

Chapter 1

The Rise of Populist Nationalism in Comparative Perspective: Europe and the Americas

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During the last decades, most scholars studying the international system have subscribed to convergence arguments about the present day realities and future of globalization. The literature argued – and still does – that increasing world integration is waiting for us around the corner. Global markets, the Internet, and faster communications have finally lowered cultural and national barriers. It has been claimed that inexorably – and increasingly – globalization constructs a more intricate and interdependent world system where “exiting” as an option is not a choice. Moved by fashion and conviction, financial regulators, politicians, economists, political scientists and journalists became staunch supporters of neoliberalism, which many equated with globalization. They used its tools, adopted its ideology and, since not many alternatives appeared possible, spread the conviction that “the end of history” had arrived. Experts and regulating institutions alike contributed to sustain the neoliberal system in place by creating widespread global consciousness that the world was pretty much divided into “dinosaurs,” who hung to old-fashioned convictions, and “innovators,” who accepted the new wisdom.

Yet even at its peak during the 1990s, the neoliberal system remained less “global,” “rational,” and democratic than it claimed to be. It neither incorporated all the international actors that mattered, nor was it efficient enough at cementing stable global governance. Today, dissident voices have gained central stage and are looking at the present and future of globalization through very different lenses. A neoliberal world deeply rooted in the inevitable growth of capital and the able skills of international financial regulators has really remained more in the realm of theoretical thinking than a reality of international practices.

Scholars, practitioners, and analysts today are pointing to the volatile character of 21st century international arrangements, their disorderly nature, and the tendency of the system to undermine convergence in favor of divergence. This, however, is not news. The move toward divergence has been central to the very process of globalization. One can argue that with the exception of some short historical moments in which the so-called market wisdom and the inevitability of free trading seemed to rule the world, politically and socially the so-called neoliberal order was never really orderly. Rather, it offered a mirage of stability and rationality with no solid and orderly structure underneath. Full-fledged neoliberal economies never existed in the flesh, and undesirable “externalities” – like nationalism or cultural resistance to global influence – were never overpowered. While much of the scholarly literature treated them as temporary inadequacies that would tend to disappear in due time, these factors grew in strength. Today, as in the past, they are shaping the international system.

In part, this book is about some of these factors: how they operate, why they are important, and how they will evolve in the near future. Our focus is on populist nationalism (PN). Nationalism, it has been argued, has “returned” with a vengeance. The same can be said about populism. Most authors in this volume argue, however, that nationalism never went away and that populism has never gone out of fashion. This debate shares some similarities with the 1980s debate on the state. While some authors like Theda Skocpol (1979) argued that we needed to bring the state “back in,” others reasonably claimed that the state had really never gone away. Nationalistic competitiveness constitutes one significant factor that has and is challenging the neoliberal order. As this collection makes evident, populism and nationalism today combine in a powerful equation that can shape and transform domestic and international arrangements. Another related, although less noticed, factor mentioned by some authors in this volume is a growing and widespread disregard for rules and conventions, including the wisdom of supreme courts, constitutions, and international accords. Terrorism, religious conflict, frequent war, failed states, and the unpredictability of rogue states also relate to the major thrust of this book, that is,

its focus on populist nationalism.

Present-day populist nationalism is linked to the fact that we live in a global system in transition; a system that is still a “system,” but that is constantly under attack in terms of its legitimacy and its capacity to impose a clear mandate. Similar to apprehensions about the intense transformations that characterized the turn of the 20th century, today uncertainty about the future of the international system also has compelled analysts to make predictions. A wealth of good scholarly research has been done and many – at times contrary – scenarios have been constructed. A brief glimpse at these future scenarios is needed to place our work on PN in a wider context.

Growing conflict motivated by the geography of regions as well as competition for their natural resources, for instance, appears inevitable (Kaplan 2012). Water wars, demographic growth leading to unsustainability, and the possibility of new technologies associated with food production are favorite topics. It also has been argued that an essential part of globalization is the conception of the future that it generates. For some, that future is based on uncertainty (see e.g., López-Alves and Johnson 2007); this affects the daily lives of individuals, influences collective action, and changes the very way people conceive of the future itself. Social actors, unclear about the options available at any given point in time, adopt decisions that attempt to lessen uncertainty but do not contribute to the common good.

