

What Is Racism? The Racialized Social System Framework

What is racism? For most people, the answer to this question is very simple. Racism is prejudice, ignorance, or a disease that afflicts some individuals and causes them to discriminate against others just because of the way they look. This commonsense view on racism is not much different than the definitions developed by social scientists. For example, anthropologist Ruth F. Benedict, one of the first scholars to formally use the notion of racism, defined it as "the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority."¹ Similarly, Pierre van den Berghe defined racism in his classic 1967 study as "any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or the absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races."² Despite some refinements, current use of the concept in the social sciences is similar to Benedict's and van den Berghe's. Richard T. Schaefer in his popular textbook on race and ethnicity defines racism as "a *doctrine* of racial supremacy, that one race is superior."³ Hence, analysts as well as laypeople regard racism as a phenomenon fundamentally rooted at the level of ideas.

I label this dominant perspective as idealist because, as idealist philosophy, it assumes that ideas are the root of social action. From

the outset, however, I want to stress that my point is not that the ideas that individuals hold on racial matters are irrelevant. Indeed, I devote one chapter (Chapter 3) to a theoretical discussion of how ideas help shape social action and another (Chapter 5) to the elucidation of the ideology that helps shape racial dynamics in the contemporary United States. My argument instead is that the narrow focus on ideas has reduced the study of racism mostly to psychology, which has produced a simplistic schematic view of the way racism operates in society. First, racism is defined as a set of ideas or beliefs. Second, those beliefs are regarded as having the potential of leading individuals to develop prejudice, defined as attitudes toward an entire group of people. Finally, these prejudiced attitudes may induce individuals to real actions or discrimination against racial minorities. This conceptual framework, graphically illustrated in Table 1.1, prevails in the social sciences.

Table 1.1 Mainstream Conceptual Framework on Racism

Components	Examples
Racism: <i>beliefs</i> about "races"	Believing that blacks are oversexed
Prejudice: <i>attitudes</i> toward "races"	Fearing black men as sexually crazed
Discrimination: <i>actions</i> against "races"	Lynching a black male

In contrast to this idealist view, I advance in this chapter a materialist interpretation of racism rooted in the fact that races in racialized societies receive substantially different rewards. This material reality is at the core of the phenomenon labeled as racism. Actors in superordinate positions (dominant race) develop a set of social practices (a racial praxis if you will) and an ideology to maintain the advantages they receive based on their racial classification, that is, they develop a *structure* to reproduce their systemic advantages. Therefore, the foundation of racism is not the ideas that individuals may have about others, but the social edifice erected over racial inequality. Eliminate racial inequality and the practices that maintain it and racism and even the division of people into racial categories will disappear.

Before elaborating my theory, however, I review a few of the most significant critical perspectives on racism developed by U.S.

social scientists.⁴ Because of the analytical relevance of these interpretations, I offer below a short formal review of each of these perspectives.

Review of Critical Frameworks Used to Interpret Racism

The Marxist Perspective

For Marxists class is the central explanatory variable of social life and class struggle is viewed as the main societal dynamic. Hence, Marxists regard other social divisions and possible sources of collective action (e.g., gender- or race-based struggles) as "secondary contradictions" or as derivations of the class structure.⁵ Not surprisingly then, the orthodox⁶ Marxist position on race is simple and straightforward: Racism is an ideology used by the bourgeoisie to divide workers. For instance, Albert Szymanski defines racism as

[A] legitimating ideology for an exploitative structure. Racist ideology propagated in the media, educational system, and other institutions, together with the actual distribution of relative petty advantage within the working class, serves to disorganize the entire working class including the ethnic majority, thereby allowing capital to more effectively exploit most majority group workers.⁷

One of the first Marxist-inspired analysts on racial matters was black sociologist Oliver C. Cox. In his impressive *Caste, Class, and Race*,⁸ Cox defined racism or race prejudice as "a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources or both may be justified."⁹ This social attitude or ideology emerged in the fifteenth century as a practical consequence of the labor needs of European imperialists. In Cox's words,

