Introduction

Mass Deportation and the Neoliberal Cycle

I could tell immediately, as with so many others, that he had lived in the United States since he was a child: His smooth skin, the swing in his step, and his calm but guarded demeanor gave him away as a U.S. Latino. I was standing on the tarmac watching as he descended from the plane.

He told me his name was Eric. I asked him about himself and we chatted for a few minutes as he waited for Guatemalan immigration agents to process him as an arriving deportee. He wrote down his number and I told him I would call him in about a month to see how he was doing. He said he wasn't sure he'd still be in Guatemala by then.

When I was in Guatemala in 2009, I witnessed thousands of deportees like Eric returning to their countries of birth. When I returned in 2013, I found that deportations had accelerated even further. Four to six planeloads of deportees arrive at the Guatemalan Air Force base each week—more than 45,000 people each year.[1]

Just over a month after Eric arrived, we met up in Metro Norte, a modern shopping center in one of the rougher neighborhoods of Guatemala City—Zone 18—close to where Eric was staying. Eric told me he had traveled to the United States when he was 11 to join his mother, who had left three years prior. He went on an airplane alone, with a tourist visa, as his undocumented mother could not come for her son or apply for an immigrant visa for him. Eric enrolled in middle school in Inglewood, Los Angeles, where his mother worked at a garment factory. In his last year of high school, Eric's mother injured her back and was unable to continue working. Eric had to drop out of school and get a job to keep the family afloat. He had no trouble finding low-wage work, and he worked two jobs. He met a Salvadoran woman who is a legal permanent resident of the United States, and they got married.

1

Once Eric had a job, he purchased a car to drive to work each morning. On weekends, Eric spent time with his wife and friends. One Saturday afternoon, Eric's friend asked him for a ride, and Eric took him to the other side of town. Shortly after he dropped his friend off, a police officer pulled Eric over and arrested him as an accomplice in the car theft that his friend had allegedly committed. Once they arrived at the Los Angeles County Jail, a police officer ran Eric's fingerprints through an immigration database, because the police district participated in the Secure Communities program. This program—designed to find and deport dangerous noncitizens—enables police officers to determine if an arrestee is in the country legally. The police discovered he had overstayed his visa and held him until immigration agents came to take him into custody, even though the car theft charges had been dropped. Immigration agents took Eric to a privately owned Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) detention center, and they held him until he was deported from the United States. Neither Eric's innocence nor his pending application for legalization on the basis of his marriage prevented his deportation, and he had to leave his mother and pregnant wife behind.

In Guatemala City, Eric moved into his aunt's house, where he had lived before leaving the country when he was 11. Soon after arriving, Eric secured a job at a call center, where he answers calls from customers in the United States. As a bilingual deportee familiar with the social and cultural norms of the United States, he is an ideal worker for this transnational corporation. His labor is also significantly cheaper than it would be in the United States: His job pays $400 a month—enough to support himself in Guatemala but not sufficient for raising a family.

Eric's story lays bare what I call a "neoliberal cycle" because of the interrelated nature of each of the events in Eric's life, and their connection to neoliberal reforms—economic changes focused on opening up the economy to global markets and reducing state spending on social welfare. The neoliberal cycle refers to the interconnected aspects of neoliberal reforms implemented in the United States and abroad. These elements include outsourcing; economic restructuring; cutbacks in social services; the enhancement of the police, the military, and immigration enforcement; and the privatization of public services. Neoliberal reforms generally involve cuts to government funding—with the notable

Figure I.1. The neoliberal cycle.

exception of the military and law enforcement—and are designed to integrate countries into the global economy. These reforms constitute a cycle insofar as they lead to and reproduce one another. This cycle of restricted labor mobility and deportation is crucial to the maintenance of global apartheid—a system where mostly white and affluent citizens of the world are free to travel to where they like whereas the poor are forced to make do in places where there are less resources (Nevins and Aizeki 2008). Global apartheid would not be feasible without deportation, as deportation is the physical manifestation of policies that determine who is permitted to live where.

Eric's story fits neatly into this cycle. His family felt compelled to leave Guatemala because of the economic havoc that neoliberalism wreaked on their home country (Robinson 2000, 2008). Once in the United States, Eric's mother found a low-wage job in the garment industry. Manufacturers have moved most garment industry jobs abroad, and those jobs that remain are low-paid and offer few to no benefits (Louie 2001). As an undocumented worker, Eric's mother was less likely to challenge her low pay and lack of benefits. When she became ill, there was no safety net—another factor related to cutbacks in social services

under neoliberalism (Harvey 2005; Wacquant 2009). Eric was then obliged to leave school and work two jobs.

Although the state did not provide resources to help this family in troubled times, the coercive arm of the state is robust. California built 23 major prisons, at a cost of about $300 million each between 1984 and 2005, amid growing poverty and inequality (Gilmore 2007). The escalation in law enforcement spending facilitated Eric's arrest and deportation. The heavy policing of poor neighborhoods predominated by people of color made it much more likely that Eric would be arrested, even though he had not in fact committed a crime. Once arrested, Eric was placed in a private prison—privatization of public services is another key element of neoliberalism, as is the profitability of prisons.

