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Plato: Civic Virtue and the Just Society

 

 

I.Introduction

Plato’s (428–348 B.C.E.) principal concern in the Republic is to define the nature of a just society. Plato’s political thinking as with Aristotle’s (whom we discuss in the next chapter) addresses the problems of the chief political unit each knew, the city-state. Plato’s Athens, like all city-states, was a small political community of about 300,000 people. In Athens, there were three main groups: slaves, resident aliens, and citizens. Slaves, who represented about a third of the Athenian population, had no role in government. Resident aliens, like the slaves, were not permitted any role in the political life of Athens but were free men, not subject to social subordination as were slaves. Citizenship was granted to about 100,000 individuals whose parents had been citizens. Citizens, including native tradesmen, artisans, and farmers, as well as the wealthy landowners, could participate in public affairs. The extent of their participation depended on the nature of the regime in power at the time. In some Athenian regimes, citizens (and here we are speaking only of males) were eligible for many different public offices, ranging from participation in the courts, to representative bodies, and to executive councils, but, in other regimes, limitations were placed on the public offices a person could hold. Still, in general and regardless of the regime, all male citizens could take part in the Assembly, which operated as a town meeting for all citizens who came together to discuss and to debate matters of public concern. The Assembly, which met about ten times a year, was not a mechanism for direct democracy; rather, policy was devised and carried out by representative bodies who were responsible to the Assembly. The representative bodies were a cross section of the citizens, and to ensure as equal a chance for participation as possible members to the representative bodies were chosen by lot.¹

In Athens, and especially during the leadership of Pericles (495–429 B.C.E.), the animating spirit was that citizens should be able to take part in public affairs. Indeed, as George Sabine said, “This ideal of a common life in which all might actively share presupposed an optimistic estimate of the natural political capacity of the average man.”²Moreover, general participation was designed to encourage individuals to think of themselves as part of the larger community whose interest each individual served.

But this ideal was never fully realized in practice because persistent and severe conflict between citizens who represented different economic interests remained strong.³Those citizens with aristocratic backgrounds, who came from old families born to wealth, predicated their economic and social position upon their landholdings. Those citizens promoting democracy, mainly consisting of people who could profit from trade, sought to expand Athenian participation in trade by making Athens a major naval power. The aristocratic group maintained strong opposition to this approach, since it would require taxing their property to support a large naval force.⁴

Plato saw these realities and the turmoil associated with them as proof that democracy could not achieve a stable society. His solution was to emphasize the central place of rational intelligence and the wise ruler in predicating stability upon a moral conception of a just society. On this view, Plato did not think that all people were equally capable of holding public office, nor did he think that the experience of participation in public affairs would by itself teach people to work with each other to achieve the common good. In contrast, the basis for moral unity rested with knowledge of what constitutes the just form or model of society.⁵

What is the just form of society for Plato? At this point, it is worth providing an overview of Plato’s argument, as a way to prepare the reader for the general themes in this chapter.

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II.Plato’s “Just Society”

For Plato, justice is a condition in which the various parts of human personality (or what he also refers to as the soul) are properly arranged and ordered. Individuals are characterized by a rational element, which is the seat of the search for truth. In addition, the soul is motivated by appetite to attain wealth or pursue sexual desire. The third part of the soul is the spirited part, which is concerned with displaying the courage necessary to act for the common welfare and win honor from others for doing so. Finding the proper arrangement among these parts of the soul is critical to achieving justice not only in the personalities of each citizen, but in the society at large. Here, for Plato, the rational part of the soul should rule the other two parts. If the other parts of the soul were to dominate reason, then the soul would be out of balance and the individual would neither deliberate nor act in the best interests of either him or herself or of society. Indeed, in this circumstance, the appetite and the spirited part might even be in conflict with each other, a situation that would ensure not only personal unhappiness, but also an inability to perform well the various tasks and functions that secure important basic needs for society.

One caveat must be made before proceeding. In developing Plato’s views, it must be clear that Plato admired Socrates’ dialectical approach to the search for truth and knowledge. What approach did Socrates use? For Socrates, truth-revealing inquiry begins, as we saw in the Introduction, from the standpoint of a reasoned discourse among individuals whose only objective is truth. The Republic is a dialogue between Socrates and his com-patriots.⁶ To avoid confusion, it should be clear that when Socrates is referred to in the Republic, as well as in this chapter, it is really Plato who is talking and who speaks through Socrates. It must also be clear that Plato sees himself as emulating Socrates’ dialectical method. The basic purpose of Plato’s approach, then, is to demonstrate that the main avenue to truth is testing propositions against other propositions to determine which ones have truth and which ones lack truth.

This discourse leads to the development of rational concepts, or what otherwise are referred to as the forms, or ideas of good order. These forms should be used as guides in developing the main roles and institutions of society as well as the various parts of the souls of individuals, so that each member of society is able to contribute to the common good. In contributing to the common good, which in Plato’s case means citizens acting to help maintain the form of a just society, citizens manifest civic virtue.

III.Plato’s Republic: What Justice Is Not

1. Cephalus and Polemarchus

Plato began the Republic by demonstrating in his various dialogues how far his own society was from holding a valid understanding of the nature of justice. Indeed, as he discussed the views of justice current during his times, Plato always seemed to have in the back of his mind a more authentic version of justice than he believed his contemporaries held. To make his view more clear, he had to first demonstrate to his colleagues why their views were wrong. In doing so, he examined conventional views of justice that, during his times, were taken to be valid and demonstrated why, upon analysis, these views were deficient. To this end, he engaged the arguments of Cephalus and Polemarchus and, in doing so, like Socrates, he challenged those who held those conventional views to defend them against his, that is Plato’s, own arguments.