The socioeconomic matrix of racial antagonism involved the commercialization of human labor in the West Indies, the East Indies, and in America, the intense competition among businessmen of different western European cities for the capitalist exploitation of the resources of this area, the development of nationalism and the consolidation of European nations, and the decline of the influence

of the Roman Catholic Church with its mystical inhibitions to the free exploitation of economic resources. Racial antagonism attained full maturity during the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the sun no longer set on British soil and the great nationalistic powers of Europe began to justify their economic designs upon weaker European peoples with subtle theories of racial superiority and masterhood.¹⁰

Cox labels the antagonisms that emerged out of European imperialism as “racial,” but does he view them as based in race? Does he recognize that certain aspects of social structure are racial in nature? Cox, as all Marxists, argues that race relations are not truly racial. Thus, for Cox, European imperialists justified their exploitation of the people and resources of the New World in racial terms but essentially established “labor-capital profit relationships” or “proletarian bourgeois relations.”¹¹ Racial exploitation is viewed as a special form of class exploitation. According to Cox, the racial component of these class-based relations stems from the fact that blacks were proletarianized in their entirety (as a people) in contrast to whites who experienced a partial proletarianization. Given that the racial aspect of societies is not deemed as real, Cox concludes *Caste, Class, and Race* by suggesting that racial minorities should strive toward assimilation, follow white working-class leadership, and ultimately struggle for socialism alongside white workers. The lack of any critical race viewpoint is amazing considering that Cox, a black writer, wrote this book at a time of great white working-class hostility toward black and minority workers and that he himself suffered the effects of racial caste in academia.

Another popular Marxist view on racism is Edna Bonacich’s split labor market interpretation.¹² The twist in Bonacich’s approach is that instead of regarding race relations and racism as fundamentally orchestrated by the bourgeoisie, she suggests they are the product of intra-working-class frictions resulting from a labor market split along racial lines. Bonacich argues that a split labor market exists when there is “a difference in the price of labor between two or more groups of workers holding constant their efficiency and productivity.”¹³ According to Bonacich, the United States has had a split labor market since slavery with blacks as the cheaply priced labor segment. After the abolition of slavery, Bonacich claims that black laborers remained at the bottom of the labor market due to a “difference in labor militance” compared to white workers. For Bonacich,

white workers—whether old stock or immigrants—had greater levels of class consciousness than blacks. Although she is aware of the fact “that a number of ‘white’ unions openly excluded blacks while many others discriminated more covertly,” she insists that the lesser degree of black involvement in labor unions was the reason for their utilization as cheap laborers by capitalists in the post-World War I period.¹⁴

What about the well-documented history of white working-class racism? Bonacich reinterprets this history as white workers’ resistance to the “threats” (e.g., strike-breaking, displacement, and lowering the wage rate) posed by blacks. In her view, this “resistance”¹⁵ involved the total exclusion of blacks from unions and caste-like occupational divisions. Significantly, Bonacich has little to say about the labor threats posed by the millions of European immigrants to white U.S. workers. Although she believes that black and white workers coalesced between 1940 and 1960, she argues that the counteroffensive launched by the bourgeoisie (plant relocation and automation in the past and downsizing today) extended the life of the split labor market. And because blacks were very vulnerable at the outset of the coalition period, the policies of the capitalists disproportionately hurt blacks and contributed to the creation of a “class of hard-core unemployed in the ghettos.”¹⁶

The orthodox Marxist view on racial matters has many limitations.¹⁷ First, orthodox Marxists regard racism and racial antagonism as products of class dynamics. Regardless of whether the antagonism is viewed as fostered by the bourgeoisie (as Cox and Szymanski would argue) or as the product of intra-working-class strife (as Bonacich maintains), racial strife is viewed as not having a real racial foundation. Second, racial strife is conceived as emanating from false interests. Because the unity of the working class and the impending socialist revolution are a priori Marxist axioms, racial (or gender-based) struggle is not viewed as having its own material basis, that is, as based on the different material interests of the actors involved. Consequently racism is regarded as “ideological” or “irrational” and the racial struggles of blacks as divisive. (Although Bonacich views the conflict between black and white workers as “rational,” she interprets the conflict as rational in *class* terms.) Finally, given that racial phenomena are not deemed as independent, most Marxists shy away from performing an in-depth analysis of the politics and ideologies of race.¹⁸