Globalization, enhanced by neoliberal reforms, facilitates the movement of capital across borders while restricting the mobility of workers. This makes it possible for Eric, a deportee, to work for a U.S. corporation in his homeland. The arrival of 45,000 deportees a year into Guatemala ensures a steady supply of bilingual workers for this transnational corporation—about half of the workers in the call center where Eric works are deportees. As this book will show, by elaborating on each aspect of the neoliberal cycle, mass deportation from the United States is critical to the sustainability of neoliberal economies. And, although mass deportation is carried out in the name of national security, these stories will reveal that it creates insecurity.

Eric was detained and deported because of a program called Secure Communities. However, it should be clear from his story that this program does not make communities more secure. Instead, it creates instability and insecurity. Angela García and David Keyes (2012) authored a report that documents the everyday lives of undocumented immigrants in North County, San Diego, the first community in California to sign on to Secure Communities. They completed 30 in-depth interviews with migrants, in addition to 851 surveys. Their study revealed that undocumented migrants were reluctant to report crimes, out of fear they could be arrested and deported. In addition, many undocumented migrants reported that they avoided public places and even walking down the street. Some parents stopped picking their children up from school once they perceived there was a crackdown in immigration law enforcement. In sum, undocumented migrants often live in

fear and experience substantial insecurity in their daily lives. This fear comes from the threat of deportation and is a consequence of record-high deportations.

The United States is deporting more people than ever before. Obama hit an all-time record high of more than 400,000 deportees in 2012. These numbers are unprecedented: In the first five and a half years of his presidency, President Obama deported more than two million people—more than the sum total of all people deported before 1997. Why are deportations at a record high? Why at this historical moment? Many deportees are people like Eric who have close ties to the United States. The vast majority of deportees are men of color. Why are they the primary targets?

When I share my work on deportees and mass deportation, people often ask me why Obama, a liberal Democrat, has deported record numbers of people. As a student of political economy, however, I know that the answer to why mass deportation is happening now has to move beyond questioning Obama's political motivations. To be sure, Obama—as the head of the executive branch—has been facilitating mass deportation. However, an explanation for why it is happening must be much broader. The answer I offer in this book comes primarily from talking to deportees. There are other ways to answer these questions: One could analyze congressional debates, interview public officials, or try to make sense of the patchwork of available statistical data. However, I contend that deportees' stories are the best way in which to capture the nuance and complexity of mass deportation and the impacts of neoliberal reforms on their overall migration trajectories. When we listen to deportees, it becomes evident that deportees are immigrants, low-wage workers, people of color, and parents. When we listen to their stories, and place them in the broader political, social, and economic context, it becomes clear why they have become the latest version of disposable workers.

I argue that mass deportation of men of color is part of the neoliberal cycle of global capitalism. I further argue that mass deportation is a U.S. policy response designed to relocate surplus labor to the periphery and to keep labor in the United States compliant. The U.S. public accepts this policy response because it targets mainly immigrant men of color, who are perceived to be expendable in the current economy and unwanted

in the broader society. To make this argument, I explain how neoliberal economic changes created migration flows, attracted migrants to the United States, required a disposable labor force, and, of late, have made migrant labor disposable.

We must look at mass deportation as part of the neoliberal cycle of global capitalism because mass deportation is only the latest permutation of this cycle that began in the 1980s. Understanding this requires stepping back and taking a critical look at the social and economic processes that produced global migration from the South to the North, the current state of the neoliberal economy, the rise of the coercive arm of the state, and the uneven integration of developing countries into the global economy. A consideration of mass deportation from this standpoint provides a comprehensive explanation for why it is happening now.

Mass Deportation

Deportation is the forced removal of a noncitizen from a host country. I refer to the current wave of immigration law enforcement as "mass deportation" because the raw numbers of deportees are significantly higher than they have been in any previous period in history. Moreover, deportations have accelerated even as the number of new immigrants has declined—and the population of undocumented immigrants has shrunk.

In 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported a record high of 396,906 people—10 times as many as in 1991, more than during the entire decade of the 1980s, yet just short of its quota of 400,000 removals per year. In an internal memo made public in March 2010, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) director, James M. Chaparro, informed ICE field office directors that the department has an annual goal of 400,000 deportations. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, this goal was finally surpassed, with more than 419,000 deportations. As seen in figure I.2, the numbers of deportations are at a historic high. During the George W. Bush administration, there were a recordbreaking number of deportations—more than two million—and, yet, by 2014 the Obama administration had already surpassed this massive number.

Figure I.2. Removal data, 1892–2012. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security removal data (2013), online at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics -2013-enforcement-actions.