The inevitability of globalization, one of the most common assumptions of the last decades, also has come under scrutiny. In the recent past it seemed apparent that, once in motion, the process of global integration led by the West could not be stopped. And yet most events in history are neither inevitable nor inescapable. It has been indeed argued that history tells a very different story and that the end of globalization may actually be a fundamental part of our future (King 2017). Western-led globalization seems to have exhausted its power and the center of the system is shifting eastwards.

The sustainability of the global economy has long been a major subject of disagreement, and those on the Left in particular have pointed out that liberal and neoliberal systems frequently are unable

to cope with bubbles and mismanagement. Today, the available record sustains this claim. It seems obvious that the financial system has become almost unable to cope with glitches. Policy makers and financiers seldom take responsibility for wrongdoing, abstractly blaming “the system” itself when, in reality, they are the system. The 2008 crisis showed that global financial regulators like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank and private capital were unable to offer a solution. Future improvements in the financial system seem undermined by mistrust and clientele politics. As Stephen King has put it, none of these international institutions could

“...easily cope with the extraordinary growth of cross border capital flows: when it all went wrong, the buck stopped here, there and everywhere. Everyone was responsible, yet no one was responsible. More than anything, the crises revealed a fundamental mismatch between, on the one hand, the global economy and markets and, on the other, the interests of nation states and non-state actors” (2017, 75).

War also has loomed high in predictions about the future, and for good reasons. Using geopolitics combined with international relations history and reaching forward “about 100 years,” George Freeman (2009), for example, predicts that the US will still be the major organizing force of the future global system; at the end, however, the possibility of a third world war remains. Closely connected to war and natural disasters, global migration stands as another important factor conspiring against the established order and contributing to instability. Migrants mainly out of the Middle East and Africa have in huge numbers tried to reach developed democracies in Europe and elsewhere, not to mention the fact that neighboring countries in those regions have been overwhelmed by the most massive migration in history. Despite liberal arguments to the contrary, the integration of these newcomers into European culture, in particular, has turned out to be problematic. The recent history of integration indicates that important numbers of immigrants have been either unwilling or unable to accept the new culture of their host countries, with disruptive consequences (Kirchick 2017). The

failure of cultural integration could further tilt the balance in favor of lesser orderliness, and some believe that we may be actually witnessing the advent of a “dark age” triggered by “the end of Europe,” its traditional values, and historical achievements (ibid.). This would undermine democracy and foster the rise of more authoritarian and despotic forms of rule.

More than twenty years ago, Samuel Huntington (1996) also looked into the incompatibility of different cultural values and warned that traditional wars – including the Cold War – were part of the past. The world of the future, Huntington posed, would instead be shaped by cultural clashes among different “civilizations.” Cultural and religious clashes could bring about the slow decline of the West, a culture that believes in universal values but fails to acknowledge that others do not. Unpopular as this argument was for quite a while, the cultural clashes that have characterized the 21st century have brought it back with renewed energy.

Add to that the growing tension between demographic growth and automation. There is now little doubt that Artificial Intelligence and Artificial General Intelligence will, in the next decades if not earlier, substitute for human labor on a large scale while growing demographics will make the world the most populated ever. Despite more optimistic diagnoses in which automation – the fourth industrial revolution – seems to have little impact on employment (Frank, Roehrig and Pring 2017), others doing research on the relationship between growing demographics, working class dynamics, and technological innovation, fear that it will.

Finally, and very importantly for our analysis of – and projections about – populist nationalism, most future scenarios concur that today the international arena is home to the highest number of actors ever, which further strengthens divergence. In a social media and Internet dominated world, the state obviously no longer is the only actor capable of bringing about change. Multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, organized crime, financial regulators, and ongoing technological revolutions also shape developments. Global actors and individuals have more access to technology

than ever before, and this has serious consequences for national security, and financial and political sabotage.

Richard Hass (2017) is right when he describes this global system as a system “in transition” that questions the very notions of “system” and “order.” As he put it:

We are witnessing a widespread rejection of globalization and international involvement and, as a result, a questioning of long-standing postures and policies, from openness to trade and immigrants to a willingness to maintain alliances and overseas commitments. This questioning is by no means limited to Great Britain; there are signs of it throughout Europe, in the United States, and nearly everywhere else (*ibid.*, 2).