The Institutional Perspective

The institutionalist perspective emerged out of the struggle of racial minorities in the United States in the 1960s.¹⁹ In contrast to the liberal view on race relations, which blames the ills of racism on poor whites, proponents of this viewpoint argue that racism is societal and that it implicates all white Americans. According to Kwame Ture (formerly known as Stokely Carmichael) and Charles Hamilton in their book *Black Power*, racism is "the predilections of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group."²⁰ Furthermore, they suggest that a distinction should be made between individual racism, or the overtly racist acts committed by individuals, and institutional racism, or the racial outcomes that result from the normal operations of American institutions. Mark Chesler developed the most succinct definition of racism produced by any author in this tradition: the prejudice plus power definition. In Chesler's words, racism is "an ideology of explicit or implicit superiority or advantage of one racial group over another, plus the institutional power to implement that ideology in social operations."²¹ In its most radical version (for example Ture and Hamilton's work), institutionalists see racism as an outgrowth of colonialism and institutional racism as the contemporary expression of this historical event. Therefore, since radical institutionalists argue that blacks are politically, economically, and socially subordinated to whites, they advocate for blacks' national liberation.

The institutionalist perspective has helped to dispel some of the myths perpetuated by the dominant paradigm on racism. Researchers inspired by this perspective have gathered data to show the systematic disadvantages that blacks suffer in the economic, educational, judicial, political, and even health systems. Their findings have forcefully served as clear and convincing evidence of the pervasiveness of racism.²² Moreover, their assertion that all whites receive advantages from the racial order and their forceful advocacy for challenging all institutions politicized more than one generation of activists and academicians to fight racism wherever it may be and in whichever form it operates. This perspective, therefore, helped to move the discussion about race in academic and nonacademic circles from the realm of people's attitudes to the realm of institutions and organizations.

Nevertheless, despite its valuable political contributions, this perspective does not pose a serious theoretical challenge to the dominant conception of racism held in the social sciences. Theoretically this perspective is just a *mélange* in which everything can be interpreted as "racist."²³ More significantly, despite its institutional label, this perspective still grounds racism at the ideological level, thus failing to challenge the root problem of the dominant perspective. This ideological grounding of racism is evident in the following quotation from Ture and Hamilton's book:

Institutional racism relies on the active and pervasive operation of *anti-black attitudes and practices*. A sense of superior group position prevails: whites are "better" than blacks; therefore blacks should be subordinated to whites. This is a racist attitude and it permeates the society, on both the individual and institutional level, covertly and overtly.²⁴

Although Ture and Hamilton argue that racism is an outgrowth of colonial domination and suggest that its contemporary expression has been institutionalized or embedded in the fabric of all institutions, they do not develop an analysis of how this happens or how this colonial relationship operates in practice, nor do they identify the mechanisms whereby racism is produced and reproduced. Thus, they are left with a mysterious almighty notion of racism as "a racist attitude" that "permeates the society, on both the individual and institutional level."

Robert Miles has pointed out other limitations of this approach. First, this perspective is intrinsically linked to a naive view of social stratification wherein race is the sole basis of social division. Second, its definition of racism is so inclusive that it loses its theoretical usefulness.²⁵ Third, its basic black-white division excludes "white" groups (e.g., Irish²⁶ and Jews) as plausible racial actors who have shared racialized experiences. Furthermore, this binary view minimizes the racialized experiences endured by racial minority groups, notably Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Chicanos. In this vein, the cry for "black power," although understandable in the struggle for civil rights, is an unnecessarily restrictive political concept that excludes the most likely political allies of blacks in the struggle for full racial citizenship. Fourth, and as in the case of the dominant perspective on racism, this perspective is ensnared in circularity. Racism, which is or can be almost everything, is proven by

anything done (or not done) by whites. The analyst identifies the existence of racism because any action done by whites is labeled as racist. Finally, for institutionalists such as Ture and Hamilton, all whites are "racist" and thus there is little room for coalition-building with white progressives.²⁷ If they truly believe this to be the case, then the logical political option for blacks is (1) waiting until racial minorities become the numerical majority in the United States or (2) emigrating back to Africa. The nationalist uprisings or electoral politics they advocate, given the demography and the nature of social power in this country, would then be untenable and unwise.²⁸