Legislation passed in 1996, combined with a massive infusion of money into immigration law enforcement in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, rendered this escalation in deportations possible. The 1996 laws were passed in a moment of racialized fears related to crime. These laws, however, have not changed substantially since then. Instead, Congress has continued to appropriate increasing amounts of money for immigration law enforcement. The FY 2011 budget for DHS was $56 billion, 30 percent of which was directed at immigration law enforcement through ICE and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). Another 18 percent of the total goes to the U.S. Coast Guard and 5 percent to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services—meaning over half of the DHS budget is directed toward border security and immigration law enforcement.[2] To put this $56 billion in perspective, the Department of Education FY 2011 budget was $77.8 billion, and the Department of Justice budget was $29.2 billion.[3] The rise in deportations over the past decade primarily stems from executive branch decisions to expand immigration law enforcement, as part of the broader project of the War on Terror. When you have more than a thousand people deported every day, that's a policy of mass deportation.

These unprecedented numbers of deportees mask the reality that most people who could be deported are not. There are approximately 11 million undocumented people in the United States. According to statistics that the ICE provided to the journalist Alan Gomez, in FY 2013, there were 133,551 interior removals and 180,970 border removals—representing a substantial decrease in interior removals from the year before. At this pace, it will take more than 80 years to deport all of the 11 million undocumented migrants currently living in the United States, and more time is required to deport others eligible for deportation: those who have committed crimes among the 13 million legal permanent residents, and unknown millions of legal visitors who have committed visa violations. DHS will never remove all undocumented migrants or all deportable people. A mass deportation policy does not aim to remove all deportable people—there are simply too many. It does aim, as Nicholas de Genova (2005) argues, to keep large sectors of the U.S. population deportable and thus vulnerable.

Faced with the gargantuan task of enforcing unenforceable laws, DHS claims it targets the "worst of the worst." The reality, however, is that immigration policy enforcement targets Afro-Caribbean small-time drug peddlers and Latino undocumented workers—not hard-core criminals or terrorists. Nearly all deportees—97 percent—are from Latin America and the Caribbean. DHS rarely deports any of the approximately 25 percent of undocumented migrants in the United States that are from Asia and Europe. Nearly 90 percent of deportees are men, although about half of all noncitizens are women (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). Additionally, dangerous noncitizens account for a small percentage of deportees.

On April 6, 2014, the New York Times reported that nearly two-thirds of the two million deportations since Obama took office have involved either people with no criminal records or those convicted of minor crimes.[4] Just two days later, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Immigration issued an even more detailed, and more damning, report.[5] The report, which looks at deportations carried out by ICE, found that 57 percent of ICE deportations in 2013 were of people who had criminal convictions. However, this statistic hides the fact that most of these convictions are minor. The authors write,

ICE currently uses an exceedingly broad definition of criminal behavior: even very minor infractions are included. For example, anyone with a traffic ticket for exceeding the speed limit on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway who sends in their check to pay their fine has just entered ICE's "convicted criminal" category. If the same definitions were applied to every citizen . . . evidence suggests that the majority of U.S. citizens would be considered convicted criminals.

In other words, not only have nearly half of all deportations involved people with no criminal record whatsoever, large numbers of "criminal" deportations involve people with traffic offenses.

The TRAC report is notable because it provides a close look at the criminal convictions of deportees—data that had not previously been available. The report further reveals that, although the percentage of deportations that involved a criminal conviction increased for each year of the Obama administration, most of these convictions were minor. Some of these convictions would only be considered criminal in a very broad definition of the term. For example, about a quarter of the criminal convictions involved the immigration crime of "illegal entry." The difference between a person deported on noncriminal grounds for being undocumented and one deported on criminal grounds for "illegal entry" is almost entirely a question of prosecutorial discretion. In other words, these 47,000 people deported for illegal entry were converted into criminals for reporting purposes.

The next largest category is traffic offenses—the majority driving under the influence or speeding—which account for nearly another quarter of all criminal deportations. In common parlance in the United States, people with traffic convictions are not usually called "criminals." The third largest category is drug offenses. Notably, the most common offense in this category was marijuana possession, which has recently been decriminalized in Washington State, Colorado, and other locations.

The TRAC analysis renders it clear that the increase in the number of noncitizens who have been deported on criminal grounds under the Obama administration is mostly a consequence of an increase in the deportation of noncitizens with immigration and traffic

violations—convictions that are only considered criminal in a very broad definition of the term. In fact, based on ICE's own definition of a serious or "Level 1" offense, only 12 percent of all deportations in 2013 were of people convicted of such offenses. According to ICE, Level 1 criminals are people who have been convicted of two or more felonies. Level 2 criminals are those convicted of one felony or three misdemeanors. Level 3 criminals are those convicted of misdemeanors, or crimes punishable by less than one year of jail time.

These details put the DHS's 2012 data into perspective. In 2012, DHS deported nearly 200,000 "criminal aliens." Almost a quarter of these deportations were for immigration offenses, another 23 percent for traffic violations, and 21 percent for drug violations. Relatively few people deported on criminal grounds had been convicted of violent crimes: 2 percent for sexual assault; 2 percent for robbery; and 6 percent for assault. And more than half of the 419,384 people deported in 2012 had no criminal conviction (Simanski and Sapp 2012). Despite official rhetoric, deportations do not focus on the "worst of the worst."

