

## Notes1

Warfare is coordinated inter societal violence .It is an attempt in an anarchic system to maximize power when bargaining or deterrence fail to gain a states core objectives like resources ,hegemony or a reversal of state decline.Key concepts: states are typically ranked according to power ,and all power is considered relative. Major powers have the greatest level of power and only major powers can initiate a war the engulfs an entire system. Systems are distinct geographical regions like Europe. Truly global wars are rare because they are too costly and difficult to wage. States can be differentiated into war states and peace states war steps have a predominant preference for war. War states are not necessarily autocracies. Preferences depend on international factors. Wars are fought for historically contingent motives like the conflicts discussed in Fromkin. They can also be fought to prevent decline or prevent one state from gaining hegemonic power in a system. Germany between 1890 and 1945 was objectively threatening because of its hegemonic potential, and this also applies to Russia between 1914 1945. Wars may be averted through bargaining but this is not likely if a state believes its pay offs from war exceed payoffs from bargaining. This can be a fully rational choice.

“Structure” refers to he distribution of power, primarily military power, in an anarchic system The most important concept is the balance of power. If adversaries are in balance there is no rational incentive to initiate war because no one is likely to win But if the balance breaks and war may result if declining powers use war to stop their decline or rising powers act to prevent preemption by hostile adversaries. States are assumed to be unitary ,rational and thus capable of choosing war. Anarchy is taken as the typical condition of systems.Institutional theory assumes that peace is preferred to war and war results from failed bargaining or a lack of information about an adversaries preferences for war and peace that leads to choices that lead to war . The outcome of bargaining is assumed to always to exceed the pay offs from war.

It is often assumed that war results from misperception of an adversaries preferences for war and peace or a failure to understand the causal implications of factors like weapons or the likelihood a war would be longer or more costly than planned.If irrational choices are unlikely this means tha war could result from a failure of state and or its adversaries for war and peace or on inability to estimate the costs of actual war fighting. This explanation is typically illustrated with the ww1 case. However as a general explanation of war this is unlikely. First it overestimates the ability of stars to signal their preferences for war and peace and there incentive to bluff. If adversaries prefer to gain an advantage through bargaining they will choose it unless they are war states. In that case there preferences are known and

war will not result from miscalculation. In 1914 the preferences for war were common knowledge revealed through diplomacy and all sides hoped to avoid the costs of a long war through a decisive battle or campaign. They also understood that although they had to launch offensives the new weapons like rapid fire artillery favored the defensive. Offensives were necessary to avoid possible economic collapse domestic pressure for quick action and the fear of losing the initiative to the adversary.

hope all of you will be well . Hirer is some explication for Fromkin .The chief problem with Fromkin is his attribution to Germany of stating Ww1 But did Germany want war as a first preference or did it choose war as a response to breakdown of the balance of power that forced Germany to act to save Aus.Hungary ,Germany's only ally ,or was Germany a war state . If the Former is true Germany was a war starter but not a war state More importantly this denies the crucial role of Aus. in choosing mobilization in order to crush Serbia Mobilization as a matter of common knowledge meant war. Finally could Russia have prevented war by accepting Austrian aggression against Serbia.

In reading Fromkin note that Germany allied with Aus Hungary .This followed the logic of gains from trade because both states rationally were better off than if they had followed rational self help The alliance liked the strongest and weakest of the great powers,and thus allowed them to balance against any possible counter alliance. In general, states will only ally if the benefits exceed costs because the alliance is better than self help. States prefer self help to alliances because benefits do not have to be shared. Self help is a guarantee against defection to the enemy conflicting objectives like peace or war and free riding by allies. Coalitions(alliances) follow a minimum winning formula or only as many allies as are necessary. Allies rationally distrust each other and attempt to war plan for fighting alone ww1 is an excellent example of all these principles.

Note2

Major powers can be assumed to start a systemic war if it is in decline or opportunistically seeks to exploit a temporary advantage. The difficult problem is to predict the behavior of an ascending major power. In principle an ascending major power has no incentive to initiate war because it can wait until its power is sufficient to dominate its system. However,this makes the rising power an objective threat to its system,particularly if it has hegemonic potential ,and this perceived threat will trigger counterbalancing adversary coalitions .This generates an incentive for the ascending power to pre empt this threat by striking first. Germany fits the above description and calls into question Fromkin portrayal as a war state.

The puzzle of Austria Hungary. One aspect of ww1 that makes it a least likely case is the behavior of Austria Hungary in 1914 As the weakest of the five great powers, its leaders had the most to lose from a major systemic war because defeat or even the defeat of Russia, its most significant adversary, could cause political collapse and the end of the state. Given minimal rationality and a correct perception of its enemies pay offs from war and peace, one might assume that the balance of costs and benefits would favor peace (the status quo) or bargaining. However Austria chose war with Serbia even though doing so would likely lead to Russian intervention and systemic war. But this choice was rational if decision makers correctly believed that any other choice was equivalent to defeat and the death of the state War with Serbia could potentially end its primary threat and restore the balance of power by reversing its decline. Note that this explanation does not depend on German behavior and focuses on Austria Hungary's rational perception that the benefits of war outweighed the costs. (R=benefits of war exceed net costs. This is a rational gamble and illustrates the danger to European peace of a balance of power that deepened on a declining major power facing major power adversaries.

Note3

Most of the literature on war focuses on major wars because they re shape entire systems and reconfigure the balance of power. However, most wars statistically are major minor power wars that involve a major power attack on a minor power that refuses the demands of the major power. Serbia's decision to fight Austria is an example. What is theoretically interesting is that such wars should never occur. This is because the minor power should always accept a bargain short of war. The minor power should bargain because it cannot defeat the major power but it can be defeated while the major power can gain while not paying the costs of war. But this logic will be overridden if the minor power sees the benefits of war as greater than the net costs. This will be true if any bargain acceptable to the major power threatens the survival of the minor power and it is a give that any state will fight if it can rather than accept a loss of sovereignty. Consider this situation. The major power makes demands that of the conflict. threaten the independence of a minor power. The latter faces a stark choice between peace and war and controls the outcome of the conflict. If the minor power chooses war the major power chooses war The major power bargains only if the minor power offers a bargain with sure benefits that exceed the sure benefits of war. The major power is indifferent between the minimum benefits of war and an equivalent bargain. The minor power will choose war if any feasible bargain threatens the minor powers survival and there is credible belief that the minor power's population will pay the costs of war.