Cephalus is a “money maker” or a man engaged in business that by Plato’s own account does not seem to “love money too much.” Socrates asked Cephalus to explain the “greatest good” he has received from being wealthy.⁷ Cephalus responds that men of wealth like him seek a clear conscience; they do not want to cheat or deceive anyone, lest after death they may suffer terrible punishments. Socrates summarized Cephalus’s response to what the latter thinks by describing justice as following the principle that the just person is one who always seeks to tell the truth and one who tries to pay his debts. In other words, one must always keep one’s agreements with others. But Socrates responded by saying that this principle could not be upheld on all occasions. Socrates asked if one should return a weapon lent to one by a friend when the friend, after going mad, asked for it back. Clearly in this case, it is necessary to violate an agreement, and Cephalus agreed.⁸

Keeping one’s agreements with other individuals, although an important virtue, is not the virtue that should be made the basis of all social interactions in the society. More important, by implication, is that one should uphold one’s obligations and duties to the larger society. And when one focuses solely on obligations owed to other individuals, it might well be that one overlooks the obligations owed to the larger society. That is what the example of keeping an agreement with a madman shows. Although the madman, in asking for the return of the weapon, may pose no harm to the person who lent it to him, he does pose harm to the society. Thus, owing to the obligation we have to protect society from murder and mayhem, we have no duty to return a weapon to a madman. In a similar fashion, wealthy businessmen such as Cephalus should ponder whether their keeping agreements with each other, in order to make possible greater wealth for themselves, causes harm to the larger society. Clearly, Plato thought it might.

Next, as a definition of justice, Polemarchus suggested the idea that “it is just to give each person what is owed to him.”⁹ Socrates, after a series of comments and rejoinders with Polemarchus, concluded that justice as Polemarchus described it involved treating “friends well and enemies badly.”¹⁰ Socrates flatly rejected this principle for defining justice. For Socrates, justice is clearly a major virtue, and virtues cannot be used to do harm to others. To put this point differently, for Socrates, to use one’s skills and abilities to harm another is to use them in a manner that contradicts their purpose. If we are teachers of music we should use our skills to make people musical, not unmusical.¹¹ To do otherwise would suggest a form of society in which people turned virtue into a license that permitted them to use their best abilities and skills to impair human flourishing. But in a just society, people should use their skills to enhance and to enrich the lives of others.

1. Thrasymachus

But why can it not be argued that helping friends and keeping agreements are important virtues for people to follow? Indeed, are these values not essential to any conception of civic virtue? Plato might certainly answer this question in the affirmative. But his point seems to be that civic virtue is not the same thing as justice, and it is wrong to define the latter in terms of the former. Perhaps, as we will see later, civic virtue contributes to a just society, but, in doing so, it contributes to a value of singular importance, one that signals the overall basic good to which all members of society should be oriented. Here, the value of the highest importance toward which all other values must contribute is justice.

Thus, in criticizing certain approaches to civic virtue, Plato did not intend to deny its importance. This fact is best seen in his treatment of Thrasymachus whose view of justice, as we shall see, would completely deny any respect for civic virtue. Thrasymachus argued that what is just is what the strongest and the most powerful say is just. On this view, there is little room for civic virtue. For civic virtue presumes that people will make sacrifices for the larger good. Thrasymachus’s position manifests the arrogance of those who owing to their extraordinary power need never contemplate making sacrifices for the larger good. Rather, people who hold Thrasymachus’s view just define the larger good to suit their own interests, thus putting themselves in a position where they never have to manifest civic virtue. The following account of Socrates’ discussion with Thrasymachus elaborates on this point.

Thrasymachus said that each regime has a ruling group, and the ruling party makes laws in its own interest. Furthermore, the ruling party claims that whatever is in its own interest is also in the interest of the whole society. Socrates responded by saying that the ruling powers are fallible and at times they make mistakes and thus put into place policies that are not to their advantage.¹² On this view, it is not always the case, then, that what is in the interest of the stronger is either in their own interest or in the interest of the society. With these arguments, Thrasymachus is now forced to qualify his view of justice, and he no longer can hold that justice is “what the stronger believes to be to his advantage, whether it is in fact to his advantage or not.”¹³

Thrasymachus’s approach to recoup his position is to qualify what he meant by saying that justice is the interest of the stronger. In particular, Thrasymachus shows that the ruler is stronger because he is much like any other kind of expert—say doctors—in that, like them, owing to expertise, a ruler is not likely to make a mistake.¹⁴ The reason for this view is that, in each case, whether we are talking of a ruler or a doctor, each operates by the knowledge that makes one capable of performing with excellence. Given this view, the ruler is stronger because unlike ordinary citizens the rulers are less likely to make mistakes in ruling, including mistakes that would harm the ruler’s interest.

This response prompts a discussion of the nature of a craft, such as medicine. Socrates said that a craft suggests an activity in which a person uses his skills to attain only the purposes of the craft.¹⁵ This means for Socrates that a doctor uses his skills not to advance his own interests, such as making money, but to advance the interests of his patients. In the same way, a ruler, by analogy to other crafts, should use his knowledge to advance the interests of the citizens.¹⁶

In arguing this view, Socrates suggested that rulers must put aside their own interests and make the interests of the community primary. This commitment is the essence of what constitutes a life of civic virtue. Indeed, for Plato, rulers, like doctors, must exercise their skills so that they are in keeping with a commitment to serve the needs of their community. And thus rulers must not seek “anything other than what is best for the things it rules and cares for, and this is true both of public and private kinds of rule.”¹⁷ In consequence, a person concerned with the interests of the citizens does not enter politics to provide for his or her own advantage or to attain goods such as money and honor, but enters politics to help those who are weaker than him or herself.¹⁸ In fact, what draws many lesser people to politics is not what draws the good individual to politics. What attracts the good person to politics is fear of those who see politics as a way to promote their own interest at the cost of the society’s interest. Good people fear being ruled by “someone worse than [themselves].” This fear “makes decent people rule when they do.”¹⁹

No reasonable person wants to be ruled by someone whose main purpose in ruling is advancing only his or her own interests. But that is what Thrasymachus advocated. For Thrasymachus, those who commit acts of injustice are “clever and good.” Indeed, for Thrasymachus, those who “are completely unjust” can “bring cities and whole communities under their power.”²⁰ There is great profit in injustice, then.