Deporting undocumented workers, traffic violators, and drug users and sellers does not make America any less susceptible to terrorist attacks. DHS almost never deports people to countries that the U.S. Department of State identifies as sponsoring terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. In 2010, for example, 387,242 people were deported. Among these were 55 Iranians, 54 Iraqis, 48 Syrians, 95 Cubans, and 21 Sudanese. (Data were not available for Libya, yet "all other countries" accounted for a total of 106 removals, and there were a total of 326 removals to North and South Korea combined.)[6] Instead, deportees are citizens of countries that are the United States' allies in the Western Hemisphere. The most recent escalation in deportations has occurred in the context of the War on Terror, and yet it doesn't seem to further that war. Instead, with large numbers of black and Latino men being deported, mass deportation shares many similarities with mass incarceration.

Instead of making us safer, mass deportation tears families apart and prevents immigrants from applying for legalization or citizenship even when they qualify. Enhanced deportation tactics increasingly deport people with strong ties to the United States. A recent report revealed that DHS deported more than 45,000 parents of U.S. citizen children in

Figure I.3. Leading crime categories of convicted criminal aliens removed: Fiscal year 2012. Source: Simanski and Sapp 2012.

the first six months of 2011—meaning that likely almost 100,000 parents of U.S. citizens were deported in 2011 alone (Wessler 2011). This marks a ten-fold increase—it previously took a decade (between 1997 and 2006) for DHS to deport 100,000 parents of U.S. citizens (Golash-Boza 2012). Prior to 1996, the deportation of parents of U.S. citizens was fairly uncommon, as those immigrants were eligible for appeals and potential cancellation of removal, based on family ties to the United States. Deportation of parents of U.S. citizens does vast damage to U.S. citizens deprived of parents and spouses. A consideration of neoliberalism and its relationship to global capitalism will shed light on why we have seen this escalation in immigration law enforcement directed at black and Latino men.

The Neoliberal Cycle

Neoliberalism has three manifestations: It is (1) an ideology that the state's primary role is to protect property rights, free markets, and free trade; (2) a mode of governance based on a logic of competitiveness, individuality, and entrepreneurship; and (3) a policy package designed to slim down social welfare and integrate countries into the global economy (Harvey 2005; Steger 2010; Steger and Roy 2010).

According to neoliberal ideology, the free market will best address the needs of the poor: The state should not intervene and provide social assistance. The United States has implemented neoliberal policies in order to make the country more competitive in the global economy and to protect the interests of the corporate class. In developing countries, neoliberal reforms have been at the core of their insertion into the global economy. Countries around the world, often at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have implemented economic reforms based on neoliberal ideologies. These reforms include (1) deregulation; (2) privatization of public enterprise; (3) trade liberalization; (4) promotion of foreign direct investment; (5) tax cuts; and (6) reduction in public expenditures (Harvey 2005; Steger 2010).

Each of these neoliberal reforms is designed to bring foreign currency into the national economy and to prepare the country to enter the global economy (Robinson 2004, 2008). Deregulation creates favorable conditions for investment by both allowing the currency to fluctuate and removing protections for workers and the environment. When public enterprises are privatized, the purchasers are often foreign investors and this process creates an infusion of dollars into the economy. Trade liberalization involves the reduction of tariffs, which promotes international trade. Tax cuts favor foreign investors. Finally, the elimination of a safety net ensures a compliant labor force and frees up government money to pay off foreign debts. The spread of neoliberalism around the globe has pulled countries into the global economy, transformed peasants into international migrants, and lured immigrants to toil in low-wage jobs in countries like the United States.

Neoliberalism and Emigration

Developing countries around the world implemented neoliberal economic reforms during and after the 1980s. In many cases, leaders of countries did this in response to demands by the IMF that they impose structural adjustments onto their economies. To explain a complicated process briefly, during the 1960s and 1970s, many poor countries around the world borrowed money from the World Bank for development projects. These development projects included building dams for electricity,

constructing ports, and modernizing agriculture toward the production of cash crops. The intent of these projects was to bring these developing countries into the global economy—these development projects would enable them to import items from abroad and export their cash crops and natural resources. In the 1980s, however, interest rates and oil prices skyrocketed and many countries were unable to pay back their loans. They thus turned to the IMF to request assistance in stabilizing their economies and paying their debts. The IMF agreed to lend money, but under the condition that the countries implement structural adjustment.

Structural adjustment is a package of neoliberal reforms. The standard package recommended by the IMF includes privatization, trade liberalization, tax reductions, deregulation, and cutbacks in social services (Steger 2010). One of the most important aspects of each of these reforms is that they are designed to generate the foreign currency necessary for these countries to repay their debts.

In general, neoliberal reforms exacerbated inequality, led to internal migration, and created severe disruptions in countries' economies. These disruptions have, in turn, led to emigration—a process I explain in more detail in chapter 1.

