has taken up the concept of transference in *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer & Freud, 1895d), but here he is beginning to embrace and acknowledge the importance of the concept. He is extending its significance, for, although he recounts that he first conceived of transference in his clinical work, he now has implicitly extended the theoretical underpinnings of transference to everyday phenomena, including the dream. We can also say that, if transference occurs in the process of dream formation, it may be possible in other aspects of our everyday life. Here, I am referring to a work of Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901b), where Freud in many ways uses the model of dream formation and compromise formation to explain ordinary phenomena, such as momentary forgetting or slips of the tongue. Even in the dream book, Freud gives us indication that he is moving in this theoretical direction. If one looks at various letters to Fliess (Masson, 1985), we see that Freud's thoughts had already traversed this theoretical roadblock. To go back to the specifics of transference we might ask why experiences to which a person is relatively indifferent would be the subject of transference.

Freud's answer is twofold: we must first understand that he feels that he has demonstrated that "every analysis of a dream shows some recent impression woven into its texture and that this recent element is often of the most trivial kind" (1900a, p. 562). This is clearly an empirical statement and one that we look at much later in our analysis. He then goes on to tell us that the reason why these recent and indifferent elements so frequently find their way into dreams as substitutes for the oldest of all the dream-thoughts is that they have least to fear from the censorship. Experiences to which we are indifferent do not find resistance from either below or above. The power of an ucs. thought can easily overwhelm these relatively unimportant experiences, and they therefore make a suitable vehicle for transference. Conversely, the pcs. censor does not pay attention to these relatively trivial, recent experiences, even if they have been somewhat transformed and intensified by the transference process. Here, we can see one of the uses of Freud's idea of compromise formation. The indifferent experience cannot be radically transformed by the ucs. derivative, or the disguise or defensive value will be lost. Nevertheless, there must be some representation of the ucs. idea, or the wish is not expressed, even in symbolic form. Thus, in the dream, there is a compromise between defensive processes (which are weakened during sleep) and the expression of a dream-wish. Why, we might ask, is it so important to the person to express this ucs. wish? What is the point of all this disguise and mental gymnastics to express a wish that is derived from childhood experience? To answer this question, Freud takes us into one realm of his ideas of early development.

Wishes, hallucinations, and fundamental hypotheses

We have talked about wishes in a general way, but Freud is going to be increasingly more specific about the nature and content of a wish in this publication and in *Three Essays on Sexuality* (which we explore later in this chapter). Here, we will encounter some of his fundamental hypotheses about human life and, implicitly, about evolution. A good deal of what we will go over Freud has attempted to conceptualize in letters to Fliess, or what is today called *The Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895a, see also Pribram & Gill, 1976). He begins by telling us that, in less developed species, an organism's efforts

> were directed towards keeping itself so far as possible free from stimuli; consequently its first structure followed the plan of a reflex apparatus, so that any sensory excitation impinging on it could be promptly discharged along a motor path. But the exigencies of life interfere with this simple function, and it is to them too, that the apparatus owes the impetuous to further development. [1900a, p. 565]

These sentences are described in the *Standard Edition* as the "so called 'Principle of Constancy'" (1900a, p. 565, fn.), which Freud alludes to in several places but explicitly in *Beyond The Pleasure Principle* (1920g). Here, we can describe this principle in two complementary ways; the organism (any organism) attempts to reduce stimulation to its lowest level. Hence, we can say that discharge of stimulation is the prototypic type of gratification for Freud, more specifically, the adult male orgasm is the type of discharge that Freud's theory views as paradigmatic. Thus, to repeat gratification occurs when we reduce stimulation to its lowest level; orgasm is a discharge which accomplishes this in terms of sexual stimulation. What does Freud mean when he says the exigencies of life interfere with the sensory–motor reflex arc pattern? The example he uses involves a human baby in the midst of experiencing a need state, hunger. The hungry infant kicks and screams "helplessly". The internal situation for the infant remains unaltered, since hunger is not a momentary excitation but rather a need that produces a continuous state of internal or endogenous excitation. A change in the state can only come about if the infant is fed, and this can only happen if a care-giver responds to the infant. When this occurs, it gives rise to satisfaction and produces a cessation of endogenous stimulation. The perception of satisfaction is associated in memory with the memory of "the excitation produced by the need". The next time the need arises, Freud posits that the experience of satisfaction will be evoked in the form of the memory of (or, using the terminology of the *Standard Edition*, the mnemic image of) the original satisfaction. This is what Freud calls a wish-fulfilment; the impulse or impetus to have the perception of satisfaction is the wish, the appearance of the satisfaction is a wish fulfilled. Thus, the "reappearance of the perception (of satisfaction) is the satisfaction of the wish". Freud assumes that the infant's first psychical act or activity is a wish fulfilment that "produces a 'perceptual identity', a repetition of the perception which was linked with the satisfaction of the need" (1900a, p. 566). This associative link between the memory traces is one of contiguity. This bond is established by a form of conditioning. The memory of the need is temporally associated with the memory of satisfaction, and the production of