The Internal Colonialism Perspective

Another group of analysts, inspired by the civil rights movement, postulates that racism is structured by the colonial status of racial minorities in the United States.²⁹ As in the case of the institutionalist perspective, proponents of the internal colonial framework argue that racism³⁰ is institutionalized and based on a system in which the white majority "raises its social position by exploiting, controlling, and keeping down others who are categorized in racial or ethnic terms."³¹ Blauner, the foremost exponent of this perspective, explains the emergence of modern racism in this way:

The association of race consciousness with social relations based on the oppression of one group by another is the logical prerequisite for the emergence of racism. The conquest of people of color by white Westerners, the establishment of slavery as an institution along color lines, and the consolidation of the racial principle of economic exploitation in colonial societies led to the elaboration and solidification of the racist potential of earlier modes of thought.³²

After different third world peoples were forcefully moved to the United States, a racial order was established with its own dynamics. Central to the operation of such order is the maintenance of white privilege. Although the racial order and the particular form of racial oppression are viewed as changing throughout history, white privilege is considered a constant systemic fact. Blauner argues that whites receive advantages at all levels but, unlike institutionalists, he gives primacy to "the special advantage of the white population in

the labor market" since in "industrial capitalism economic institutions are central, and occupational role is the major determinant of social status and life style."³³

This framework takes head-on many of the limitations of mainstream approaches to race relations. While most of the perspectives developed by social scientists are ahistorical and postulate the existence of "race cycles" or common "ethnic patterns,"³⁴ the internal colonial model is historically contingent (as Mario Barrera argues) and informed by the differences between the experiences of white ethnics and racial minorities. Moreover, the internal colonial perspective challenges the purely psychological view of racism. First and foremost, it challenges the dogma of conceiving of racism as the virulent prejudice of some individuals by suggesting that prejudiced individuals are not necessary for the existence of a racial order. Racism, in Blauner's view, has an objective reality "located in the actual existence of domination and hierarchy."³⁵ As with the institutionalist perspective, this tradition regards racism or racial-colonial oppression as systemic, comprehensive (all actors involved), and rational (based on the interests of whites). Furthermore, by conceiving racism as rational and material (as a social structure organized to benefit whites), this tradition challenges the simplistic assertion of social scientists and most whites that the cure for racism is education. Instead, Blauner and writers in this tradition believe that the abolition of racism, as is the case with other systems of exploitation, requires social mobilization.³⁶

Although this perspective offers a clear improvement over the institutionalist perspective and provides new insights for the study of race relations, it still has some serious limitations. First, because it is centered on the colonial nature of racial subordination, it assumes unity among both the dominant and the subordinated "races" and thus neglects the class-, and gender-, based divisions among them.³⁷ Second, by stressing the centrality of economic oppression as the foundation for understanding white privilege, this approach misses the process of economic marginalization and exclusion that some races may experience at some historical junctures. For instance, how would an analyst in this theoretical tradition interpret the contemporary status of "underclass" African Americans or the almost complete exclusion of American Indians to reservations?³⁸ Finally, neither Blauner nor other writers in this tradition formulate the con-

ceptual tools or analysis needed for a truly structural understanding of racism. Despite asserting that racism is systemic, Blauner does not develop the theoretical apparatus to study how racism is systematized and reproduced in societies. Notwithstanding these limitations, I incorporate many of the insights developed by authors in this tradition in the alternative framework that I develop in this chapter.

The Racial Formation Perspective

The recent work of Howard Winant and Michael Omi represents a theoretical breakthrough in the area of race relations. In their *Racial Formation in the United States*, these authors provide a thorough critique of previous theoretical approaches and suggest a new approach for the study of racial phenomena: the *racial formation* perspective. They define racial formation as the “process by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings.”³⁹ The essence of this approach is the idea that race “is a phenomenon whose meaning is contested throughout social life.”⁴⁰ The very existence of the category race is viewed as the outcome of *racialization*, or “the extension of racial meaning to a previously unclassified relationship, social practice, or group. . . . [It] is an ideological process, an historically specific one.”⁴¹ In their view, race should be regarded as an organizing principle of social relationships that, at the micro level, shapes the identity of individual actors and, at the macro level, shapes all spheres of social life. Although racialization affects all social spheres, Omi and Winant assign a primary role to the political level,⁴² particularly to the “racial state,” which they regard as the factor of cohesion of any racial order. Hence, racial conflict, particularly in the post-civil rights era, is viewed as playing itself out at the state level.