The question that remains half-answered in most of these scenarios is: transition toward what? This book argues that the consolidation of PN, that is, the combination of populism and nationalism in a variety of forms both in core and periphery, gives us a good clue. While there is a wealth of literature on nationalism and also a widespread interest in populism – especially in those countries that have experienced populist governments – the way in which populism and nationalism have combined to form a loose but powerful 21st century ideology is lacking adequate treatment.

This collection thus offers a comparative picture of the genesis, evolution, and spread of populist nationalism around the world, from developed democracies to lesser-developed ones, from authoritarian versions of populism to more open, democratic forms, and from right-wing ethnonationalism to leftist–liberal types that propose a very different version of the desired nation. The collection also studies cases of PN that challenge average definitions of populism and nationalism, as Diane Johnson argues for Argentina and Martin Marger for Canada. A substantial part of the discussion focuses on the nationalism of populism, including all its varieties and different combinations, in order to offer a better understanding of how these two concepts combine to shape the political landscape of the 21st century.

Part I: Cross-National Comparisons of Populist Nationalism

In Chapter 2, “Populist Nationalism in Europe and the Americas: Past, Present, and Future,” Fernando López-Alves argues that populism is in fact a type of nationalism. The 21st century combination of populism and nationalism is the product of the long historical process that constructed national identity going back to the late eighteenth century. He poses that a key part of modernity rests upon the foundation of nationalism, and that the bureaucratic practices of identity building created by modern western states explain nationalism’s growth and evolution. More than any others, these states constructed specific bureaucracies dedicated to nation building. As a result, a complex and powerful ideology of nationalism created in the West soon spread worldwide, constructing a collective consciousness of nationality attached to the state. This process, according to the author, is key to explaining why and how, in the 20th but especially in the 21st century, different combinations of PN have gained centrality both at the core and periphery of the global system. Nationalism is not just the defense of the nation, but rather, the foundational pillar of all 20th century political regimes, including democracies. It is in populist regimes, however, that the influence of nationalism is the strongest.

López-Alves compares different forms of present day PN in Europe and the Americas, arguing that one of the most powerful characteristics of 21st century PN ideology is its eclecticism. Its proponents have successfully appropriated and employed major ideas traditionally put forward by left- and right-wing ideologies, claiming that it has accomplished what they could not. According to López-Alves, globalization – and modernization theory before it – totally misread the importance and influence that nationalism and populism enjoyed in the developed countries that constituted the core of the international system. Theories that viewed them as ideologies that could only prosper in the underdeveloped periphery were wrong.

In a similar line of thinking, in Chapter 3, “Why the Nation Never Really Went Away,” Gregory Jusdanis stresses that any discussion of populism must focus on nationalism as an essential component and common denominator. Despite globalization theory’s claims to the contrary, he submits that nationalism has never gone away and for centuries has remained a ubiquitous component of domestic and international policy. Globalization, Jusdanis shows, is not a recent modern phenomenon; rather, it goes back to antiquity. Because of its focus on recent historical phenomena and a tendency to ignore the rest, globalization theory has misconstrued historical processes and the very essence of nationalism. Its major mistake has been to interpret nationalism as a form of pre-modern identity due to go away in due time. Acknowledging that Francis Fukuyama’s claim was not about a real “end” of history, Jusdanis nonetheless uses this metaphor and other similar arguments – the so-called “expiration of violence” and the progressive “homogenization” of the international system – to show not only that these theories are erroneous, but also that the notion of “endings” is fallacious. This is especially true when these theories are applied to nationalism, a persistent component of the international system and local politics. Jusdanis argues that differentiation, after all, is inevitable and desirable.

Theories that argue for “comebacks,” “endings” or the “disappearance” of nationalism are therefore flawed not only when applied to the history of national identity but also to history itself. If one sees nationalism and populism as products of recent history, one can grasp neither their process of formation nor their future. Drawing from literature of sociology, history, religious studies, political science, philosophy and other humanities, Jusdanis provides a broad, fascinating picture of the tensions between globalization and nationalism through the prisms of religion, secularization, westernization, war, and peace. The reader travels from Greece to the Philippines, from Europe to the Americas, and from Egypt to Rome and Syria. Contrary to convergence globalization theory, Jusdanis shows that there seems to be no final peace, no final standpoint to history, no period free of conflict, and no possible cultural homogeneity. Nationalism, he argues, is not a pathological extremism but, rather, the inevitable

expression of the pull between the local and the global, the defense of our identities and the unattainable idea of homogenization. Today's intersection of nationalism and populism incarnates another expression of this tug-of-war between convergence and divergence, between the individual and the general.