the satisfying mnemic image is an attempt to endogenously produce satisfaction. Obviously, the most direct path for fulfilling a wish is to have the entire memory trace (or original perceptual image) reappear (in energic terms, it is recathected). If this is done in complete sensory detail, Freud calls this a hallucination, and he assumes that this first attempt by the infant is experienced in sensory terms.

This hallucination, or reappearance of the experience of satisfaction, obviously does not bring complete satisfaction. The hunger persists and the

> bitter experience of life must have changed this primitive thought-activity into a more expedient secondary one.... In order to arrive at a more efficient expenditure of psychical force, it is necessary to bring a regression to a halt before it becomes complete, so that it does not proceed beyond the mnemic image, and is able to seek out other paths which lead eventually to the desired perceptual identity being established from the direction of the external world. In other words, it becomes evident that there must be a means of reality-testing (i.e., of testing things to see whether they are real or not). [*ibid*.]

(The term reality testing was added in 1919 by Freud.)

Freud is postulating, in this part of his model, that, after the first experience of satisfaction from the outside world, the infant, when it experiences hunger, endogenously reproduces this experience. In his terms, the infant re-cathects the mnemic image and in this way "re-evoke(s) the perception itself" (*ibid*.). When this hallucination does not significantly reduce the experience of hunger, it becomes necessary to try another pathway, that is, to turn towards reality. What does the infant do? It probably cries in a manner that signals to its care-giver that it is hungry (or that a need has arisen). Here, again, we can say that the infant learns to bring its "regression" to a halt and try other behaviours that will bring it in contact with reality. Freud is once more invoking learning mechanisms; the infant learns that a signal it naturally emits (crying when it is in discomfort) will bring satisfaction. It learns to turn away from what Freud calls regressive activities (the wish-fulfilment, or hallucination) towards the external world.

As we have gone over Freud's ideas about early development, we have implicitly introduced some terms that have not as yet been defined. The term regression, in this context, is one that will need to be more fully explicated. Freud also begins to introduce the idea of the wish-fulfilment as the primary or first activity, and the infant's turn towards the external world (or reality) as a secondary response. Here is the beginning of Freud's ideas about primary and secondary process, which will be highlighted in one of our next sections. Before we discuss these topics, Freud has a few more words to say about wish-fulfilment and the importance of wishes to the development of thought processes.

Freud tells us that thought is a substitute for an unconscious wish. We have seen that the primary wish gives way to secondary activity that deals with reality. Similarly, thoughts that deal with reality begin to take the place of the primary wish. It is his view that the prime mover for the mental apparatus is the wish. This is true in a number of senses of the term "prime mover", and we have seen that he views the

wish as appearing first in the infant's development. Freud postulates that the energy for thoughts is derived from the wish, and this is another important sense in which the wish is the prime mover (a term both Aristotle and Augustine utilized). Wishes are prime movers for dream formation and for neurotic symptoms as well. However, in neurotic symptoms, there is always a pcs. wish that is opposing the ucs. wish. (Here, Freud uses the term "wish", but, in modern terms, we might call this a defensive function. However, when Freud puts in terms of "wish", he is giving a picture of the conflict there is between different systems or different areas of the mind.) For a symptom to be formed, the two wishes must be able to merge into a single expression. The pcs. wish in symptom formation has as its function the desire to keep an unconscious idea from attaining consciousness. Typically, the motive for this involves a self-punitive wish or some type of pcs. motive that would act to keep the ucs. wish out of cs. A patient of Freud's had an ucs. wish to be continuously pregnant, and with as many men as possible. "A powerful defensive impulse had sprung up against this unbridled wish. Since the patient (felt) she might lose her figure and her good looks as a result of vomiting" (1900a, p. 570), it was a symptom that expressed her pcs. (defensive) wish to punish herself as well as symbolizing her ucs. wish to become pregnant. The symptom was a compromise formation, in that it expressed tendencies from two different types of motives. We could alternatively say that both the ucs. and pcs. systems were represented in the formation of the symptom.

