warfare is so complex an event that attempts to sanitize it are as inadequate as those to brutalize it, is it possible or even worthwhile for a historian to write about the experience of battle?

Peter S. Kindsvatter's ambitious study answers that question. It is at once narrower than Schrijvers's, being focused on soldiers in combat, and more expansive by analyzing battlefield conduct in the four major wars fought by the United States from 1917 to 1972. Kindsvatter asks what motivates a soldier, in James Jones's words, to "'go out into dangerous places and get himself shot at'" (p. xii). To answer the rhetorical question, he relies extensively on "published fiction, memoirs, and histories by combat veterans" (p. ix), all of it familiar to military history specialists. What sets *American Soldiers* apart is Kindsvatter's excellent melding of secondary sources and battle literature into a coherent and insightful explanation of men in battle. It is good to have this distillation of history and literature with its thought-provoking interpretations in a single volume.

American Soldiers is arranged thematically, with each chapter carrying its subject from World War I through the Vietnam War.

Chapter 1, for example, examines why men enlisted or accepted being drafted, and it finds similar motivations and preconceptions about warfare in all four conflicts. Subsequent chapters deal with the individual soldiers' or marines' reaction to battle, their ability or inability to cope with the environment, and insightful analysis of the motivations that kept them in harm's way when all ordinary instincts suggested flight.

By pulling together fragments of accounts drawn from over a half century of American warfare, Kindsvatter demonstrates the continuity of the combatant's experience of war, the repetition of soldiers' behavior, and the constant need to relearn previously hard-gained experience, which suggests the difficulty combat veterans encounter when passing along their personal narratives. Like Schrijvers, he concludes that a variety of motivations conspire to make soldiers go forward into battle. Racial hatred may be one, but it is not the sole reason to fight and kill. Others include basic survival, vengeance, adventure, enjoyment in dealing with stress, and the obvious but often overlooked satisfaction, sense of accomplishment, and pride of the soldier who took a deadly job seriously and did it well.

Both authors develop and analyze the complex, multiple, and often simultaneous motivations of the G.I. at war. Both break down the stereotypes of combat and warfare that have been perpetuated into national myth. Read together, the two accounts offer the reader a new appreciation of the social consequences of warfare from the eyes of participants, not distant observers. For a complex societal grouping such as the armed forces, their conclusions should not be surprising, but they are ones that constantly need restating. These books do that in superb fashion.

Edward J. Drea
Fairfax, Virginia

The Hidden Campaign: FDR's Health and the 1944 Election. By Hugh E. Evans. (Armonk: Sharpe, 2002. xviii, 202 pp. $29.95, ISBN 0-7656-0855-3.)

This addition to the literature on Franklin D. Roosevelt is a worthy and well-written study by Hugh E. Evans, an eminently qualified and experienced physician. It focuses primarily upon Roosevelt's health during the last months of his life, and it provides a brief treatment of FDR's medical history and some general observations on the life expectancy of the twentieth-century president.

When Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1933 he was in excellent health except for the partial paralysis resulting from the polio attack in 1921. The first known evidence of decline in Roosevelt's health was a very high blood pressure reading in 1937 and results of an "abnormal" EKG (electrocardiogram) in 1941. Thereafter until 1944 during the stressful days of World War II "the president's hypertension progressed without even minimal treatment as noted in available records" (pp. 37–38).

The person Evans found most responsible for ignoring these warning signs was the president's personal physician, Ross T. McIntire. Finally in early 1944, under pressure from worried staff and family members, McIntire invited Howard G. Bruenn, an internist and cardiologist, to examine Roosevelt. Bruenn then became Roosevelt's primary physician until the president died in April 1945. Bruenn was sworn to secrecy and reported only to McIntire. Bruenn's diagnosis: hypertension, congestive heart failure, and bronchitis. He recommended hospital confinement, digitalization, a strict diet, and weight reduction. McIntire responded, "'You can't do that. This is the President of the United States!'" (p. 46). Roosevelt was not hospitalized, and Evans estimated that the probability of Roosevelt surviving a fourth term was low.

Nonetheless, Roosevelt ran in 1944 and was elected to a fourth term. The president's performance in his "Fala" speech and his campaign appearance in New York in the rain seemed to dispel any public concerns, and most press coverage on the president's health depended primarily upon McIntire, who "'isn't a bit worried about him'" (p. 80). This despite a blood pressure reading in September 1944 at the second Quebec Conference that ranged from 180/100 to 240/130! Roosevelt died not long after the Yalta Conference in April 1945 of a massive cerebral hemorrhage.

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