In a manner somewhat similar to López-Alves, Kristin Haltinner and Jacqueline Hogan in Chapter 4, "Comparing Cabals: The Role of Conspiracy Ideation in Right-Wing Populist Groups in the US and UK," also stress the power of ideology and ideation in the construction of conceptualizations of the nation. The chapter focuses on the consolidation and evolution of right-wing populism in the US and the UK, and offers telling examples of conspiracy narratives in both countries. The authors carefully analyze and dissect these narratives. Using ideological frames specifically focused on conspiracy ideation, the authors' comparative analysis shows that by using such frames, these movements are able to construct collective identities and successfully encourage their followers to commit to the movement.

The tensions that these narratives show between "us" and "them," always both explicit and implicit, link the analysis to the more ample literature on the nation, nationalism, and national identity. Indeed, these conspiracy ideations seek to defend national sovereignty against global initiatives, especially those coming from international financial and political regulators. They encourage mistrust toward elites – the intelligentsia, professional politicians, and scientists – and understand the "real" nation as an ethnic community that shares a common heritage, race, language, and faith. Haltinner and Hogan show that these right-wing narratives of conspiracy do not, most of the time, offer any concrete solutions to the issues that they target as the roots of societal disarray and conflict. They do, however, offer an ideological framework and a powerful set of beliefs that strongly impact populist and other kinds of organizations as well as society in general. The key to their success is that political and social movements find that conspiracy narratives provide a powerful and easy-to-use tool that increases the individual's identity and commitment to the group's goals.

Part II: Populist Nationalism in Europe

In Chapter 5, “Populist Nationalism in Ukraine,” Mikhail A. Molchanov analyzes a complex and conflictive case of PN. Molchanov contends that Ukraine represents a relatively recent example of PN – in part triggered by the 2014 revolution – but one that has reproduced the pattern already established by prior European cases. Molchanov is therefore able to connect the case of Ukraine to broader theories of nationalism and populism, offering the opportunity of inserting this case into wider comparative theories of identity, conflict, nationalism, and populism. It is of course impossible to separate nationalism in Ukraine from the powerful historical presence of the Soviet Union in the region. While this is not surprising, the unintended consequences of these policies are of particular interest. After the unifying “indigenization” policies of the USSR were strongly implemented in Ukraine, local groups and other quarters took the notion of ethnic nationalism quite seriously but in a different way than the Soviets intended. It provoked a divisive situation rather than the intended unity, and the country found itself divided into competing ethnic communities.

Thus, similar to what Haltinner and Hogan show about the power of right-wing nationalist narratives when creating individual identities and loyalties, Molchanov’s chapter demonstrates how groups can use ethnonationalism to create cohesiveness and rally people into nationalist wars. Indeed, a kind of PN inspired by ethnonationalism became both a tool and an end for competing political forces in Ukraine. Thus, a very important lesson that the chapter teaches us is that when framed in ethnic claims, unifying nationalist policies can bring about the opposite effect. This exploration of Ukrainian nationalism reminds us of Max Weber’s definition of nations as groups defined by their desire to construct their own state. Molchanov argues that nationalism became the middle managers’ response to independence and the collapse of the USSR. Devoid of that central authority and rejecting bilingualism, the revolution started a new phase in the political history in the country. The author

concludes that PN became a tool used by both the established and the challenging elites.

In Chapter 6, “‘Mut zu Deutschland!’ On the Populist Nationalism of the Alternative für Deutschland,” Joseph Sterphone scrutinizes and monitors a specific case of PN in Germany through the analysis of the *Alternative für Deutschland*, a right-wing populist-nationalist party. Not unlike the analysis provided by Haltinner and Hogan, López-Alves, Johnson, and other authors in this volume, Sterphone uses AfD’s shifts in rhetoric and policy orientation as analytical tools in order to explain the construction of this party’s ideology and its turn toward more hard-core interpretations of PN. Not surprisingly, given the lessons learned in prior chapters, the defense of European and German culture lay at the very foundations of this organization. Contrary to common belief, however, he argues that the populist nationalistic approach of this party goes back to its foundations, rather than to the 2015 shift toward a more explicit form of PN. A major question that the author tackles is about the conditions under which groups like the AfD can emerge and consolidate, opening the door for further comparative analysis.