Socrates attacked this position, arguing that the desire to act unjustly is a defect in the character of people. And the contention that injustice is a defect is easy to prove. Any society that was designed to act for unjust purposes will never succeed because the society will become riddled through and through with hatred and quarreling, thus making it impossible for people to work together as a unified community.²¹ This point is very important because the major purpose of any society is to serve the basic needs of its citizens, and a society that is unable to act in a unified fashion cannot possibly achieve this objective. Only people committed to the larger good of the community, those who manifest civic virtue and a concomitant commitment to justice, should be rulers, because it is only these people who can create the conditions that make possible the just, well-ordered society that Plato hoped to achieve.

Another important proof that injustice is an undesirable defect arises from the contention that no person would ever be personally happy were he or she to live life outside of a commitment to justice. Why is this? No person wants merely to live, said Socrates, but to live well and living well means being able to perform well one’s functions in society. But one cannot perform one’s functions well if one’s soul has been deprived of the “peculiar virtue” that allows one to execute one’s tasks at the level of excellence required for the good performance of a task. The virtue of the soul that enables one to perform well one’s function is justice, and thus it follows that “a just soul and a just man will live well.” Moreover, this state is desirable for people because one who lives well leads a “blessed and happy” life.²²

IV.The Next Question: What Is Justice?

Socrates has demonstrated not only what justice is not, but he has demonstrated, also, that it is far better or advantageous to lead a just life than to lead an unjust one. But Socrates suggested that in making these points he has raised another important question. In particular, he has yet to tell us exactly what justice is. And, since a just life is to be a happy life, if it is not possible to demonstrate the nature of justice and how justice as a virtue contributes to our well-being, it will not be possible to demonstrate the basis for a happy life.²³

Socrates thus felt compelled to demonstrate to Glaucon the definition of justice, intending to show him not only that justice is a good, but that it is “one of the greatest goods.”²⁴ As one of the greatest goods, what kind of good is justice? Justice is a good that not only provides an important result for its holder, but it is important for its own sake as well. Goods that are good for their own sake do not include money, for instance, but they do include “seeing, hearing, knowing, being healthy and all other goods that are fruitful by their own nature and not simply because of reputation.”²⁵ A good that is good for its own sake, then, is one that is so essential to life that it would be impossible to imagine a worthwhile life in the absence of that good. Such is the case with knowing, seeing, and hearing as well as justice. It is for this reason that justice is the basis for a life “blessed with happiness.”²⁶

But whereas it is intuitively clear to all what knowing, seeing, hearing, and good health are, it is not intuitively clear what justice is. To make a careful representation of justice, it is necessary to turn to sound, rational argument as opposed to intuition.

So what is a just society? What arguments defend the conception of justice Plato supports? In the next sections we will begin to address these questions.

1. The Basic Dimensions of Society

The early part of the Republic, which is a discourse between Socrates and the various individuals we have mentioned, now turns more to a conversation dominated by Socrates. Socrates’ intent in this conversation, which involves Glaucon, is to provide a basic lecture on the fundamentals of social organization, and, once he has done that, to build from these fundamentals to develop his conception of justice.

The starting point, then, for describing justice is that, in any society, it is clear that people have basic physical needs and thus they desire those material goods that satisfy these needs. Moreover, people by themselves cannot provide for these needs. So societies are formed for this purpose. In particular, we are told that, to secure the basic requirements of the citizens for food, shelter, and clothing, society needs a class of working people including farmers, builders, and weavers.²⁷ There also must be a marketplace where citizens can purchase the various goods that the different groups produce. Money is invented to facilitate exchanges. In the market setting, there are many merchants and retailers or shopkeepers trading their goods for money. These are people “whose bodies are the weakest and who aren’t fit to do any other kind of work.”²⁸

In this setting, all the basic needs that people have are cared for, and people live a long, peaceful, and healthy life in a just society, which they bequeath to their children. But Glaucon suggests to Socrates that Socrates’ city is not satisfactory because people will want luxuries as well as having their basic needs satisfied.²⁹ Socrates thought that the city built on serving basic needs is the “true and healthy city.” But he conceded the need to include in his discussion of a model for a just city what presumably some people want: namely, in addition to providing for basic needs a city must provide luxuries, as well. Socrates called this city the city with a “fever.” Here, Socrates described a city in which some people will seek to have fine clothes and good food. In addition, some people seek to have comfortable and decorated furniture, as well as prostitutes for sexual pleasure. Also, there will be people to provide art, music, and dance, as well as goods such as jewelry.³⁰ In order to enjoy these goods, people will have to have leisure time, and this dimension is secured by providing them with a class of servants, including tutors and cooks who take care of the day-to-day necessities of life.³¹ Finally, and most tragically, the quest for luxuries becomes the main motive for war as people, in the search for the “endless acquisition of money” for the sake of luxuries, seek to take each other’s resources.³²

In accepting that the pursuit of wealth and money is the essential motivation in society, Plato certainly accepted the notion of private ownership. Being able to have exclusive ownership to property provides one with an incentive to perform the necessary work that produces both basic goods and luxuries. Still, Plato did not intend to make a conception of society that emphasized the pursuit of wealth and luxury the basis for defining a just order. As we can see from his view of the origin of war, which emanates from the constant pursuit of wealth, Plato clearly feared making appetite the main motivating and dominant force in society. To avoid this circumstance, appetite—in this case the quest for luxuries and wealth embodied in private property ownership—must be limited by the constraints of reason. Here, property ownership need not symbolize the unlimited pursuit of appetite, but a willingness to use one’s property in ways that support the common good. To achieve a society with this possibility, Plato discussed the role of the guardians.