However, this type of formation is somewhat different in dreams, and Freud says that only occasionally in dream analyses do we come upon reactive creations, as he maintains are found in symptom formation. During sleep, the ucs. wish can usually find expression in the dream after undergoing certain distortions because there is a withdrawal by the pcs.–cs. system into a state of sleep. Freud sees dreams that incorporate ongoing events as examples of the person attempting to maintain the dream narrative in order to remain asleep. Thus, the alarm clock becomes a car alarm in the dream and placed in the context of the dream narrative. During sleep, the strongest wish is to remain sleeping, and, interestingly enough, the dream narrative is designed to continue this state (i.e., the state of sleep). Freud goes so far as to tell us that we have some awareness that we are sleeping during sleep and, correlatively, we are aware that we are dreaming during this activity. Freud cites various people who are even able to direct their dream content while a dream is proceeding (today called lucid dreaming). We will go back to the many interesting questions and fascinating theoretical forays that Freud has introduced, but first the question of Freud's assumptions about the nature of regression beckons, since we have used that term several times and still have not defined this concept.

To modern ears it is a bit confusing to deal with so many systems that have contradictory wishes. The confusion is largely terminological, since we can say that there are different motives that Freud is ascribing to the different systems (Cons.–Pcs. *vs*. Ucs.). We can eliminate the term "wish", and say that if unconscious wishes attain consciousness they would be putting the person in conflict and invoke some type of negative affect. This is what Freud is striving for in describing the wishes of

each system. In addition, he is assuming that sleep is a biological and psychological requirement for humans and there is a great need to continue sleep, hence the wish to stay asleep. The manifest dream is then a compromise formation; an unconscious wish is symbolically expressed, but if it is expressed too directly sleep will be disturbed and thus the super-ordinate wish to stay asleep aids the defensive process. The unconscious wish must not be intense enough to wake the dreamer, but, to be gratifying, it must find expression in the dream. Thus, although the dream is a compromise formation, the compromise is not between competing wishes but, rather, the wish must not become intense enough to wake the dreamer.

Regression

The term regression has several interrelated definitions but it seems likely that the meaning that we will be exploring in this chapter is the least known and least frequently used in psychoanalytic discourse. Most frequently, when the term regression is used, it refers to either psycho-sexual or ego regressions. (For the present, we can say that regression refers to the return to earlier forms of activity or thought processes. It is my view that, most frequently, the term regression is used without precision and the two forms of regression are combined in various ways.) In this context, Freud has designed an aspect of his theoretical model to explain regression. He begins by pointing out that dreams are usually sensory in nature and that the middle voice is normally omitted in the dream. The "perhaps" in the dream is gone, replaced by clear affirmations. If we look at a dream of Freud's (a now famous dream, the Irma dream), Freud wishes to believe that his friend Otto was responsible for a patient's illness. He does not wish to think his friend Dr Wilhelm Fliess was responsible for the patient's condition, even though he knows that various things went wrong when Fliess operated on Irma. Freud tells us in the Irma dream that he replaces the thought of "If only Otto were responsible for Irma's illness" with the thought in the dream, "Yes, Otto is responsible" (1900a, p. 534) for the illness. Freud maintains that typical day-dreams have the same characteristic, that is, the elimination of the middle voice. Day-dreams, however, do not have the intense sensory quality of night dreams. Freud's explanation for this begins with the idea that "the scene of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life" (Freud, 1900a, p. 48). He tells Fliess (Letter 83, in Masson, 1985) that this idea of Fechner's is the only intelligent remark he has seen in the dream literature. Freud attempts several analogies to describe the different "scenes" of activity. He pictures the mind as a "compound instrument… the components of which we will give the name of 'agencies', or 'systems'" (1900a, p. 537). He names these systems Psi-systems, and gives us a picture of the apparatus. Thus, before we can understand why dreams are typically intense sensory events, we have to understand Freud's model of the mind in terms of reception and retention of images and information (Figure 1).

The large arrow on the left side of the diagram is an indication of a stimulus (endogenous or exogenous) which is received by the sensory end of the apparatus. All psychical activity starts with a stimulus, whether from an internal (endogenous) or external (exogenous) source. Freud states that an activity "ends in innervations". He portrays the system as having both a sensory (receiving) and motor (output) end and to repeat "Psychical processes advance in general from the perceptual end to the motor end" (*ibid*.). The diagram that Freud provides simply shows a stimulus entering in the sensory end and being discharged in the motor end. "Reflex processes (arcs) remain the model of every psychical function" (*ibid*., p. 538). The lines that are drawn between the ends of the system represent traces that are left in the system from "perceptions which impinge on" the sensory end. These traces are memory traces. They are formed as the sensory end receives perceptions, but they are part of a separate system and they do not alter the sensory end of the system. Freud is postulating a sensory system that receives stimuli, but is not modified by incoming stimuli. This system (the perceptual or Pcpt. system) is in the front and receives impulses "but retains no trace of them"; behind this sensory system lies another system that transforms sensory stimuli into permanent memory traces.