Sterphone’s chapter also offers a wealth of information on the foundation and trajectory of nationalism and populism in Germany during recent decades. As in most other cases studied in this volume, the AfD’s version of populist nationalism claims to defend the “real people” against its enemies. It portrays these threats as coming both from the international environment and from within Germany, especially Islam and multiculturalism. Unlike other similar parties, however, the AfD also included a conversation on femininity and womanhood. The call for immigration reform, curiously enough, was based on the Canadian model studied below by Martin Marger. Yet the German interpretation of this model differed from the original (as analyzed by Marger) in terms of its strong emphasis on cultural singularity and its focus on immigrants who are willing to integrate, although they will not fully be considered part of the *Volk*. Sterphone’s focus on the definition of the “nation” under national

populism in Germany, rather than a discussion on populism *per se*, distinguishes this chapter from the rest of the volume.

In Chapter 7, historian Raúl Moreno Almendral studies the complex case of Spain under the title “Nation, People, and National Populisms in Contemporary Spain.” After a helpful discussion on the use of populism and nationalism in Spain mostly by Spanish scholars, Moreno Almendral provides a clear account of the different manifestations of nationalism in the country, including that of the Basques and the Catalans. He interplays the consolidation of regional nationalism and separatism in Spain with the development of political parties and the process of democratization that started in the late 1970s. Two factors combine, he argues, to strengthen populist nationalism in Spain. On the one hand, the major Spanish parties – the socialist PSOE and the liberal-conservative PP (*Partido Popular*) – have long used populist discourse and practices to enlarge their constituencies. On the other, is the long history of autonomic claims in the country (by “autonomous regions”) that have incessantly claimed independence from the central state. To this, the author suggests that we should add the foundation of the populist *Podemos* in January 2014, a young movement soon transformed to a party that has consistently gained a stronger voice in parliament.

The chapter by Moreno Almendral contributes a needed analysis of this newer but growing populist movement and the pulls that characterize its ideological tenets. The author concludes that the political landscape in Spain today presents the largest upsurge of populism in the history of the country, coupled with a very strong sense of nationalism both at the regional and state levels. This tense combination may lead to further conflict as it has through the recent events in Catalonia, when nationalists in the legislature proposed to split both from Spain and the European Union. To this complex set of factors, Moreno Almendral adds the tensions between Republicanism and Socialism, the differences between the populism of *Podemos* and that of the ruling party, and the contradictions that hurt separatist positions, especially the internal politics of Cataluña.

In Chapter 8, “Anglo-Saxon Populism: Brexit and ‘Brexit on Steroids,’” Atul Singh concentrates on the United Kingdom and the meaning of Brexit for the consolidation and growth of PN. Singh connects the Brexit process to a broader international picture that includes the United States and the Trump presidency, as well as the shifting scenario of European politics. Economic crises, unemployment, and lowering standards of living in the UK and also in the US, he argues, contributed to popular discontent and the consolidation of a type of PN that blames immigrants, the internationalization of business, and globalization for the maladies that affect their countries. As most other authors do in this volume, Singh argues that the very definitions of populism and even nationalism are fuzzy and need some redefining to be applicable to today’s realities. Contrary to some traditional wisdom that has claimed that populism and populist nationalism originated in the US, Singh traces PN’s origins back 500 years ago in the UK, specifically to 1527, and suggests that it goes back even further in Germany. He argues, however, that populism and nationalism do not always converge. The very history of the two in Britain shows that at times, only tenuous ties unite the two.

Singh’s work mainly coincides with most other chapters in this volume. He characterizes populism in the UK as movements “that sought to extend suffrage, mitigate class divides, and ameliorate the terrible state of the working classes”; they were, thus, openly anti-elitist. The chapter argues that Brexit is the product of a very long historical process – which the author thoroughly examines – and that it would be misleading to solely connect it with British discontent regarding the evolution, consolidation, and policies of the European Union. Singh does acknowledge, however, the stormy relations between British political elites and Brussels. He connects this complex political and economic process with the ups and downs of European politics, especially in France and Germany. He claims thus that PN in the UK is the product of a multifaceted set of variables that include a long and tense historical tradition of populism and nationalism coupled with the interplay of European politics.

Singh also includes cultural variables in his analysis and demonstrates that the UK and US share a similar cultural tradition that shaped their versions of PN.

