

in our last meeting...

- we discussed how the conversation of the *Republic* transitions from discussing
 - a minimal city in which everyone's basic survival needs are met
 - a 'luxurious city' which enables its citizens
 - not merely to *live*
 - but also to *live well*
- following Plato,
 - we call the hypothetical 'luxurious city' the interlocutors are constructing in discourse:

'The Kallipolis'

the need for guardians
in the Kallipolis

having turned to consider the ‘luxurious city’, Socrates’ plan is to follow a two-step strategy for getting at

- *what it is for a city to be just*

[STEP 1] construct (in speech) the **best** luxurious city that Socrates & his interlocutors can conceive of

– i.e. the **ideal luxurious city**:

➤ an autonomous political community which **functions maximally well** in the sense that

- given its resources, the city succeeds in providing the citizenry **as a whole** with
- the greatest amount of **happiness** that
- any such self-sustaining political community **inhabited and run by human beings** feasibly could

– (following Plato, we call this city ‘**The Kallipolis**’)

[STEP 2] analytically examine The Kallipolis constructed in Step 1 to determine what precisely its **being just** consists in

Republic II (373d-374e)

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‘spirit’ and ‘spiritedness’ as a character-type

the ancient Greek noun *thumos*

- gets translated as ‘**spirit**’
- doesn’t exactly correspond to any noun in contemporary English
- was close associated with the character-type of ‘**spiritedness**’

for the Greeks of our period, ‘**spirited**’ [*thumoeidēs*] people are ones who’re

- highly **competitive**
- unusually passionate about
 - **distinguishing themselves** through **impressive successes**
- obsessed with **getting respect** and **being respectable**

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Republic II 376b ff. (Socrates)

‘So **gentleness** [to the citizens]... **spirit** [*thumos*], **speed**, and **strength** must all, then, be combined in anyone who is to be a good and fine guardian of our city...

‘But how are we to **bring up** and **educate** a guardian?...

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4. so the Kallipolis will need **guardians** who
 - can **defend** the well-being of its citizens **through violence**
 - are in charge of **ruling** the Kallipolis


class of *guardians*

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graph TD; A[class of guardians] --> B['auxiliary guardians<br/>(often just called 'auxiliaries'):<br/>experts in war and combat']; A --> C['complete guardians:<br/>(often just called 'guardians'):<br/>those who rule the city'];
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
division the Kallipolis into 3 political classes



THREE POLITICAL CLASSES IN THE KALLIPOLIS

1. CLASS OF **GUARDIAN RULERS**
2. CLASS OF **AUXILIARIES (= THE SOLDIERS)**
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Socrates case for
the **tripartition** of the embodied
human soul [*psychē*]

Republic IV 435e-436c (Socrates speaking)

‘... [Various cities around us are variously reputed to be **money-loving, spirited, & learning-loving**]... It’d be ridiculous for anyone to think that the **spirited** [*thumoeides*], **learning-loving** [*philomathes*], [...] and **money-loving** [elements] in cities *don’t* come to be from the individuals who dwell [in the cities]... and themselves possess [these characteristics]... This much isn’t hard to know.’

‘It certainly isn’t.’

‘But this further matter *is* hard. In each of these cases, are we *acting with the same part of ourselves*? Or are we *acting* [in these cases] **with three different parts of ourselves**: doing one [action] with one part, another with another? Do we **understand** [*manthanei*] with one part of ourselves, **feel indignation** [*thumoumetha*] with another, and **have appetites** [*epithumoumen*] for the pleasures of food, drink, sex, & the like, with a third part? Or is it that when we’re impelled in each such case, we do [the action] with the whole soul? [...] Let’s try to determine whether these things [in us] are *the same as* or *distinct from* one another.’

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‘Well, it’s manifest that **the same thing** will never permit [itself] to do or undergo **opposites** in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, and at the same time. So, if we discover that [such simultaneous opposites] *are* generated within ourselves we’ll know that it isn’t **the same thing** [within us that possesses these opposite characteristics] but **many**.’

Socrates thinks it clear that...

in actual human cities one can find these 3 kinds of people:

1. **‘money-loving’ people** who organize their entire lives around the goal of
 - accumulating **wealth** and using it to secure **bodily pleasures & comforts**
2. **‘spirited people’** who organize their entire lives around the goal of
 - **winning** competitive victories & **being honored for honorable accomplishments**
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according to Plato...

- the embodied human soul is a **composite of three distinct parts**

‘appetite’
[epithumia]

1. an ‘**appetitive**’ element that
 - loves **bodily pleasure**
 - hates **bodily pains**

‘spirit’
[thumos]

2. a ‘**spirited**’ element that
 - loves **victory, honor, & being respectable**
 - hates **defeat, dishonor, & being disrespectful**

‘reason’
[logos, logismos]

3. a ‘**rational**’ element that
 - loves **truth, knowledge, & beauty**
 - hates **falsehood, ignorance, & ugliness**

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the principle of opposites (cf. 436b, 437e)

it's impossible for something *numerically one* to be

- at the same time, in the same respect, & in relation to the same things,

the *proper subject* of two opposite characteristics

‘Well, it’s manifest that **the same thing** will never permit [itself] to do or undergo **opposites** in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, and at the same time. So, if we discover that [such simultaneous opposites] *are* generated within ourselves we’ll know that it isn’t **the same thing** [within us that possesses these opposite characteristics] but **many**.’

Socrates case for
the **tripartition** of the embodied
human soul [*psychē*]

according to Plato...