Figure 1. Freud's model of the mind.

Breuer, in a previous communication, pointed out a logical difficulty that Freud took quite seriously; he stated that in the compound microscope there was no system that both received and retained stimuli. Freud had even more convincing reasons to postulate that the sensory system had limited capacity and functioned to receive, but not to store, stimuli. (We shall see shortly, in this work and throughout Freud's career, that he equated the sensory end with consciousness. Consciousness was not where the major processing or major storage took place in Freud's ideas about cognitive processing.) He begins to tell us that the separate perceptual (Pcpt.) elements would be obstructed in performing their function if the Pcpt. system retained memory traces. The Pcpt. system optimally handles each new perception in an independent manner. The associative network lies in the mnemic system(s) and

there are a number of such systems, according to Freud. Thus, "one and the same excitation leaves a variety of different permanent records" (1900a, p. 538). His idea was that if the Pcpt. system is strongly influenced by memory, then it would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a veridical account of reality. This system must, according to Freud, continue to be available to receive incoming stimuli. Freud realizes that at times memories are going to reach Cs., but here he maintains that if memories become conscious they retain few sensory qualities. Thus, usually, it will not be difficult for an individual to discriminate a memory from a sensory stimulus. Freud's position on this point changed somewhat and in 1920g he theorizes "that consciousness actually arises instead of the memory trace" (1900a, p. 540, fn added in 1925).

Freud posits that after the sensory receives a stimulus, it is recorded in several ways (types of memory networks). One memory system will record temporal simultaneity, while other systems will record other types of psychical significance. Here, Freud is talking about the type of psychological significance that he alluded to in *Studies on Hysteria*, that is, symbolic relationships. During sleep, the barrier to the pcs. is lowered (the censorship) and there is less resistance to ucs. mnemic images transferring on to pcs. thoughts. If this occurred during waking, there would be a tendency towards action (in Freud's diagram, the motor end would be activated). During sleep (particularly during dreams), motoric activity is blocked (or made more difficult, as shown by modern sleep research, which has demonstrated that during rapid eye movement [REM] sleep, motor neural activity is actively inhibited [Ellman & Antrobus, 1991]) and the mnemic images are transformed from motoric tendencies to sensory images. This is Freud's concept of regression in this context, the movement from motor tendencies to sensory images. During dreams, the transformation takes place with pcs. thoughts that are strongly influenced by ucs. images.

Freud relates this idea to waking hallucinations, and he tells us that

> My explanation of hallucinations... is that they are in fact regressions—that is, thought transformed into images, but that the only thoughts that undergo this transformation are those which are intimately linked with memories that have been suppressed or have remained unconscious. [1900a, p. 544]

This the last piece in Freud's idea of regression: regression only takes place with ideas that have been strongly associated with memories or images that have remained unconscious. These memories are wishes from childhood and are, in effect, images of what the person wished would have taken place in childhood. "On this view a dream might be described as a substitute for an infantile scene modified by being transferred on to a recent experience" (*ibid*., p. 546).

If we look at the ground we have traversed, we can say that dreams are stimulated by wishes and that these wishes are transferred on to receptive pcs. thoughts. These transformed pcs. thoughts are then further transfigured into sensory images. The wishes are always from childhood and are always, at least in part, unconscious.

Although we have touched upon this issue, we might again ask the question as to why we do not see these wishes more directly in the dreams of adults. Why are dreams most typically narratives, rather than sensory images that jump from image to image? Why, frequently, do our dreams seem to portray such typical or everyday events?

These questions and others are relevant to Freud's theory of dream formation, and he gives answers to these and a number of other queries that he poses in this Socratic narrative that he is presenting to the world.