Part III: Case Studies from North America

In Chapter 9, “Global Model or Unique Experiment: Multiculturalism and Nationalism in Canada,” Martin N. Marger focuses on the correlation between immigration, multiculturalism, and PN. The chapter concentrates on Canada but offers comparisons with the US and Europe. As we stated above, a major problem for Europe has been the integration of newcomers into European society. Indeed, the question of how Europeans will respond to increasing waves of immigration is still open. The author argues that much depends on how countries conceptualize and pursue the idea of multiculturalism. The chapter conveys some good news: it seems that the tense relations between newcomers and natives that has assailed Europe and the US – places that have emphasized as a goal the integration of immigrants into the pre-existing society – do not threaten Canada. This country, a salient exception, has indeed received large numbers of immigrants; in fact, comparatively more than most European countries or the US. Nonetheless, Canada has been able to create a much less conflicted multicultural society. Canada seems to stand at the opposite end of the spectrum from Ukraine, as studied by Molchanov in this collection, and offers a sharp contrast to its southern neighbor, as analyzed in the three subsequent chapters on the US.

Marger rightly asks whether we should treat Canada as an exceptional case that offers a formula that allows avoiding the typical conflict that affects most multicultural nations. Canadian multiculturalism is fundamentally based on the pluralist notion that ethnic groups are entitled to retain their cultural differences within the context of the larger nation-state without necessarily becoming a part of the dominant culture. His point is that differences in the policies of multiculturalism, more than anything else, explain the differences that separate the successful case of Canada from the US. The

chapter opens the door for comparisons with other lands of recent settlement such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Australia. The idea of a “melting pot” or “salad bowl” implies the “fusing of diverse groups into a hybrid culture,” and this is precisely what Canada has not done. The author suggests that the US, for instance, has kept the melting pot goal as an ideal but has not genuinely pursued melting-pot policies, while Canada has taken seriously its multiculturalism. Marger concludes that the strong multiculturalist policies of Canada make it difficult for PN to grow and consolidate. It also makes for a positive correlation between national identity and immigration.

In Chapter 10, “From ‘Empty Lands’ to ‘Empty Signifiers’: Nativism, Race, Gender, and National Populism,” Jasmine Noelle Yarish also touches upon issues of multiculturalism and connects them with gender and race in order to render an analysis of populist nationalism in the US. As the title of the chapter suggests, Yarish uses historical and sociological analysis to study PN in connection to nativism and gender. She starts in the Jackson era and extends the analysis to the present time and the Trump presidency. She draws important lessons, however, from two specific periods: the middle of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th. The chapter investigates whether nativism is the glue that, in America, holds together the marriage of nationalism and populism. Has nationalism been captive to nativism and, if so, can it break free from this early association? Was it nativism that provided fertile soil for populism to grow in the US, or were there other factors that combined to strengthen the populist tradition? The author argues that nativism provided the discursive terrain for US populist nationalism.

Similarly to López-Alves, Jusdanis, and Haltinner and Hogan, Yarish argues for the power of ideology and suggests that narratives and semantics, structured within a complex populist ideological construct, became the major vehicles for the consolidation and spread of populist nationalism in the US. This type of PN finds its foundations in a nativist discourse that encourages racial, sexual, and gender systems of discrimination. White supremacy is the result; hence the ethnonationalism of the Trump administration. As Yarish puts it, “masculinist bravado and patriarchal protectionism consistently

underscores US national populism.” The chapter offers one of the few available discussions of nativism in connection to PN and also places the history of US populism in the context of immigration. As in the chapter on Canada by Martin Marger, Yarish emphasizes the land of recent settlement characteristics of the US and the importance of a model of integration in the construction of multiculturalism; according to her, a project scarcely successful in the US.

In Chapter 11, “Populism and Nationalism in US Politics,” Mark D. Brewer offers an analysis of the evolution of populism and nationalism in the United States, providing a background that led to the presidency of Donald Trump. Brewer’s theoretical tools include both the analysis of the ideology of several political leaders and the trajectory of populism as an ideological whole. The author uses this analysis to make an argument about the future of PN in America. Brewer, as many other authors in this volume, points to the fuzziness of the concept of populism. In the case of the US, different periods of American history reflect singular versions of what “the people” and “populism” mean; in addition, populist positions have been shaped by different political alliances. Yet despite variations through its different epochs, American populism has consistently agreed upon a number of points: its rejection of central authority and its denunciation of the invasive character of Washington policies, its claim that economic arrangements are unfair and need to be changed, its view of the unfairness that characterizes the relations between the elites and the common people, its defense of the nation, its belief in conspiratorial policies, and its mistrust of intellectuals.