- the embodied human soul is a **composite** of **three distinct parts**

‘appetite’
[epithumia]

1. an ‘**appetitive**’ element that
 - loves **bodily pleasure**
 - hates **bodily pains**

‘spirit’
[thumos]

2. a ‘**spirited**’ element that
 - loves **victory, honor, & being respectable**
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‘reason’
[logos, logismos]

3. a ‘**rational**’ element that
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one and the same **in number**

vs.

one and the same **in kind**




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consider the predicate:

is the author who wrote Ulysses

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James Joyce



his right hand

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Republic IV 436c-d (Socrates speaking)

‘Let’s make our agreement [to this thesis about opposites] more precise so that we don’t run into disputes later on. If someone said that

- a human who’s standing still but moving his hands and head is, at the same time, moving and standing still

then our judgment, I think, would be [the speaker] shouldn’t express it like that. [The speaker] should instead say that *part of the human* is moving and *part of the human* is standing still.’

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 1. moving & standing still
 2. white & black
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Zayd the sheep



a bow being simultaneously
pushed forward & pulled back



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Aristotle's 'principle of non-contradiction'

it's impossible for something *numerically one* to both *have* and *lack* the same property

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"This is a bank and isn't a bank."

6. having property P & lacking property P

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- crucially relies on the following two posits

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suppose I told you...

- **sphere A** is such that its surface is entirely black
- **sphere B** is such that its surface is entirely white

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[epithumia]

1. an **‘appetitive’** element that
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it's important to appreciate the difference between...

1. (merely) having **two incompatible desires** at one & the same time
2. simultaneously having both
 - an **attraction driving you towards** doing action X
 - an **aversion repulsing you from** doing action X

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Socrates' case for **distinguishing**

- a **part** of the embodied human psyche that's (1) **appetite-driven**
from
- **part(s)** the human psyche that are
(2) **reasoning-driven** & (3) *thumos*-driven

Republic IV 439a-c

Soc: 'So, the soul of the thirsty person... is impelled to drink. [...] And if anything in [the soul of a thirsty person] draws it back when it's [at the same time] thirsty, wouldn't it be something different from what thirsts and---like a beast---drives it to drink? For surely, we say, the same thing, in the same respect of itself, in relation to the same thing, and at the same time, cannot do opposite things?'

Glauc: Correct. [...]

Soc: "Now, we would say, wouldn't we, that some people are thirsty sometimes, yet unwilling to drink?"

Glauc: "Many people, and often"



according to Socrates...

- it's quite possible for any embodied adult human psyche to simultaneously have
1. an *appetite-driven* **attraction** to drinking this W
 2. a *reasoning-driven* **aversion** to drinking this W



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1. an *appetite-driven* **attraction** to drinking this W
 2. a *reasoning-driven* **aversion** to drinking this W

Republic IV 439d

Soc: 'In cases of the kind [we've been talking about]

- the [aversion] hindering [us from the action]—if it's generated at all—is generated within [us] **from reasoning** [*ek logismou*],
- while the [attraction] driving and dragging [us towards the action] arrives [in us] **through feelings and afflictions** [*dia pathēmatōn te kai nosēmatōn*].

Or isn't that right?'

Glc: 'It's clearly right.'

Soc: 'Hence, there's good reason for us to maintain that these very things are **two**, and *distinct* from one another. We'll call the part of the soul [*psychē*] with which it **reasons** [*logizetai*] **the reasoning part** [*to logistikon*]; and the part [of the soul] with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, & gets excited in connection with other such **appetites** [*epithumias*]: *this* we'll call the [soul's] unreasoning **appetitive part** [*to epithumētikon*], a partisan of these particular pleasures and gratifications

Socrates' case for **distinguishing**

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- it's quite possible for any embodied adult human psyche to simultaneously have
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 2. a *thumos-driven* **aversion** to staring at this Z

Republic IV 439e-440a (Socrates speaking)

“Leontius... was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses with the public executioner nearby. He had an appetitive desire to look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and turned himself away. For a while he struggled and put his hand over his eyes, but finally, **mastered by his appetite**, he opened his eyes wide and rushed toward the corpses, saying: “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches; take your fill of the lovely sight!”

Socrates' case for

- *distinguishing*: (1) an **appetite-driven** part of the embodied human psyche
- *from*: part(s) of the human psyche that are
(2) **reasoning-driven** and (3) *thumos*-driven

it's quite possible for any embodied adult human psyche to simultaneously have

- an attraction to drinking this W **generated by sheer appetite**
- an aversion to drinking the same W **generated by rational calculation**


it's quite possible for any (embodied) adult human psyche to simultaneously have

- an attraction to staring at this Z **generated by sheer appetite**
- an aversion to staring at this same Z **generated by *thumos***

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- Republic IV argues that the embodied human soul is a **plurality** consisting of several distinct **parts**

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Odyssey XX.5-18

(Lattimore translation lightly edited by Crager)

[Bedding down that night outside his palace]

Odysseus was sleepless, ideas of doing evil to the suitors

racing in his *thumos*. In the morning the women

came out from the palace, on their way (as usual)

to sleep with the suitors, full of laughter and giggles.

But the *thumos* deep in Odysseus' chest was stirred by this sight,

and he was much vexed, opposing mind [*phrēn*] and *thumos*,

whether to spring on the women and kill them all,

or rather to let them sleep with the arrogant bastards

this one last time...

His heart growled within him, in indignation at the suitors'

evil deeds. But he struck himself on the chest

and he rebuked his heart with a story [*muthos*].

“Be patient, my heart. At other times, you’ve patiently endured treatment even more shameful this! On that day when the unbeatable Cyclops ate up our strong comrades, you patiently endured it until, although you expected death, intelligence [*mētis*] got you out of that cave”

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a human body that (see *Rep.* IV 439b-c)

- *simultaneously,*
- *in the same respect,* and
- *in relation to the same thing* (the bow)

pushes forward and **pulls back**

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