Emigration does two things for the local economy: (1) It shrinks the ranks of the unemployed, and (2) emigrants often send money home, filling a crucial need for families unable to subsist on their meager wages. In some countries these remittances become vital for the overall economy: In 2009, remittances accounted for substantial portions of the gross domestic product (GDP) in Tajikistan (35 percent), Honduras (19 percent), and El Salvador (16 percent).[7] For people to migrate and send remittances, however, there must be a need for their labor in receiving countries. In the next section, I detail how neoliberalism has created a labor market primed for immigrant labor in the United States. Just as globalization, modernization, and neoliberal reforms created a mass exodus of workers from Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Guatemala, and other countries, neoliberal reforms in the United States led to economic restructuring and created an abundance of low-wage jobs in the service sector that immigrants were able to fill (Massey et al. 2002; Varsanyi 2008). In chapter 1, I elaborate further on the connections between neoliberal reforms and emigration.

Neoliberalism and Immigration

Changes in foreign economies made neoliberal economic reforms in the United States possible. The U.S. economy changed in two important ways during the era of globalization that took off in the 1980s: (1) Manufacturing jobs have gone abroad, and (2) the service sector has expanded. These trends have continued up to the present day. There were about 27 million jobs created in the United States between 1990 and 2008; 98 percent of these jobs were in the nontradable sector, which produces goods and services for domestic consumption.[8]

Instead of expanding the manufacturing sector in the United States, U.S. corporations have moved production overseas. In order for manufacturing jobs to go abroad, there must be international agreements between U.S. employers and foreign governments. Trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have been a major part of neoliberal reforms. Neoliberal economic reforms in the United States have facilitated the restructuring of the U.S. economy—from an economy based on manufacturing to one based on services. After World War II, the U.S. economy grew rapidly with the production of automobiles and steel. These manufacturing jobs often paid well and came with benefits. Mostly men worked in these jobs, and many earned a "family wage"—enough to support their wives and children. Between 1950 and 1960 the average incomes in the United States increased steadily. However, these increases began to level off, and by the 1970s incomes for the working poor stopped increasing. The average income for someone with less than a high school diploma decreased from $30,015 in 1967 to $23,419 in 2010 (in constant 2010 dollars).

In the 1980s, these well-paying manufacturing jobs began to disappear due to global competition and increased outsourcing. As it became easier for U.S.-based manufacturers to move production abroad, many did. While manufacturing jobs disappeared, there was an increase in jobs in the service sector. Service jobs include high-paid workers such as lawyers and investment bankers and low-paid workers such as gardeners and nannies (Louie 2001). High-level service professions such as lawyers and bankers are often concentrated in large urban areas, yet they require a different skill set than those men that worked in factories had—leaving many of these latter men jobless.

The men who had worked in factories often were not in a position to retool themselves and take on the new service jobs. Instead, immigrants have filled many of these low-paying service jobs (Louie 2001; Massey et al. 2002; Boehme 2011). Immigrants are concentrated in low-paying and dangerous industries. In 2010, immigrants made up 16 percent of the workforce and were overrepresented in specific industries: construction, food services, agriculture, household employment, and hotels (Singer 2012). Many of these employment sectors are also highly gendered—male immigrants work outside in construction and gardening and women are inside houses in childcare and housekeeping. Immigrants made up 49 percent of all private household employees in 2010 (Singer 2012).

Inequality has grown with economic restructuring: In 1980, when manufacturing dominated the economy in the United States, CEOs earned, on average, 42 times more than the average worker. Today, that figure is 380.[9] This increase in inequality is a consequence of the bifurcation of the U.S. labor force into two kinds of employment: high skill and low skill. Economic restructuring, designed to keep the United States competitive in the global arena, has led to the impoverishment of large swaths of society and to the enrichment of a few (Harvey 2005; Louie 2001).

David Harvey (2005) contends that the neoliberal turn in the United States began in the late 1970s in New York City, marking a change from the more socially conscious government of the 1960s and early 1970s, where the federal government had expanded its urban funding to create jobs and raise the standard of living of city dwellers. Once President Nixon declared the urban crisis over, he withdrew federal funding, and the New York City government decided to implement wage freezes and cut back funding for education, transportation, and public health. This marked the beginning of the neoliberal turn in the United States, where it became increasingly acceptable for city, state, and federal governments to cut social spending, invest in public safety, and implement policies that favored the wealthy. This version of trickle-down economics took off across the country—and around the world—in the 1980s, creating vast inequality.

Neoliberalism in developing countries has created economic conditions that lead to emigration by attracting migrants from the countryside

into the cities and then creating economic instability and inequality, which makes leaving the country an attractive option. Without these disruptive economic changes in countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, and the Philippines, the United States would not have had the compliant workforce it needed to make its own economic transition. The trade liberalization and incentives for foreign direct investment that are central to neoliberal economic reforms created the conditions abroad for U.S.-based manufacturing factories to relocate. Absent these favorable conditions, it would not make sense for U.S.-based manufacturers to outsource production. For example, U.S. manufacturers would not move to Mexico if they had to pay high tariffs on exports or if Mexican laws required adequate wages and permitted unions to demand workers' rights.