1. The Guardians and the Three Parts of the Soul

As we have mentioned, Plato distinguished three parts to the soul. In addition to the rational part that deliberates with the intention to determine truth, there is the part referred to as appetite and the spirited part. The appetite, says Socrates, “is the largest part in each person’s soul and is by nature most insatiable for money.” Moreover the appetite is motivated by the “pleasures of the body.”³³ Still, the appetite can be made subject to the commands of reason. One basis for this contention is the presence of the spirited part. Socrates views the spirited part as the “helper of the rational part,” or as the dimension of the soul committed to see that the rational conception of good order is realized.³⁴Socrates says, “I don’t think you can say that you’ve ever seen spirit, either in yourself or anyone else, ally itself with an appetite to do what reason has decided must not be done.”³⁵ In resisting appetite but in promoting the goals of reason, the spirited part manifests courage because, in holding steadfast to the “declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t,” the spirited part enables individuals to endure the pain of promoting the reasonable course.³⁶ Here, the spirited part signifies a desire to win honor from others for upholding the common good.

Moreover, for Socrates, the spirited part must be “rightly nurtured,” lest instead of courage it manifests itself as “hard and harsh.”³⁷ In this case, as opposed to working for the goals of reason, it might work against them. This view suggests that the spirited element is a fierce sort of passion or emotion that, if improperly developed, harms instead of helps the quest to realize the common good.

There are several other important implications to be gleaned here as well. First, Plato is not saying that the appetite can or should be completely suppressed. Still, however, the appetite must be constrained by reason and the spirited part, lest appetite lead to a situation in which individuals are prone, as Socrates says, to seek to “enslave and rule over the classes it isn’t fit to rule, thereby overturning everyone’s whole life.”³⁸ Here, those who are motivated by their appetite to acquire wealth and luxuries, for instance, must accept the regimen of a society that requires them to conduct their lives in keeping with the norms established by reason.

The problem, then, for Plato, and this is the second important implication of his three-part view of the soul, is to harness both the appetite and the spirited part so that each serves the goals posited by reason. To this end, Plato emphasized the importance of a special class of citizens, whom he called guardians.

Now, there are different types of guardians, and furthermore, guardians have two major functions, ruling and guarding the city. The “best of the guardians,” as Socrates referred to them, are rulers.³⁹ Those guardians, who have acted both as rulers and as protectors of the city, presumably through military exploits, are referred to as complete guardians. Younger people, who show promise of being guardians in the future, but who have as yet not proved themselves capable of being complete guardians, are called auxiliaries who act as assistants to the guardians.⁴⁰ The auxiliaries assist the guardians by supporting their objectives and helping to carry them out.⁴¹ The auxiliaries would certainly help the guardians fulfill their military duties. In the latter role, guardians would manifest courage and a desire for honor, as well as the various skills associated with soldiering. For Plato, it is a mistake to believe that people, who have expertise in other areas of life, say as farmers or craftsmen, will also have the knowledge and skill needed to be good warriors. In all cases, the complete guardians act from an unstinting commitment to protect the society from “external enemies and internal friends.”⁴²

Moreover, guardians must be properly educated so that they are able to perform their functions well. Here, Plato’s key point is that, without a proper system of training, individuals will not attain the appropriate degree of civic virtue that will enable them to act in the best interests of society. Speaking specifically of the auxiliaries, for instance, who possess military prowess, it is important to make certain that they do not use that power against the best interests of the people they are supposed to protect.⁴³Indeed, we are told that guardians will “be gentle to their own people and harsh to the enemy.”⁴⁴ That is why to the question: Who will guard the guardians?” Plato would certainly answer, no one will have to, because the guardians, owing to proper education, are the model of rational self-command.

Plato, in discussing the guardians, had in mind people who could be trusted with great power and authority, and yet ordinary citizens would never fear that they would harm society. The guardians, as rulers or as soldiers, are the moral saviors of the society because they act always and only for the common good. Finding them will be a society’s greatest challenge. Children will have to be watched and monitored to determine whether they demonstrate guardian traits, to be either rulers or auxiliaries.⁴⁵ This view suggests that, when proper candidates for a guardian life are found, they must be separated from the rest of the society. This will be necessary in order to raise these people independently from the ordinary influences that, if not properly controlled, would tend to deny the proper training that makes both the appetite and the spirit subject to reason.

Thus, guardians, unlike ordinary people, own no private property, accumulate no luxury, live in common with other guardians, and are not allowed to have their own families. Within guardian communities, each parent is the parent of all the children. No parent claims a child as his or her own, nor does any parent claim a special status for children he or she helped to conceive.⁴⁶ Were people to do so, guardians would identify too closely with their own children. And this would cause guardians to define their objectives in a narrower way than would be healthy for society. Guardians are not to place the needs of their own children above those of others and certainly not above the needs of the whole community. The words mine and not mine for Socrates must have reference only to what the community as a whole defines as mine and not mine. When these words refer to any particular individual’s preferences, then that person’s ability to support the common good will be very weak.⁴⁷

Each person who is a guardian must orient oneself to support the good of the community. Such individuals will not be limited to men, but will include consideration of women as guardians, also. In support of this position, Plato even suggested that the relationship between the sexes should be different for guardians from what this relationship entails for ordinary citizens. Male guardians should be willing to accept the view that some women have the ability to perform all essential guardian functions and those women who have this ability should be given the same opportunity as men to be guardians.⁴⁸ Now, Socrates’ position in comparing men and women is to accept the general prejudice of his age and to say that on the whole men are superior to women. He says in discussing various life activities that “in all of them women are weaker than men” or, in other terms, women perform them less well than men. However, there will be some women who have guardian natures, and these women, even if weaker than men, are “adequate for the task” and should be allowed to be guardians.⁴⁹