Equipped with these categories, Omi and Winant review the recent history of racial formation in the United States. Of theoretical interest is their claim that racial dynamics have been reframed in recent times through the *racial project* (the active process of reorganization of racial dynamics by a fraction of the dominant race) of neoconservatives and the New Right. These groups have pushed an anti-statist, moral, and individual-rights agenda that, in fact, suggests that the ills of America are deeply connected to liberal racial policies

going awry. Thus programs such as affirmative action have been redefined as “reverse discrimination” and welfare as a system that entraps people (many of them minorities) in poverty.

Most radical writing on race in the 1990s has been inspired by Omi and Winant.⁴³ My own theory owes heavily to their work. Nonetheless, the racial formation perspective still has some significant limitations. First, Omi and Winant’s concepts of racial formation and racialization give undue emphasis to ideological processes. Although both concepts are helpful in grasping how racial meanings are formed and reorganized, they do not help analysts understand how it is that racial orders are structured. Arguing that racial classifications are permanently contested and malleable is a reaffirmation of the old idea in the social sciences that race is a socially constructed category.⁴⁴ However, this affirmation does not make clear whether or not they believe that race is or can become an independent basis of group association and action.⁴⁵ Second, although in their book there are hints of a conception of races as social collectivities with different interests (e.g., “race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies”⁴⁶), Omi and Winant stop short of making such a claim. By failing to regard races as collectivities with different interests, their analysis of political contestation over racial projects seems to be quarrels over meanings rather than positions in the racial order. Thus, it is unclear why people fight over racial matters and why they endorse or contest racial projects (see chapters 4 and 7 in 1994 edition).⁴⁷ Third, Omi and Winant’s analysis of the most recent rearticulation of racial ideology in the United States leaves out a comprehensive or systemic view of the process. The change is described as singularly carried out by the right wing and neoconservatives instead of reflecting a general change in the nature of U.S. racial structure. In order to make the latter claim, Omi and Winant would have to include the agency of all the members of the dominant race—rather than privileging some actors—and conceive the change as affecting all the levels of the social formation—rather than privileging the political level. Finally, although I share with Omi and Winant the idea that race is “a fundamental organizing principle of social relationships,”⁴⁸ their theoretical framework comes close to race-reductionism in many areas. For instance, their conceptualization of the state as the “racial state” leaves out the capitalist—as well as the patriarchal—character of the state.⁴⁹

Racism as Societal Waste

The last theory I review here is that of Joe R. Feagin and Hernán Vera in their celebrated book *White Racism: The Basics*. These authors argue that racism is a “socially organized set of attitudes, ideas, and practices that deny African Americans and other people of color the dignity, opportunities, freedoms, and rewards that this nation offers white Americans.”⁵⁰ Feagin and Vera suggest that racism wastes human talent and energy and, hence, that broadly viewed, it can be conceived as societal waste. Feagin and Vera operationalize racism as rituals (the rites that accompany many racial practices), discrimination, mythology (i.e., ideological constructions taken on faith), a subjective component of “sincere fictions” developed by the dominant race to feel good about themselves, and an emotive component that they label as the “madness of racism.”

Joe R. Feagin has recently refined this view in his *Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations*. In this book Feagin concentrates on making the case that racism is systemic and rooted in real race relations. In language that fits nicely my own theorization, Feagin writes,

Indeed, systematic racism is perpetuated by a broad social reproduction process that generates not only recurring patterns of discrimination within institutions and by individuals but also an alienating racist relationship—on the one hand, the racially oppressed, and on the other hand, the racial oppressors. These two groups are created by the racist system, and thus have different group interests. The former seeks to overthrow the system, while the latter seeks to maintain it.⁵¹

Feagin’s and Vera’s conceptualization of racism includes the core arguments of the theorization I advance here. First, they emphasize, as do the institutional and colonial positions, the systematic nature of racism. Second, they focus on the relational or group nature of the phenomenon. Finally, they point to the material (group interest) foundation of racism.