Although neoliberalism at home and abroad has created powerful push and pull factors for labor migration, open borders for capital have not led to open borders for labor. The U.S. economy depends on immigrant labor, yet it offers potential migrants few options for legal immigration. Monica Varsanyi calls this the "neoliberal paradox" and asks, "How can nation-states manage the tensions that emerge between the seemingly contradictory forces of economic openness and political closure?" (2008: 879). Similarly, Philip Kretsedemas (2012) points to a contradiction where neoliberal economic practices welcome new migrant flows yet fund an enforcement apparatus designed to keep migrants out. And Stephen Castles (2011: 312) contends that restrictions on labor flows in the context of free flows of capital constitute a "global class hierarchy, in which people with high human capital from rich countries have almost unlimited rights of mobility, while others are differentiated, controlled, and excluded in a variety of ways." Building on this work, I argue that, in the context of the Great Recession, the enforcement apparatus keeps migrant labor compliant. Whereas Castles (2011) focuses primarily on nation and class in his construction of the concept of a "global class hierarchy," I find Joseph Nevins and Mizue Aizeki's (2008) concept of "global apartheid" more compelling insofar as race maps neatly onto this global hierarchy of labor mobility. Accordingly, in the context of global apartheid, mass deportation reinforces the limited mobility and enhanced vulnerability of black and brown labor.

Neoliberalism and Deportation

At the same time that global economic developments that encourage international migration have unfolded, the United States has witnessed an augmentation of the coercive arm of the state. Remarkably, those scholars who focus on the connections between global capitalism and immigration rarely engage with those who focus on neoliberal reforms in the United States and their relationship to the rise of mass incarceration. A study of deportation helps us to see the connections between mass incarceration, global capitalism, and economic restructuring in the United States.

Scholars who consider why deportation happens generally provide two related explanations: (1) Deportation functions as social or migration control (Welch 2002; Bloch and Schuster 2005; Gibney 2008; Bosworth 2011; Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Collyer 2012), and (2) deportation creates a vulnerable workforce (de Genova 2005). I place these arguments in a broader context. I agree that deportation functions as both social and migration control. It is also clear that deportation incites fear in migrants who have not been deported. The question I set out to answer is why deportation is being used in the current historical moment for these purposes.

Loïc Wacquant (2009) argues that there is a "close link between the ascendancy of neoliberalism . . . and the deployment of punitive and proactive law-enforcement policies" (1). Wacquant notes that the primary victims of enhanced law enforcement are men of color. He contrasts the 2.1 million people in the incarcerated population (nearly all men) to the 2.1 million on welfare (nearly all women). He further notes that the United States designed both welfare policies and the War on Drugs not to protect the poor but to transform them into "compliant workers fit or forced to fill the peripheral slots of the deregulated labor market" (101). This argument has great resonance with the experiences of deportees.

Although neoliberalism demands that the state cut back on social services, at the same time, it requires that the state strengthen enforcement. Insofar as neoliberalism diminishes opportunities and services for the poor, the state must ensure that working-class and poor people

do not pose a threat to the rich. The state's cutbacks in social services often lead to dissent and increases in crime on the part of frustrated workers. The state responds by enhancing the police force and the military. Under neoliberalism, "forms of surveillance and policing multiply: in the United States incarceration became a key state strategy to deal with problems arising among discarded workers and marginalized populations. The coercive arm of the state is augmented to protect corporate interests and, if necessary, to repress dissent" (Harvey 2005: 77).

The current economic crisis has created high rates of unemployment, meaning there are large numbers of expendable workers. Many of the diminished markets for workers had employed immigrant men. For example, the construction industry lost more than a quarter of its jobs in five years: Whereas in April 2006, there were 7,726,000 jobs, in May 2011, there were only 5,516,000 jobs.[10] In the same time period that 2,210,000 jobs were lost in the construction industry, over 1.5 million people—mostly men—were deported. Both incarceration and deportation remove people from society and work to keep people compliant. Additionally, both regulatory policies cost taxpayers billions and harm communities.

Incarceration and deportation both require substantial financial outlays, which supposedly should not be part of neoliberal governments. However, insofar as neoliberalism creates economic insecurity, it requires the state to strengthen its coercive arm. In a neoliberal state, economic crises occur frequently, and the people at the lowest rungs of society suffer the most (Harvey 2005). As the economic crisis deepens, it threatens the economic security of the middle class: 40 percent of Americans say they are struggling "a lot" in the current economy, and 37 percent of these people identified themselves as being in the middle- or upper-middle class.[11] Economic worries translate into a general sense of insecurity (Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger 2013). Politicians—anxious to distract us from real economic issues—attempt to assuage people concerned about their economic situation with promises to deport all undocumented immigrants and strengthen crime enforcement (Davis 1998; Simon 2007).

In the United States, the War on Drugs and the War on Terror involve massive outlays of cash—expenditures that could be used to provide financial security for people teetering on the edge of foreclosure,

bankruptcy, and unemployment. However, in a neoliberal climate that demands government cutbacks in social services, the state cannot extend unemployment insurance, subsidize homeowners, or invest in public housing. Instead, politicians assure people that the Wars on Drugs and Terror enhance public and national security. Security from terrorism and crime replace financial and social security.