Why, if Plato had such a patronizing view toward women, did he grant them the opportunity to be guardians? Perhaps, Plato’s actual intention in according women a place in society as guardians was to reduce their sexual importance to men. Here, as men look upon women as partners in a common enterprise, possibly they will not seek to conquer women sexually. In this case, Plato’s commitment to sexual equality for guardians was merely a way to check male sexual aggressiveness, which, if unleashed, would make the appetite the primary factor and deny respect for reason. Plato argued on behalf of women’s being allowed to be guardians for reasons of securing a society committed to the common good and not because he was principally a proponent of gender equality.

The commitment to the common good and the need to create a special class of people able to bring about this great goal make it necessary for the introduction of manipulative techniques regarding marriage and childbearing. Marriages among guardians will be regulated in order to match people with the best combination of qualities to each other. To make this outcome possible, there will be lotteries in which people choose their mates, but these lotteries will be rigged so that the best people are matched together. And further, even though the number of children will be regulated by the rulers, those men who are successful in war will be able to have sex more frequently so that they can father as many children as possible. This will ensure a larger and better stock of children.⁵⁰ For others, full sexual freedom is regained after they have passed the childbearing age. In this case, people can have sex with anyone they choose to have sex with, but if they should conceive a child by accident, their offspring would be killed.⁵¹

1. The Philosopher as King

For Socrates (or Plato, who, as we have said, speaks through Socrates), the “best of the guardians” must be rulers, and, to this end, must train for the life of philosophy, which will be a major part of a ruler’s life. Socrates argued that “future rulers” must, in childhood, be offered basic training in geometry and mathematical calculation as well as all other topics needed to prepare them to engage in dialectical thinking.⁵²

Not everyone will be permitted to complete the course that leads to elevation to philosopher/ruler. Indeed, Socrates sought individuals who could use dialectical thinking to construct a unified and true picture of the reality under study, or, as in the Republic, of a just society. Those individuals with this ability will be screened from the rest and when they reach the age of 30 they will undergo training in the techniques of dialectical argument. Socrates did not want to have those who are capable of philosophy trained in dialectical argument younger than age 30 because he feared that when people are exposed to the techniques of argument as young persons they will employ these techniques merely to demonstrate an ability to refute other arguments. Such people merely seek to best others in argument as opposed to using argument to find truth.⁵³ But Socrates said that “an older person won’t want to take part in such madness. He’ll imitate someone who is willing to engage in discussion in order to look for the truth, rather than someone who plays at contradiction for sport.”⁵⁴

Again, those who are capable of dialectical thinking will be selected for training in the dialectic at the age of 30. After five years of training in this endeavor, in which they learn how to find truth, the future ruler will be sent into the “cave,” a term for ordinary society, to live with average people. In the cave, future rulers take part in military matters “and occupy the other offices suitable for young people, so that they won’t be inferior to the others in experience. But in these, too, they must be tested to see whether they’ll remain steadfast when they’re pulled this way or that or shift their ground.”⁵⁵ A person will undergo this experience for 15 years and then at the age of 50 these individuals will be permitted to spend most of their time with philosophy, but, as Socrates said, “when his turn comes, he must labor in politics and rule for the city’s sake.”⁵⁶These individuals, both men and women alike, will be given the task of putting “the city, its citizens, and themselves in order.”⁵⁷

Socrates said that, until “philosophers rule as kings” or until kings act as philosophers, it will be impossible to marry power to philosophy and thus create cities bent upon avoiding evil and achieving good.⁵⁸ Why are philosophers especially suited for linking power and morality? The answer lies in their character. Philosophers are gentle people, they are not cowardly or slavish, they are lovers of knowledge, they are not desirous of money or luxuries, and they learn quickly and with ease.⁵⁹ When power is placed into the hands of people with these characteristics, we can be assured that it will not be used to advance a quest for personal wealth. But instead power will be used to support, in a steadfast and courageous way, a desire to make sure that the goods defined by reason are made the main objective of society.

1. Justice, Civic Virtue, and the Noble Lie

To make possible a society in which an ethical order based on reason can be achieved, the guardians need to provide a basic education that teaches children civic virtue.⁶⁰ In particular, children must be taught the importance of law-abiding behavior if they are to mature into law-abiding people. To this end, children must take part in games that teach the importance of respect for law, and music and poetry must be designed for the same reason. Respect for lawfulness is also taught by learning to accept the authority of one’s elders and by being taught to care for one’s parents.⁶¹ When people are filled with good habits such as these, they are likely, from their own volition, to maintain conduct that contributes to the basic good of the society. Furthermore, these people will know what is best for the city and, in consequence, what laws need to be legislated. Indeed, for Socrates, when right conduct is not a part of the ingrained civic outlook of people, efforts to achieve good ends for the city through legislation will always fall short of the mark. The reason for this is that people who lack the habits of civic virtue are like “sick people” who are prone to the extremes of appetite, and thus they are not likely to listen to those who warn against the harmful effects of lechery, drunkenness, and overeating.⁶²

Once a basic commitment to civic virtue or a general respect for the common good of the society is in place, then the city has been properly established and a basis exists for the flourishing of other critical virtues in the city: wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice.⁶³ It is clear that these basic virtues are linked so that justice, the highest and most important of the four, cannot exist unless the others do. To explain this point, we will describe each virtue in turn.