The only limitation I find in their theorization is their claim that racism produces “societal waste,” a claim that Feagin seems to have dropped in his recent work. Although they are right in claiming that societies would be collectively better off (less wasteful) if the energy they spent to maintain racial hierarchy was used to increase the welfare of humanity, the notion of waste conveys the idea that racism is

not “rational” (in the utilitarian sense of the word) for whites. In fact, in the conclusion of *White Racism*, Feagin and Vera contend that racism involves substantial material, moral, and psychological costs to whites. These claims are problematic. Materially, racism provided the foundation for the expansion of the world-system and accumulation at a global scale for the West.⁵² Although economists debate today whether racism increases or decreases the rate of capital accumulation and the welfare of white workers, I am persuaded by the analysis of Steven Shulman,⁵³ who claims that racial stratification benefits both capitalists and white workers. It is precisely this material foundation that I contend helps keep racial stratification in place. Their claim that whites behave immorally when they participate in racist structures and experience a moral dilemma is important as a political tool but not as an analytical one. Whites do not experience moral dilemmas⁵⁴ precisely because they develop what Feagin and Vera label as “sincere fictions” that allow them to ignore the inhumanity of racial stratification (see Chapters 3 and 5 in this book). Finally, the psychological costs of racism to whites have not been well documented or measured. Nevertheless, social psychologist Tony R. Brown suggests in his recent work that if anything, whites either benefit somewhat from racial stratification or at least do not lose from it.⁵⁵ Hence, from a world perspective racism is wasteful (the population of the world would be better off if racism did not exist), but at the micro level (whites in the world-system), it is and has been highly profitable. Despite this limitation, the work of Feagin and Vera is theoretically sophisticated, advances the core arguments of a structural or systemic understanding of racism, and provides an impressive documentation of contemporary racist practices in a variety of social spaces.

Limitations of Mainstream and Critical Frameworks on Racism

I list below the main limitations of the idealist conception of racism. Because not all limitations apply to the critical perspectives I review above, I point out the ones that do apply and to what extent.

1. *Racism is excluded from the foundation or structure of the social system.* When racism is regarded as a baseless ideology ulti-

mately dependent on other, "real" forces in society, the structure of the society itself is not classified as racist. The Marxist perspective is particularly guilty of this shortcoming. Although Marxists have addressed the question of the historical origin of racism, they explain its reproduction in an idealist fashion. Racism, in their account, is an ideology that emerged with chattel slavery and other forms of class oppression to justify the exploitation of people of color and survives as residue of the past.

Although the institutionalist, internal colonialism, and racial formation perspectives regard racism as a structural phenomenon and provide some useful ideas and concepts, none developed the theoretical apparatus necessary to describe how this structure operates.

2. *Racism is ultimately viewed as a psychological phenomenon to be examined at the individual level.* The research agenda that follows from this conceptualization is the examination of individuals' attitudes to determine levels of racism in society.⁵⁶ Given that the constructs used to measure racism are static—that is, that there are a number of standard questions that do not change significantly over time—this research usually finds that racism is declining in society.⁵⁷

This psychological understanding of racism is related to the limitation I cited above. If racism is not regarded as society-wide but as a property of individuals who are "racist" or "prejudiced," then (1) social institutions cannot be racist and (2) studying racism is simply a matter of clinically surveying populations to assess the proportion of "good" and "bad" individuals (those who do not hold racist beliefs and those who do).

Orthodox Marxists and many neo-Marxists conceive of racism as an ideology that affects many members of the working class. Although the authors associated with the institutionalist, internal colonialist, and racial formation perspectives focus on the ideological character of racism, they all emphasize how this ideology becomes embedded or institutionalized in organizations and social practices.