As Wacquant and Harvey suggest, neoliberalism requires docile workers willing to work for less than a living wage. Noncitizens in the United States provide this necessary labor force in a neoliberal economy. However, as inequality has increased, real wages have dropped, and unemployment has risen, the state has become increasingly repressive to ensure workers are compliant. I met many Dominicans who arrived in New York City and worked in low-wage jobs for years before getting tired of the low pay, long hours, and lack of benefits. They turned to the illegal economy to supplement their income. However, they were caught, arrested, and deported. These men told me they wished they could go back to the United States so they could have another chance to do things the right way. The right way, it seems, is to accept jobs that pay $8 an hour or less. Even though these men will not have the chance to do things the "right way," their deportation sends a message to their communities that subservience to the global economy is the best way to survive. Workers who might entertain the thought of eschewing low-wage labor fear deportation and keep their heads down. The threat of deportability—similar to the threat of incarceration—encourages workers to self-govern, which is another key element of a neoliberal era.

Criminal aliens, similar to felons, have become expendable and serve as an example to others who may consider transgressing the law. With no powerful lobbies to defend them, working-class, immigrant men of color who break the law experience harsh castigation. Their punishment serves two purposes: (1) Law makers and enforcers have statistics to show how effectively they are using public funds, and (2) the draconian consequences keep potential transgressors in check and willing to work in dead-end, low-wage jobs that barely ensure their subsistence. Stories of deportation that circulate in immigrant communities and in the media encourage immigrants to keep their heads down, stay away from drugs, and accept work in low-wage jobs.

Neoliberalism, Global Capitalism, and Mass Deportation

My arguments with regard to why we are in an era of mass deportation are based in large part on interviews I conducted with 147 deportees. Read together, the stories of deportees reveal the elements of neoliberalism and global capitalism that make mass deportation possible. Three elements create this neoliberal cycle of migration and deportation: stark inequality, social and border control, and economic shifts.

Global inequality is one of the prime reasons for international migration: There is tremendous inequality between countries, so people seek out their fortune in wealthier countries when they have the opportunity to do so. For many people, simply moving to a new country can significantly increase their income. For example, 80 percent of the people in Côte d'Ivoire earn less than the poverty threshold in Italy. Were these Ivoirians to move to Italy, they would be better off, even if they joined the working poor in Italy.[12] Similarly, when working-class Guatemalans move to the United States and join the U.S. working poor, they still can earn several times more than they could have in Guatemala.

Deportees I interviewed consistently told me they or their parents came to the United States in search of a better life. People who migrate to the United States also encounter significant inequality here: In 2012, the richest 20 percent of people in the United States earned 16 times more than the poorest 20 percent. In 2007, the share of the income in the United States held by the top 1 percent of earners was higher than it had been since 1917 (Morris and Western 1999; McCall and Percheski 2010). Wealth inequality in the United States is staggering: 1 percent of Americans own nearly half of the wealth in the country (Norton and Ariely 2011). As I explain above, this high level of inequality is due in part to the shifting nature of the labor market.

High levels of inequality at the global level lead to international migration. At the national level, they often lead to discontent. Both of these responses—migration and discontent—have engendered a state response of control. The United States has erected an elaborate system of border control, ostensibly to keep unwanted immigrants out and to create a complex system of immigration policing to render those immigrants that are there more vulnerable. The border control system does not actually keep migrants out—it simply makes their passage more

difficult (Cornelius 2006). And immigration policing does not remove all migrants who are in the country illegally, yet it does create fear in migrant communities and renders migrant labor more vulnerable.

Immigrants have been able to fill jobs in the new economy in the United States. However, often these jobs are undesirable and various systems of social control have emerged to ensure that immigrants stay in these jobs and don't disrupt the economy. These systems of control include border enforcement, immigration law enforcement, zealous criminal law enforcement, and migrant self-policing.

Methods and Case Selection

The arguments I present in this book are based primarily on 147 interviews I conducted over 14 months between May 2009 and August 2010 in Jamaica, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil, as well as follow-up observations in Guatemala in 2013. I spent a minimum of three months in each country, and I was able to interview at least 30 deportees in each country. I employed local research assistants to help me find interview candidates. In Jamaica, I found two assistants—both of them deportees—who assisted me in locating interview candidates. In Guatemala, students with connections to the migrant community as well as a deportee were able to find interview candidates. In Brazil, university students helped me to locate interview candidates. And in the Dominican Republic, a deportee and a student helped me find people to interview.

Using a variety of entry points, I obtained a sample that closely resembles the overall deportee population in each country. I selected interviewees who had spent varying lengths of time in the United States, who were deported on criminal and noncriminal grounds, who had served varying prison sentences, and who had gone to the United States at various ages. Although the deportee population in each of the countries is nearly all male, I interviewed women to gain their perspective as well. The interviews ranged in length from 20 minutes to more than two hours and were all audio-recorded, transcribed, and coded.