1. Wisdom, Courage, Moderation, and Justice

First take wisdom. In discussing wisdom, Socrates distinguished between the knowledge possessed by particular craftsmen and the kind of knowledge needed to govern a state. Those who possess the latter kind of knowledge, the philosophers, have the knowledge necessary to understand what is needed to secure a well-ordered city, including how to create good relations internally as well as between the city and other cities.⁶⁴Courage is a capacity that enables people to maintain a steadfast commitment to uphold the basic values given to society by those who make the laws. Here, the laws embody fundamental beliefs that society is to protect, and individuals who manifest courage uphold these values, regardless of any particular difficulties or pains such actions may entail.⁶⁵Moderation is a third important virtue, and it suggests self-control or the ability to constrain our desires so that they do not rule our lives. Possessing moderation, individuals are not given to extreme modes of behavior, and in consequence the different parts of the society are more able to co-exist in harmonious and cooperative relationships.⁶⁶ A city that possesses moderation “makes the weakest, the strongest, and those in between—whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth, or anything else—all sing the same song together.”⁶⁷ Where moderation is the norm, each is able to contribute to the common needs of the society, and the quest for luxury or any other desire is not allowed to defeat this objective.

These values create the setting that is conducive to justice, the fourth essential virtue. Justice is mentioned last after the first three virtues because it is clear that the first three prepare the ground for justice. Indeed, Socrates said that justice would be what was “left over in the city when moderation, courage, and wisdom have been found.”⁶⁸Given this view of the relationship among the basic virtues, how would this relationship be rendered into concrete, practical terms to define the vision of a just society? A city with moderation, courage, and wisdom is just because each person has a role for which he or she is best qualified and, in performing that role well, each contributes in essential ways to the community’s common good. Socrates’ view was that “everyone must practice one of the occupations … for which he is naturally best suited.”⁶⁹ This state of affairs represents the condition of a just society. As Socrates said, “This doing one’s own work … is justice.”⁷⁰ Indeed, a just society is one in which “each does his own work and doesn’t meddle with what is other people’s,” and this value, the value of doing one’s own work, “rivals wisdom, moderation and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city.”⁷¹

A society in which each person makes a contribution to the good of the whole, in keeping with one’s basic abilities and skills, is a society that manifests what might be called external justice. Clearly, for Plato such a state is predicated upon a meritocratic principle of each person’s being assigned to those tasks for which one is, as Socrates says, “best suited.” Here, the workers should carry out the particular skills of their respective crafts, the auxiliaries should perform well their warrior role, and the philosophers should be good rulers.

The problem with maintaining this principle is how best to persuade people of its truth. After all, as a consequence of adhering to the norms of Plato’s just society, some will be given more important tasks than will others, so how will those at the bottom of society accept this outcome? Socrates’ answer was to invoke a lie in the name of securing justice. Here, it would seem that, in addition to learning the habits of basic civic virtue as a way to encourage people to contribute to the common good, a citizen must be made to believe a falsehood about the reason that justice is a worthy value. Obviously, then, the habits of civic virtue, such as law-abiding behavior, are by themselves not sufficient to secure support for the ways of life of a just society.

Thus, Socrates referred to a “noble falsehood” that could be used to persuade the rulers and the people in the city of the importance of all people’s accepting the role in society for which they are most naturally suited. According to the falsehood that Socrates would teach, even though “all in the city are brothers,” the god who created people placed a different metal in each person. He put gold into those who would be rulers; silver into those who would be auxiliaries; and iron and bronze into those who would be farmers and craftsmen (workers). Moreover, god engineered people so that they would, for the most part, produce children like themselves. Still, it is possible that children with silver or bronze metal will be born from a gold parent or vice versa. When this event occurs it is god’s intention that people be placed into positions in society appropriate to their abilities and coincident with the particular metal of their souls. For instance, if it is the case that the children of rulers are found to have a soul with bronze, then these people should be placed into the farmer or worker class. On the other hand, if the offspring of the worker class have gold in their souls, they should be given training to become rulers.⁷²

A lie can be noble and thus worthy if it is used for a good reason. And Plato would no doubt envision several good reasons for his noble lie. The first good reason, as just indicated, is that the lie maintains support for the external justice of a meritocracy. Another good reason for the lie is that it encourages what underlies external justice, namely, the proper ordering or the arranging of the key elements of the soul: reason, appetite, and spirit. We call this condition of the soul internal justice, and it represents a condition of mind that is the highest-order possibility of human life, a condition that the just city secures.

What is internal justice or the justice of the soul, and why is it such a valuable condition? Each of the parts of the soul has its own objectives and, in achieving these objectives, one is able to attain the pleasure associated with that part. Thus, in realizing the objectives of the spirited part, one receives the pleasures associated with manifesting the courage to uphold the common good; in realizing the objectives of the appetite one realizes pleasures associated with receiving money. But for Socrates when one’s focus is entirely upon either of these dimensions to the exclusion of the direction provided by one’s reason, or what Socrates refers to as “those pleasures that reason approves” of, then one does not “attain the truest possible pleasures” associated with the appetite and the spirited part of the soul.⁷³ For instance, take a situation where either the spirited part or the appetite is made so central in one’s life that the importance of reason is downplayed. Here, a person pursuing the objectives of the spirited part of the soul, outside the direction of reason, may become so desirous of success in battle that he or she becomes overly violent and loses the ability to make decisions that would bring about the victory he or she seeks. Or, a person whose only quest in life is to accumulate money may end up having no regard for the goods that reason stipulates, and, in consequence, such a person may destroy all relationships with others who love him or her.