3. *Racism is treated as a static phenomenon.* Racism is viewed as unchanging; that is, racism yesterday is like racism today. Thus, when a society's racial structure and its customary racial practices are rearticulated, this rearticulation is characterized as a decline in racism (as in Wilson's works), a natural process in a cycle (as Robert Park sees it), an example of increased assimilation,⁵⁸ or effective "norm changes."⁵⁹ This limitation, which applies particularly to

mainstream survey researchers on race and Marxist scholars, derives from not conceiving racism as having an independent structural foundation. If racism is merely a matter of ideas that have no material basis in contemporary society, then those ideas should be similar to their original configuration, whatever that was. The ideas may be articulated in a different context, but most analysts essentially believe that racist ideas remain the same. For this reason, with notable exceptions,⁶⁰ attitudinal research is still based on responses to questions developed in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

4. *Analysts defining racism in an idealist manner view racism as "incorrect" or "irrational thinking"; thus they label "racists" as irrational and rigid.* Because racism is conceived of as a belief with no real social basis, it follows that those who hold racist views must be irrational or stupid.⁶¹ This view allows for a tactical distinction between individuals with the "pathology" and social actors who are "rational" and free of racism. The problem with this rationalistic view is twofold. First, it misses the rational, material elements on which racialized systems originally were built. Second, and more important, it neglects the possibility that contemporary racism still has a rational foundation. In this account, contemporary racists are perceived as Archie Bunkers. Among the critical frameworks reviewed here, only orthodox Marxism insists on the irrational and imposed character of racism. Neo-Marxists and authors associated with the institutionalist, internal colonialist, and racial formation perspectives insist, to varying degrees, on the rationality of racism. Neo-Marxists (e.g., Bonacich, Harold Wolpe, Stuart Hall) and Omi and Winant acknowledge the short-term advantages that workers gain from racism; the institutionalist and internal colonial paradigms emphasize the systematic and long-term character of these advantages.

5. *Racism is understood as overt behavior.* Because the idealist approach regards racism as "irrational" and "rigid," its manifestations should be quite evident, usually involving some degree of hostility. This does not present serious analytical problems for the study of certain periods in racialized societies when racial practices were overt (e.g., slavery and apartheid), but does pose difficulty for the analysis of racism in periods wherein racial practices are subtle, indirect, or fluid. For instance, many analysts have suggested that in the contemporary United States racial practices are manifested covertly⁶² and racial attitudes tend to be symbolic.⁶³ Therefore, it is a waste of

time to attempt to detect "racism" by asking questions such as "How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Black friend home to dinner?"⁶⁴ Also, many such questions were developed to measure the extent of racist attitudes in the population during the Jim Crow era of race relations; they are not suitable for the post-1960s period.

Furthermore, this emphasis on overt behavior limits the possibility of analyzing racial phenomena in Latin American societies such as Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico where race relations do not have a clear, overt character. The form of race relations—overt or covert—depends on the pattern of racialization that structured a particular society⁶⁵ and on how the process of racial contestation and other social dynamics affected that pattern.

6. *Contemporary racism is viewed as an expression of "original sin"—as a remnant of past historical racial situations.* In the case of the United States, some analysts argue that racism preceded slavery and capitalism.⁶⁶ Others, such as Nathan Glazer and Moynihan, view it as the result of slavery.⁶⁷ Even in promising new avenues of research, such as that presented by Roediger in *The Wages of Whiteness*, contemporary racism is viewed as one of the "legacies of white workerism."⁶⁸ By considering racism as a legacy all these analysts downplay the significance of its contemporary material foundation and structure.

Again the Marxist perspective shares this limitation. Marxists believe that racism developed in the fifteenth century and has been used since then by capitalists or white workers to further their own class interests. All other approaches recognize the historic significance of this "discovery" but associate contemporary racial ideology with contemporary racially based inequalities.

7. *Racism is analyzed in a circular manner.* "If racism is defined as the behavior that results from the belief, its discovery becomes ensnared in a circularity—racism is a belief that produces behavior, which is itself racism."⁶⁹ Racism is established by racist behavior, which itself is proved by the existence of racism. This circularity results from not grounding racism in social relations among the races. If racism, viewed as an ideology, were seen as possessing a structural⁷⁰ foundation, its examination could be associated with racial practices rather than with mere ideas and the problem of circularity would be avoided.