I interviewed deportees in the two countries to which the United States sends the highest proportion of criminal deportees (Jamaica and the Dominican Republic) and the two with the lowest proportion

TABLE I.1. Top 10 Countries of Origin of Deportees, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006 Combined

Country	# of Deportees	% Criminal
All	527,405	36%
Guatemala	35,049	**17%**
Brazil	11,314	**18%**
Honduras	42,632	20%
Nicaragua	3,738	25%
Ecuador	3,240	27%
El Salvador	19,355	34%
Mexico	355,757	40%
Colombia	5,382	50%
Dominican Republic	6,317	**71%**
Jamaica	3,685	**74%**

Source: Department of Homeland Security, "Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2005 and 2006."

of criminal deportees (Guatemala and Brazil). The concentration of deportees in a handful of countries made it relatively easy to choose sites for this project. Overall, 92 percent of the 527,405 people deported in FY 2005 and 2006 were from just nine countries: Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Jamaica—in descending numerical order (2005 and 2006 Immigration Enforcement Data Tables—DHS). Fewer than 20 percent of the Guatemalans and Brazilians deported in 2005 and 2006 had been convicted of crimes in the United States, compared to 74 percent of Jamaicans and 71 percent of Dominicans.[13] (See table I.1 for details.)

In addition to the interviews, I draw from DHS statistics on immigration law enforcement, DHS published statements and reports, as well as data from the TRAC, which publishes data on immigration law enforcement and court proceedings.

Overview of Rest of This Book

This book explains the neoliberal cycle of emigration, immigration, and deportation. For this reason, I have organized the book around the journeys of immigrants who eventually became deportees. My analyses

of their narratives make clear the mechanisms through which stark inequality, social and border control, and economic shifts—the undercurrents of neoliberalism—underlay their experiences. I develop arguments in each chapter that describe the mechanisms by which global capitalism drives mass deportation, and I use deportees' stories to illustrate their positions within the cycle.

In chapter 1, "Growing Up," I tell the stories of several deportees to describe the conditions these deportees left behind in their home countries. These stories show how global inequality compelled people to leave their countries of birth. The deportees we will meet in this book traveled to the United States because they knew someone else who had done so before them and because they had good reasons to do so. When these deportees and their families migrated, they were playing a crucial role in global capitalism—that of providing their labor where it was needed. However, these deportees likely would never have left their home countries if global capitalism had not already made them economically vulnerable. They became necessary cogs in the migration machine primarily because it was the best option available to them.


Figure I.4. The path from migration to deportation.

In chapter 2, "Crossing Over," I detail the experience of crossing over into the United States and document the consequences of enhanced border enforcement. We see that migrants who traveled earlier tended to find it fairly easy to get into the United States, whereas those that came in the recent era of enhanced enforcement have had more harrowing experiences. I asked each of the deportees I met to describe to me his or her experience of trying to make it to the United States. The stories were often traumatic adventures across sea and land. They are also a testament to the risks migrants must endure in order to make it to the United States.

In chapter 3, "Becoming (Black and Latino) American," I consider the lives of young immigrants coming of age in the United States and how their parents' marginal positions in the economy combined with heavy policing in their neighborhoods affected their lives. Many of the deportees I met spent their formative years in the United States. Their stories make it clear that immigrant children who grow up in the United States have distinct experiences based largely on the situation into which they arrive and the ability of their family to adapt to the new situation. Whether the journey culminated in a reunion with parents after years of separation or immigration had been with their families intact, whether they settled in New York City or other places, all affected the experiences of deportees growing up in the United States.

In chapter 4, "The War on Drugs," I tell the stories of Jamaican and Dominican immigrants who were deported on drug charges. Dominicans and Jamaicans are the two immigrant groups most likely to be deported on criminal grounds and most often deported on drug charges. Their stories lay bare the intersections between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror through a consideration of how the War on Drugs has affected their neighborhoods and how small-time drug dealers have been targeted in the War on Terror. This chapter renders it evident how mass incarceration and heavy policing affect immigrants in a neoliberal era.

Chapter 5, "Getting Caught," tells the story of how deportees got caught up in the deportation dragnet. This chapter draws from the narratives of deportees to explain how criminal law enforcement contributes to the skewed nature of immigration law enforcement and to

illuminate how the stories of immigration law enforcement that circulate in immigrant communities contribute to a climate of social control.

Chapter 6, "Behind Bars," describes deportees' experiences behind bars—in jails, prisons, and immigration detention centers. Many of the deportees spent time both in prison and in immigration detention centers, experiencing varying levels of mistreatment. A look inside detention centers and prisons reveals the underbelly of global capitalism. Both prisons and detention centers are a literal manifestation of the coercive arm of the state under neoliberalism.

Chapter 7, "Back Home," details the struggles deportees face in their countries of birth. Many face stigma, exclusion, and even legal sanction. We see how the context of reception matters in these homecomings. The Dominican Republic treats arriving deportees as unwelcome criminals; Guatemala ushers the English-speaking workers into jobs at transnational telemarketing centers, while eschewing those who have tattoos; Jamaica blames its crime wave on the influx of criminal deportees; and Brazil, with a growing economy, barely notices its returning citizens.

The conclusion recaps key policy lessons and discusses the most recent policies and proposals in light of my findings.

Each of these chapters provides insights into a critical aspect of the neoliberal cycle. In the first chapter, we will consider how global inequality and economic restructuring in Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Brazil accelerated emigration flows from these countries.