Moreover, when a person allows him or herself to become maniacally dedicated to the objectives of the spirited part and the appetite at the same time, he or she may set in motion two powerful desires, each warring with the other. For instance, individuals desirous of both showing courage and having money may find that to have the former they may have to sacrifice the quest for money. But the appetite may demand that their quest to demonstrate courage and dedication to the common good take a back seat to money. In this case, the quest to serve society is always at war with the urge for money. In contrast, when an individual allows their reason or philosophical part to have the upper hand, this tragedy is avoided. For Socrates, “therefore, when the entire soul follows the philosophic part, and there is no civil war in it, each part of it does its own work exclusively and is just, and in particular it enjoys its own pleasures, the best and truest pleasures possible for it.”⁷⁴

Now a well-ordered and balanced soul brings happiness to the individual, but, in addition, such a soul is able to make an important contribution to maintaining the well-ordered character of society. Here, owing to the fact that the appetite and the spirited part are under the direction of the philosophic part, it follows that individuals maintain an internal balance to their personalities that would permit them to be able to perform well the various tasks for which they are best suited. The internal justice of the soul is linked to and supports the external justice of a meritocratic life.

Given this account of internal justice, for Socrates it is now understandable why it is best for “everyone to be ruled by divine reason, preferably within himself and his own, otherwise imposed from without, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends, governed by the same thing.”⁷⁵ It must be clear that, to attain this objective, the real city is not so much the external city in which people live their daily lives, although it is of course that, too. But the real city is the properly arranged soul, and unless this state of mind is possible, there will be no happiness or external justice. As Socrates said, “It’s also our aim in ruling our children, we don’t allow them to be free until we establish a constitution in them, just as in a city, and by—fostering their best part with our own—equip them with a guardian and ruler similar to our own to take our place. Then, and only then, we set them free.”⁷⁶ When the city reaches this stage, the habits of civic virtue—which contribute to each citizen’s ability to support the common good by upholding basic virtues such as moderation, courage, wisdom, and justice—as well as Plato’s noble falsehood have both paved the way for not only a good constitution in the state, but an equally good one in the soul of each individual.

V.Democracy and Injustice

The hope for the good city must be contrasted with the reality of the bad ones. For Plato, timocracy, oligarchy, and democracy are corrupted regimes that propel society in the direction of tyranny. The implications for people are severe and tragic. In what follows, we provide a brief summary of Plato’s argument. To understand Plato’s account, it is important to recognize that regimes are distinguished by the fact that different characteristics of the soul come to dominate them. In the best city, the Republic, the faculty of reason is preeminent. But in the lesser regimes, either the spirited part of the soul or the appetite dominates.⁷⁷

In a timocracy, the spirited part dominates and thus the regime is dedicated to make honor, courage, and the love of military victory the main objective.⁷⁸ This situation results from the dueling tendencies in a timocracy. On the one hand, there are those who seek to acquire wealth, and on the other there are those who manifest aristocratic tendencies and who want to govern by virtue. A civil war breaks out between the two groups, but it ends with a compromise that permits private property in land and the enslavement of peasants to work the land. In addition, war-related activities become a main aspect of life. The individuals appointed as rulers will be “spirited and simpler” people who will spend their time engaging in war as a means for gaining honor from others. Further, they will satisfy their own appetites with other people’s money, while saving their own. Still, of the two passions—that for money and honor—the latter dominates, and thus there is continual quest for military victory. In this setting, there is no interest in making philosophy and the rational dimension of the soul count for much in society.⁷⁹

The next regime is oligarchy, a regime in which “victory-loving and honor-loving people become lovers of making money, or money lovers.”⁸⁰ Here, the appetite takes over as money is valued more than virtue, and the wealthy people are admired and made the rulers. Indeed, the political system is designed so that only people with property may hold office and the poor have no opportunity to rule, even if a poor person could do a better job.⁸¹ A major characteristic of this kind of society is that money is not used to support a life of luxury so much as it is used to satisfy necessary needs or appetites, and the rest of the money one accumulates from the profits of one’s enterprises is hoarded.⁸² Also, in this kind of society in which money is worshipped and virtue is lost sight of many people avoid responsibility for their own lives. In consequence, some sell all they own, and by doing so many people no longer have the means or are willing to perform essential functions as workers and craftsmen, and, instead, they become poor people without the means to make a living. These people become “drones,” who must live off the labor of others. Some do so as beggars and others do so as “evildoers” who commit crimes and become thieves and pickpockets.⁸³

Naturally the poor become resentful of the rich, and the poor see the rich as undeserving of their station. When the poor overthrow the rich, they establish a democracy. Here, each person is given a chance to take part in ruling the city.⁸⁴ Democracies quickly become societies in which the appetite, in this case not just for basic or necessary needs, but for unnecessary goods (or goods such as luxuries that people could live without), is allowed unlimited freedom. In an atmosphere of “general permissiveness,” individuals lack sufficient self-control and all pleasures are declared to be of equal value. Indeed, the democrat cannot distinguish between “fine and good desires” and those that are “evil.” The democrat pursues whatever desire is at hand, and there is no basis for establishing a rational order to life. But the democrat calls this way of life free and happy, when in fact this way of life is a passport to “extreme slavery” or tyranny.⁸⁵

Finally, there is tyranny. The latter evolves from democracy, and it is associated with a form of appetite that is “lawless,” because it promotes desires that, in addition to being unnecessary, will not accept the discipline of reason.⁸⁶ The setting that culminates in the rule of the appetite not subject to the discipline of reason is characterized by an “insatiable desire for freedom.”⁸⁷ Indeed, Socrates blames an extreme desire for freedom for the emergence of tyranny.⁸⁸ In this setting, the ruling class consists of people who can make no useful contributions to society—the “drones” who were part of oligarchic life. The ruling drones seek to maintain power by currying favor with the common people. To this end, the ruling class postures as the champion of the people against the rich, and thus the ruling class promises to take money from the rich and give it to the people. However, the ruling drones keep for themselves the largest part of the money that they take from the rich.⁸⁹ The rich complain before the common people while the ruling drones accuse the rich of plotting to hurt the ordinary people. The rich, in turn, fearing that the ordinary people will side with the ruling drones, react by becoming like oligarchs and demand rule by the rich. All of this feuding culminates in both the rich and the drones being charged with crimes and being put on trial.⁹⁰ In the midst of this general disorder, the people decide to set up one person as their champion. The latter becomes a tyrant when he dominates the “docile mob” and resorts to violent and coercive tactics, including inciting a civil war against the rich.⁹¹ Ultimately, the people realize they have created a monster, and they thus order him to leave the city, but he refuses and he uses violence to retain control.⁹²