The censor, resistance, Cs., and issues of representation

Freud has said that the path from the Ucs. to the Pcs. is barred during the day, but at night the "watchman… relaxes its activities… [and] allows the suppressed impulses in the Ucs. to find expression, and makes it possible for hallucinatory regression to occur" (1900a, pp. 567–568). This censor that bars the path between the Ucs. and the Pcs. is equivalent to the idea of a defensive structure, and, in the Freudian language of this era, the censor uses resistance to keep unconscious ideas out of the Pcs.–Cs. system. Freud also conceives of there being a type of censor that can divide the Pcs. from consciousness. To delve into this topic, we must gain a more intensive understanding of Freud's view of the relationship between the Pcs. and consciousness. Here we can learn more about the system Pcs.:

> Pcs. stands like a screen between the system Ucs. and consciousness. The system Pcs. not merely bars access to consciousness, it also controls access to the power of voluntary movement and has at its disposal for distribution a mobile cathectic energy, a part of which is familiar to us in the form of attention… But what part is there left to be played in our scheme by consciousness… Only that of a sense-organ for the perception of psychical qualities…. we can only regard conscious perception as the function proper to a particular system; and for this the abbreviation Cs. seems appropriate… we regard this system as resembling the perceptual system Pcpt.: as being susceptible to excitation by qualities but incapable of retaining traces of alterations—that is to say, as having no memory…. Excitatory material flows in to the Cs. sense-organ from two directions: from the Pcpt. system, whose excitation… is probably submitted to a fresh revision before it becomes a conscious sensation, and from the interior of the apparatus itself, whose quantitative processes are felt qualitatively in the pleasure–unpleasure series when, subject to certain modifications, they make their way to consciousness. [*ibid*., pp. 615–616]

In this extract we see Freud making reference to assumptions not fully spelled out in the dream book. Rather, in the preceding chapter, we have discussed how quantitative factors can be converted into qualitative perceptions. These ideas, which come from the project, are aspects of Freud's conceptualizations in the dream book. We can see that Freud is placing central importance on the Pcs. system in that it not only controls aspects of consciousness (the mobilization of attention via attention

cathexis), but it also controls how an internal signal enters consciousness. The Pcs. is able to transform an excitatory stimulus in terms of how it will be consciously perceived. What is termed an excitatory stimulus is a perception, or memory, or idea that can be transformed in terms of the pleasure or unpleasure that will be consciously perceived. Here, again, is a form of defence that Freud is positing, and what seems like a complete system will, to some extent, unravel when Freud considers the status of the Pcs. censor. Is this censor itself able to attain consciousness? If not, why not particularly the aspect of the censor that is involved in controlling levels of excitation between the Cs. and Pcs. systems? We will wait a number of years before Freud attempts to fully answer these questions, but we can speculate as to why some of these questions were not part of his considerations earlier in his career.

Although we have to wait for some answers we can now consider some of the questions that were introduced at the end of the previous sections. One of Freud's principal theorems is that an idea (memory, experience) may be pleasurable in one system and yet cause unpleasure, or be aversive, in another system. More specifically, an unconscious idea may stand for a certain type of pleasure, but, if perceived in the Pcs.–Cs. system, it would cause anxiety or unpleasure. Thus, if we consider the dream, the ideal compromise is that the dreamer should stay asleep while Ucs. thoughts gain expression in the dream. The necessity for compromise is brought about by the regression that sleep entails, which means the relaxation of the censor. The censor, however, is not completely relaxed, as we have already discussed, and must change or transform Ucs. ideation at least to the extent that the dreamer will not experienced anxiety and thus be able to stay asleep. Following these assumptions, the more common the dream images, the greater the probability of the dreamer staying asleep. This includes providing narratives that will seem like ordinary events to the dreamer. Thus, the censor, with the help of the primary process mechanisms, optimally creates a dream that allows both the expression of Ucs. wishes and the continuation of sleep. What are primary process mechanisms? We have implicitly discussed these concepts, but now, in completing the review of the dream book, we will explicitly discuss some of Freud's best known concepts.

Primary and secondary process

Here, not only can we discuss Freud's distinction between two types of mentation, but we can also review his basic assumptions and apply them to some of the dreams he provides in the dream book. Freud reminds us that dreams, in one sense, are never occupied with minor details, but that there is reason to accept the contrary view that dreams "pick up indifferent refuse left over from the previous day" (1900a, p. 589). We have just discussed that, in order to allow the dreamer to sleep,

> the dream-process finds it easier to get control of recent or indifferent ideational material which has not yet been requisitioned by waking thought-activity; and for reasons of censorship it transfers psychical intensity from what is important but objectionable (in the pcs.–cs.) on to what is indifferent. [*ibid*.]