In a vein similar to many others in this volume, Brewer argues that nationalism in the US provided populists with the enemy that they needed to grow and thrive. One can conclude, therefore, that the combination of populism and nationalism operates in a similar way in the US, Europe and Latin America. Arguments of American exceptionalism, therefore, do not ring true when it comes to PN. Donald Trump’s populism, Brewer contends, fits nicely with the long trajectory of populism and nationalism that preceded it, except in one very important respect: Trump has completely failed at

“valorizing the common people and railing against centralized power makes” and has, instead, established a sort of authoritarian style of government that makes it very different from prior populist governments in US history.

In Chapter 12, “Donald Trump, the Republican Party, and the Scourge of Populism,” John Kenneth White argues that Trump was able to take advantage of intraparty insurgency and cultural resentment in order to engineer a “hostile takeover” of the Republican Party. This included a turn toward economic nationalism that sought to put “America First” and was imbued “with a populist diatribe against an unresponsive establishment in Washington D.C.” Like other authors in this volume, White emphasizes the importance of anti-elitism and the conviction that corrupt elites have weakened the nation. But he also stresses the importance for political parties of recent heroes. So while the Reagan “spell” and accompanying rise of a conservative intellectual class in the 1980s in many ways replaced the ideas of the New Deal, it now is receding in the minds of Americans. And importantly, the lack of innovative conservative thinking since then provided a space into which Trump could step. White illustrates how far Trump’s goals are from Reagan’s on international trade deals, immigration, and foreign policy – especially toward Russia.

Relying on careful analysis of direct quotations from intellectual leaders and politicians throughout the chapter, White also demonstrates how Trump’s “hostile takeover” was facilitated by deep cultural resentment among many Americans, but particularly Republicans. This is a theme found in other cases of populist nationalism discussed in this volume. Trump was able to play on this resentment in spreading his populist message that corrupt politicians and weak presidents – notably Barack Obama – have given away the country and betrayed the “real” America. In this and other ways, Trump is similar to earlier populist leaders. Trump paints himself as a man of “action” and insists that he alone can restore American greatness and the American dream. And as other contributors to this volume agree, Trump’s portrayal of politics as a conflict between “us” and “them” is integral to both

populism and nationalism. But while Trump has successfully and convincingly taken hold of the Republican Party for now, White contends that like populist nationalists elsewhere, Trump's version is "devoid of either ideology or ideas" and relies heavily on a single individual. Thus, its appeal is unlikely to last. White fears that this does not bode well for the Republican Party's prospects in the coming years.

Part III: Populist Nationalism in Latin America

In Chapter 13, Barry Levitt turns to the southern hemisphere in "Populist and Nationalist Attitudes in Contemporary Latin America: An Exploratory Analysis." Levitt takes a different approach than the other contributors to this volume, using quantitative analysis to try to measure and compare populisms and nationalisms. He first offers a helpful review of the theoretical literature on populism and nationalism in Latin America, noting the importance of "the people" for both. In this chapter, he uses survey data from 18 Latin American countries to explore demographic and attitudinal traits that might shape, and distinguish among, people's populist and nationalist worldviews.

Levitt's findings suggest that views toward populism and nationalism are distinct, and importantly, that there are multiple and discrete populist and nationalist worldviews. The evidence leads him to identify five: direct rule/majority populism, statism, civic/institutional pride, national/military pride, and national autonomy/anti-imperialism. He analyzes these at both the national and individual levels. At the individual level, the data suggest that demographic traits (age, gender, ethnicity/race and socioeconomic status), and attitudinal traits (trust in other people, a sense of political efficacy, political ideology, and evaluation of the national economy) have an impact on people's populist and nationalist worldviews, as do country-level political and economic variables. Levitt's findings about multiple populisms and nationalisms in contemporary Latin America give us additional theoretical tools for conducting more sophisticated and nuanced analyses of how populism and nationalism affect

publics, for measuring the “ebb and flow” of views about populism and nationalism, and for helping us conceptualize how these worldviews may impact other phenomena such as political stability, equality, and conflict.