The story just described demonstrates that when civic virtue is eroded and, in consequence, the great virtues such as justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom are no longer a part of the life of the city, appetite in its various forms and with its harmful effects rules a city. In the context of what Plato described, it is best for cities to follow a just course.

However, the good consequences of justice and the terrible ones following injustice exist not only for cities, but for individuals as well. Socrates concluded the Republic by making clear the nature of the personal advantages of leading a just life and the disadvantages for individuals of leading an unjust life. Thus, Socrates argued that the gods will always help a just person in need “either during his lifetime or afterwards,” because the gods “never neglect anyone who eagerly wishes to become just.”⁹³ Socrates asked whether it is not true that just people “enjoy a good reputation and collect the prizes from other human beings?”⁹⁴ In contrast, Socrates said the unjust person will become “wretched,” and he will be “ridiculed.” Indeed, the unjust will be “beaten with whips, and made to suffer those punishments, such as racking and burning, which you rightly described as crude.”⁹⁵

This fate awaits the unjust person in the life to come, as well. In his discussion of the Myth of Er, Socrates gave an account of the terror and pain that await unjust individuals in the afterlife. He cautioned Glaucon to practice justice and to act in accordance with reason in every way, so that he will be able to receive the rewards from the gods while on earth and after his death. In this case, Socrates concluded, “We’ll do well and be happy.”⁹⁶

The account Socrates provided here suggests that, if people cannot be persuaded to act justly through a reasoned discourse as he had provided throughout the Republic, then perhaps a picture of the terrible pains they will suffer for acting unjustly will frighten people into a life of justice. Fear, then, may achieve what reason cannot.

VI.Plato and Civil Society

Plato’s political theory is an account of justice both in the society and in the individual. This struggle for justice does not have to include, as it later will, the need to integrate into society the idea of people as free and equal moral persons, subject to rules that all accept as a condition for their common equality. Instead, justice must culminate in a city that encourages the proper arrangement of the essential parts of the soul. Here, individuals will not have equal rights as in the modern world. Still, there is a commitment to give to each person something of great import, a life whose essential elements are in concord with each other. When the souls of persons are properly constituted, they can contribute in essential and necessary ways to society, making possible a just order. For Plato, only when there is justice in the individual can there be justice in society.

What are the implications of this view for civil society? At first glance, the answer to this question might suggest a pessimistic answer. If by a civil society we mean a setting that contains both a separate sphere of voluntary associations, as well as an overarching commitment to shared norms such as respect for both the freedom and rights of individuals, then Plato’s republic would certainly find these arrangements unacceptable. After all, a separate sphere of voluntary groups, acting independently of the ruler, in this case philosopher king, would make it difficult for the state to have a central role in coordinating the activities of the different classes, so that overall the common good could be achieved. Indeed, Plato’s guardians, who raise children in common and whose marriages are arranged by an elite group of rulers, would find the civil society setting intolerable. Similar rejection of civil society would be manifested by Plato’s guardian/rulers, who had no difficulty resorting to the manipulative techniques associated with Plato’s “noble falsehood.”

On the other hand, there is a sense in which Plato’s arguments, at least indirectly, suggest the need for a civil society. For the fact is that Plato’s philosopher king establishes the role of an independent spokesperson for truth. Clearly, the philosopher class, especially as manifested by the actions of Socrates and by Plato’s depiction of the truth-seeking individual, can function well only if it has the freedom that permits it independence from all external shaping influences and forces. Truth seeking thrives in an environment free from unruly emotions, as well as external efforts by tyrants to coerce thought. Plato’s philosopher king could flourish only in a society that provides a separate sphere, operating within a larger moral environment that is dedicated to securing individual rights and those civic virtues that make such rights possible. Thus, whereas Plato’s philosopher king might not advocate a civil society, it is hard to imagine how he could survive without one.

Of course to the last argument, it could be claimed that the philosopher king would not be able to achieve his or her objectives except in the special setting of Plato’s Republic. Only in a setting in which society is organized to make certain that political rule is reserved for those with the highest wisdom will the philosophers ever feel capable of engaging in philosophy. Outside of this type of society, no philosopher would be secure enough to practice philosophy. What reasons support this position? First, truth seeking threatens existing norms, and often when contemporary opinions are challenged, those who do so are considered liabilities to the society, and in this circumstance made subject to forms of intolerance and social exclusion. Thus, only in Plato’s Republic, where society is designed to protect the philosopher, could the philosopher be free to practice his or her art. Second, it is only in Plato’s Republic where the system of education can be designed to develop the philosophical acumen of individuals. In societies where matters other than philosophy are emphasized, matters such as the pursuit of money or pleasure or even rights, for instance, a person with philosophical ability will never be able to develop one’s basic philosophical talent. But Plato’s Republic will ensure a place where the training for philosophy will always supplant in importance all other activities and interests.

The civil society proponent would respond by arguing that a civil society can protect philosophers from mob intolerance, and it can also provide the training people must have to become philosophers. To say otherwise is to place philosophy in jeopardy by having to associate it with a form of elite life that menaces the basic freedoms a civil society protects and that the life of philosophy surely needs.