Freud also reminds us that organic stimuli present during the night (e.g., stomach ache, need to urinate, etc.) are to be regarded as similar to the type of waking indifferent stimuli that we have just discussed. How can we conceive of the system Ucs.? What is the nature of the ideation that is present in this system? How does an idea reach the system Ucs.? What is the nature of the ideation that is present in this system? How does an idea reach the system Ucs.? If we take Freud's ideas about associative trains, or trains of ideas, he says that "a purposive is placed along associative paths with a reasonable amount of 'cathectic energy'". A train of thought that is repudiated is one where the cathectic energy is withdrawn (defence) and is then rendered Ucs. There are trains of thought that, in Freud's words, are "neglected", but remain in the Pcs. This is a train of thought that has not received cathectic energy. Although Freud does not fully deal with this, he is, at this point in time, purposing a quantitative model that determines the level of consciousness of a given train of thought. To be consistent, he would have to maintain that even a neglected Pcs. train of thought has a minimal amount of cathexis to remain in the Pcs. Alternatively, he could maintain that ideas in the Ucs. are forcibly placed in the Ucs. Here, he would be postulating defence as an active inhibitory system. We will have to wait (see Chapters Three, Four, and Five) to talk about these alternative ways of thinking of the process of defence.

Let us go back now to the question of how an idea from the Ucs. enters into the Pcs. and forms an aspect of what we can now call the dream (or the manifest dream, in Freud's terms). Since sleep brings the lowering of the censorship, there is a higher probability of an Ucs. idea entering the Pcs.–Cs. system. It is rare, in adults, for this to happen directly; rather, groups of ideas form within one ideational element. This compression, or "the fact of 'compression'", is called by Freud condensation, and is "responsible for the bewildering impression made on us by dreams, for nothing analogous to it is known to us in mental life that is normal and accessible to consciousness" (*ibid*., p. 595). Condensation produces a number of effects. Freud is first struck by the fact that it causes an intensification of an idea or image. It also has a defensive aspect, since the condensed image may contain a number of elements with the same theme, but with physically diverse properties. Thus, a patient of mine has a dream about a man who is tall and bald, but much younger, with a goatee. She does not really think that I am included in the dream (I am 6'1" and bald) since the man is young and has a goatee. Here, the reference to me is apparent later in the session, but there is a mild defensive function in that she has combined an element of her brother with elements of her analyst. The elements that symbolize her brother are actually the ones that, in some ways, she wishes to more strenuously defend against in this instance. Freud's examples of condensation are more intricate than the previous example and we will look at some in the postscript to this chapter.

Another aspect of condensations that are of interest to Freud is that sometimes the connections are loose and, in fact, mutually contradictory. Thus, a hated person and elements of a loved person might be included in the same image. Similarly, elements of the present might be combined with images that formed during childhood. Freud, in a summary statement, says that

> It will be seen that the chief characteristic of these processes is that the whole stress is laid upon making the cathecting energy mobile and capable of discharge; the content and the proper meaning of the psychical elements to which the cathexes are attached are treated as of little consequence. [*ibid*., p. 597]

Freud, in his discussion of primary process, is giving us a picture of a system that is solely interested in discharge or pleasure. The wishes and pleasures of childhood that have been repudiated still exist in the system Ucs. Freud is maintaining that this system operates by different syntactical rules than we normally encounter in ideal Pcs.–Cs. cognitive operations. The Ucs. system takes no account of negatives, or contradictions, or time. Rather, it is a preemptory organization that demands satisfaction in the present. When an element of the Ucs. becomes attached to (or, in Freud's terms, transferred to) a Pcs. representation, the tendency is to make this Pcs. representation operate in terms of Ucs. rules of organization. If we return directly to the extract from Freud, we can say that the object for Ucs. rules is unimportant; what is important is the aim. The aim of the system Ucs. is discharge; it is unimportant with whom or under what circumstances the discharge takes place. Using an obvious example, Freud is picturing a person who wants to have sex but who has no attachment to a given individual; therefore, one partner is as good as the next. In his terminology, this is a person who is operating to a large part in primary process terms and whose cathexes (attachments) can shift from one person to the next as long as he is satisfied.

Freud is also picturing the newborn as being able to receive nourishment from different care-givers as long as the care-giver is able to provide pleasure. (We will see that a modern analyst either has to define pleasure in a way to included maternal attachment or make important modifications in Freud's conceptualizations about early development.) It is later in development (but still quite early) that Freud sees the mother as being represented as permanent figure or object. Here, again, we have to retrace our steps; how does the infant go from an organism that is governed by the system Ucs. and, therefore, the primary process, to one that is not only concerned with discharge and pleasure, but is, in addition, concerned with the object. We have already stated that the infant, after first receiving nourishment, attempts to recreate the situation by a type of perceptual identity; the infant recreates the situation through retrieving memory images of the nourishing situation. Freud calls this a hallucinatory event similar to the motivational conditions necessary for creating a dream. The recreation of the feeding situation is an example of primary process, an endogenously produced image intended to provide gratification. Simply having a sensory image of the feeding situation is, of course, not

ultimately gratifying, and so the infant learns both to signal its care-giver in reality and to inhibit the full sensory expression of the gratifying memory. This learning signals the onset of the second system, and Freud, in formally describing this process, says