The next two chapters provide case studies of two Latin American countries affected deeply by populist nationalism: Venezuela and Argentina. In Chapter 14, entitled “Inculcating Populist Nationalism? Education and Ideological Change in Venezuela,” Matthias vom Hau, Jared A. Abbott, and Hillel David Soifer argue that while there is plenty of work on the former Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez and his strong version of populism (arguably inherited by Nicolas Maduro), there is surprisingly little literature on the nationalistic aspect of this populism. This is even more surprising given the resilient nationalistic posture and discourse of the Chávez regime and the continuous use of strong nationalistic rhetoric on the part of the present Venezuelan government. Indeed, Chávez and his political team sought to redefine the very notion of “nation” and nationhood in Venezuela by restructuring the state apparatus, including constitutional reform. Like most other PN regimes, *chavismo* sought to retell national history (something that Molchanov points to in Ukraine and Johnson in Argentina), going back to colonial times. Similar to others included in this volume, the authors also see PN as a complex ideology, in this case crafted by the state in order to achieve popular compliance.

The major thrust of the chapter by vom Hau, Abbott and Soifer, however, is the key question of how, why, and under which conditions populist visions of nationhood gain resonance and achieve their goals. The authors wish to place the case of Venezuela in comparative perspective and to make a contribution to a theory of populist nationalism. In order to answer this question, the authors focus on the educational system. The chapter offers a rich database on the educational curricula under Chávez, more specifically focusing on textbooks. These data are complemented by semi-structured interviews with educational officials and teachers. Somewhat unexpectedly given the tight control that the Venezuelan state was able to exercise over the polity in general and the educational system in

particular, the authors find that the results were disappointing for *chavismo*. At the end, this top-down effort to impose PN ideology had limited influence.

Analogous to what López-Alves and Molchanov argued in prior chapters, vom Hau, Abbott and Soifer claim that intrastate tensions are critical to understanding the degree of effectiveness with which the administration was able to impose PN upon the population. The authors identify the clash between the central government and the teachers, as well as the exclusion of teachers from the dominant *chavista* coalition, as the key variable that explains the government's limited ability to imposing this version of PN. The government's success was mild, both in dominating organizations devoted to education, and in imposing its version of PN among those who were in charge of propagating it. In other words, if state agents responsible for imposing the new ideology are not included into the dominant coalition, this ideology does not achieve "hegemony." While the main focus of the chapter is on the educational system, the authors offer a theory that can apply to other state agencies and institutions, therefore opening the door for a wider model to help identify the conditions under which PN ideology can be more or less successful.

In chapter 15, Diane E. Johnson dissects the case of Argentina in "The Strange Case of Argentina? Populist Nationalism that Defies Right- and Left-Wing Labels." The chapter offers a comprehensive bibliography of the work on Argentine nationalism and populism from the 1830s to the present time. Johnson emphasizes the period of the 1920s to the 1950s as a critical phase of populist nationalist history in the country. PN in Argentina, she argues, is not just a passing phenomenon; it is, rather, deeply immersed in the political life of the country to a point that we cannot think of Argentina without thinking of populism. Indeed, the author shows that many key Argentine political figures that have not generally been associated with populism adopted, in fact, populist leanings and agendas. Like other authors in this volume, especially López-Alves in Chapter 1, Johnson contends that invariably nationalism feeds populism, and that some sort of nationalism always lies behind populism.

Many scholars have studied the various types of Argentine nationalism, but for the most part, they have not linked it with populism as two factors of the same equation. Johnson does. She reminds us that by the beginning of the present era of globalization, many scholars studying Latin America assumed that populism was dead. Yet through careful analysis of available literature, the author guides us through a complex set of theories and events that demonstrate that this was more wishful thinking than a statement about reality. Even today in Argentina, under a government that has struggled to differentiate itself from populism, disagreements over national identity and who can best represent “the people” continue to capture the attention of the public and the agenda of the new administration. The door on populism has not been closed but left ajar.

In the final chapter of the volume, “The Future of Populist Nationalism in Europe and the Americas,” Diane Johnson and Fernando López-Alves return to the notion that rather than fading in importance as much of the late 20th century scholarly literature anticipated, populism and nationalism remain critical shapers of the 21st century world. The editors seek to pull together some of the key themes presented by the authors of the previous chapters, and to think about how populist nationalism is likely to affect the coming decades.

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