> that the activity of the first psi-system is directed towards securing the free discharge of the quantities of excitation, while the second system, by means of the cathexes emanating from it, succeeds in inhibiting this discharge and in transforming the cathexis into a quiescent one. [*ibid*., p. 599]

In this extract, Freud is maintaining that the first system has free or unbound energy that is purely pleasure seeking, and that the second system's task is to both inhibit the primary system and bind the energy from this system so that small amounts of energy can be utilized to direct the person's decision. In this system, objects (persons and things) start to receive stable (relatively) permanent cathexes and, when this occurs, it will matter who feeds the infant. The developmental sequence of how people get represented or internalized will be the subject of a good deal of Freud's subsequent writings. Here, however, he is concerned with conceptualizing what he considers to be these two basic systems. He continues his discussion of the second system, and says that

> under the dominion of the second system the discharge of excitation is governed by quite different mechanical conditions from those in force under the dominion of the first system. When once the second system has concluded its exploratory thought-activity, it releases the inhibition and damming-up of the excitations and allows them to discharge themselves in movement. [*ibid*., pp. 599–600]

In condensed form, Freud has described the second system. It is a system that can inhibit the first system, veridically perceive reality (through the Cs.–Pcpt. system), expend small quantities of trial energy (thought), and, when appropriate, interact with reality and expend large quantities of energy (motor activity). Thought, in this model, begins as trial action where various alternatives are considered without being fully cathected through motor action. There can be large expenditures of energy by the second system but only if there is a strong investment or commitment to a person (object), or to an activity (work).

We can now summarize the primary and secondary systems, and we are also in a position to summarize Freud's ideas about dream formation. The primary system is primary in two senses of the term: it is the system from which all energy flows, and it is the system that is developmentally primary and which first dominates the life of the infant. The second system comes to inhibit the primary system. The motivation for this inhibition is once again the pleasure principle; if the infant does not begin to deal with reality, it continues to be hungry, and this hunger causes unpleasure. In the infant, the second system inhibits the first system attempts at pleasure and, by doing this, decreases periods of unpleasure, or at least hastens the flow of pleasure or immediate care and nourishment. Thus, the second system also is under the

domination of the pleasure principle, but the infant (developing child) optimally comes to learn that dealing with reality is more pleasurable than continuing with, or revelling in, fantasy. The first system is also "totally incapable of bringing anything disagreeable into the context of its thoughts". It remains for the second system to tolerate unpleasurable stimuli. Obviously, an organism that cannot think about unpleasurable issues is one that will not be able to deal with certain aspects of reality. Freud's view is that, in so far as the first system dominates, the person is always attempting to flee aversive situations. In clinical terms, one sees certain types of patients who frequently need to rid their minds of troubling thoughts. One important clue about the type of patient one is seeing has to do with the person's ability to tolerate distressing ideation. Clearly, everyone has to avoid certain types of ideas, but one gets a view of the person by the extent to which the person must rid their mind of distressing ideation. To the extent that this true of an individual, Freud would say to that extent the person is influenced by their primary system (by primary process).

We have focused on the two systems as being in conflict and, to some extent, Freud views this as true for everyone. However, there are times when the two systems work together, and Freud is beginning to see how this is possible in works that we will briefly refer to at the end of the chapter (*Jokes* [1905c], *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* [1901b], etc.). In the dream book, Freud's main focus is to characterize the Ucs. as operating according to primary process principles. In the Ucs., opposites can co-exist, there are no negatives and only the present (no past or future) exists. Discharge is attempted immediately and planning does not go on in this system. In the secondary system (when functioning optimally) there is a past and future and planning is a key element of this system. It is in the Pcs.–Cs. system that reality orientated thinking takes place and where the motor end of the system is controlled. During sleep, when the motor system is quiescent and there are regressive trends brought on by the sleep process, the inhibition of the Ucs. by the Pcs.–Cs. is lessened. The transfers between systems takes place more freely and there is a greater chance for ideation to be intense enough to reach consciousness. When ideation during sleep reaches the Cs.–Pcpt. system, Freud considers this to be a dream. The ideation that reaches Cs. is the manifest dream. The processes that go into developing the ideation that will be intense enough to reach consciousness is called the latent dream.

We have already discussed how the censor helps to inhibit the flow (less than in waking) and, in addition, helps to normally form a narrative that will both allow the expression of Ucs. ideas and allow sleep to continue.

Freud's genius in this work is to be able to bring together the formation of the dream with the development and maintenance of cognitive processes in childhood and adult functioning. In the last section of the book, we will briefly look at the extent to which contemporary research supports Freud's contentions.

Three Essays on Sexuality

It is interesting to go back to Freud's seduction hypothesis and realize that Freud did not completely reject the hypothesis. Gay states that

> Freud insisted that not everything he had written in the mid-1890s on the sexual abuse of children deserved to be rejected: "Seduction has retained a certain significance for etiology." He explicitly noted that two of his early cases, Katharina and a Fraulein Rosalia H, had been assaulted by their fathers. Ceasing to believe everything his patients told him did not require him to fall into the sentimental trap of holding sober black-coated bourgeois incapable of revolting sexual aggression. What Freud repudiated was the seduction theory as a general explanation of how all neuroses originate. [1988, p. 95]

Freud, for a period of time, did not even completely reject the seduction hypothesis as a general theory. After he announced to Fliess that the seduction theory was dead, he still put forth the theory that he ostensibly had rejected (Freud, 1898a; Gay, 1988). Nevertheless, at the same time that he was leaving the seduction theory, he was beginning to take seriously the idea that the sexual thoughts that he began to uncover in his own self-analysis were of a more universal nature. He wrote to Fliess that the Oedipal relationship of the child to its parents was a more general relationship than he had thought, and that it occurred relatively early in childhood (Gay, 1988). This was in 1898, and he began to recognize that things that he called the perverse nature of children might not be pathologically perverse, but, rather, a normal "perversity" that all or most members of the species typically experience. This "perversity" is not the property of neurotics or any other special population, but, rather, at least during different points of development, part of the human condition. This was a startling change in his interest in sexuality, but, as Gay writes, for Freud to believe in the seduction theory he would have to have credited his own father with the role of abuser. No matter what his feelings towards his father, he felt he knew that this was not the case. Thus, we can say that Freud's self analysis was an important factor in leading him to think that sexuality is part of normal childhood experience. There is no doubt that his disappointment in finding that seduction hypothesis was incorrect led him to search for alternative explanations of the clinical phenomena that he was experiencing.

Three crucial essays

Freud begins these essays by maintaining that popular opinion has quite definite ideas about the nature of sexuality. The popular belief is that sexuality is absent in childhood and begins to "set in at the time of puberty"(1905d, p. 135). He will try to demonstrate that sexuality is part of everyone's childhood experience; it is not simply an accidental aspect in the life of a child who is unfortunate enough to have

undergone sexual abuse. In his first chapter, he describes what he calls the sexual aberrations. In describing these, he distinguishes the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds (the sexual object), and the act towards which the instinct tends, which is labelled the sexual aim. To fully understand Freud's concepts in these essays, we must go to his ideas about the psycho-neuroses. Neuroses are now viewed as the negative of perversions. In this view, what is defended against by neurotics is a conflict that involves a perverse tendency. Perverse tendencies, however, are perverse not in the sense that the general public might think about these acts, but, rather, they are perverse in that they do not allow for a full developmental sequence.

Freud's view is that perverse tendencies (an unfortunate name) are universally present during childhood. These tendencies (fantasies and/or acts) are part of development, but if one becomes particularly attached to a given tendency, then development for that person cannot proceed in an optimal manner (there is a fixation to this point of development). This attachment can occur because of an over or under stimulation during a given period. Thus, a central concept for Freud that emerges in these essays is the idea of optimal stimulation and optimal frustration. As childhood progresses, the child must be able to endure more and more frustration and, implicitly, it is a parental (maternal) function to be able to help the child endure frustration and turn away from tendencies that were at one time seen by the child as central in its life. Freud's view is that with most people (perhaps everyone), some of these childhood tendencies will be present in adult life. As we shall see, Freud's evaluation of an individual depends on both the extent of these tendencies and the use the person gives to them. Although we might wonder at Freud's use of the popular term "perversions", he deliberately stays with this term to express another central theme of this work: the relationship between childhood and adult sexuality. He not only sees sexual tendencies in children, but how these tendencies are internalized will be crucial in the child's development and adult life.

Essay One: the sexual aberrations

In describing deviations of the sexual object, it is not surprising that Freud starts with a homosexual object choice. Undoubtedly, the choice of homosexuality (or inversion) to begin the discussion of the sexual aberrations is multi-determined. The trial of Oscar Wilde