Racialized Social System Approach to Racism

In order to capture the society-wide, organized, and institutional character of racism I build my alternative theory around the notion of *racialized social systems*.⁷¹ This term refers to societies in which economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or races. Races typically are identified by their phenotype, but (as we see later) the selection of some human traits to designate a racial group is always socially rather than biologically based.

These systems are structured partially by race because modern social systems incorporate two or more forms of hierarchical patterns. Although processes of racialization are always embedded in other forms of hierarchy, they acquire autonomy and have independent social effects. This implies that the phenomenon that has been conceived as a free-floating ideology in fact has its own structural foundation.

In all racialized social systems the placement of actors in racial categories involves some form of hierarchy⁷² that produces definite social relations among the races. The race placed in the superior position tends to receive greater economic remuneration and access to better occupations and prospects in the labor market, occupies a primary position in the political system, is granted higher social estimation (e.g., is viewed as "smarter" or "better looking"), often has the license to draw physical (segregation) as well as social (racial etiquette) boundaries between itself and other races, and receives what W.E.B. Du Bois called a "psychological wage."⁷³ The totality of these racialized social relations and practices constitutes the racial structure of a society.

Although all racialized social systems are hierarchical, the particular character of the hierarchy, and, thus, of the racial structure, is variable. For example, the domination of blacks in the United States was achieved through dictatorial means during slavery, but in the post-civil rights period this domination has been *hegemonic*, that is in the Gramscian sense of the term, achieved through consent rather than coercion.⁷⁴ Similarly, the form of securing domination and white privilege is variable too. For instance, the racial practices and mechanisms that kept blacks subordinated changed from overt and eminently racist in the Jim Crow era to covert and indirectly racist in

the contemporary period (see Chapter 3). The unchanging element of these systems is racial inequality—that the subordinated races' life chances are significantly lower than those of the dominant race. This is the feature that ultimately distinguishes this form of hierarchical social organization. Generally, the higher the level of racial inequality, the more racialized the social system, and vice versa.

Because the races receive different social rewards at all levels, they develop different interests, which can be detected in their struggles to either transform or maintain a particular racial order. These interests are collective rather than individual, are based on relations among races rather than on particular group needs, and are practical; that is, they are related to concrete struggles. Although one race's general interests may ultimately lie in the complete elimination of a society's racial structure, its array of alternatives may not include that possibility. For instance, the historical struggle against chattel slavery led not to the development of race-free societies but to the establishment of social systems with a different kind of racialization. Race-free societies were not among the available alternatives because the nonslave populations had the capacity to preserve some type of racial privilege. The historical "exceptions" occurred in racialized societies in which the nonslaves' power was almost completely superseded by that of the slave population.⁷⁵

A simple criticism of the argument I have advanced so far is that it ignores the internal divisions of the races along class and gender lines. Such criticism, however, does not deal squarely with the issue at hand. The fact that not all members of the dominant race receive the same level of rewards and (conversely) that not all members of the subordinate race or races are at the bottom of the social order does not negate the fact that races, as social groups, are in either a superordinate or a subordinate position in a social system. Historically the racialization of social systems did not imply the exclusion of other forms of oppression. In fact, racialization occurred in social formations also structured by class and gender. Hence, in these societies, the racialization of subjects is fragmented along class and gender lines. The important question—Which interests move actors to struggle?—is historically contingent and cannot be ascertained a priori.⁷⁶ Depending on the character of racialization in a social order, class interests may take precedence over racial interests as in contemporary Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. In other situations, racial

interests may take precedence over class interests as in the case of blacks throughout most of U.S. history.

In general, the systemic salience of class in relation to race increases when the economic, political, and social inequality among the races decreases substantially. Yet this broad argument generates at least one warning: The narrowing of within-class differences among racial actors usually causes *more* rather than *less* racial conflict, at least in the short run, as the competition for resources increases.⁷⁷ More significantly, even when class-based conflict becomes more salient in a social order, this cannot be interpreted as *prima facie* evidence that race has subsided as a social factor. For instance, because of the way in which Latin American racial formations rearticulated race and racial discourse in the nineteenth-century-post-emancipation era,⁷⁸ these societies silenced from above the political space for public racial contestation. Yet more than 100 years after these societies developed the myth of racial democracy, they have more rather than less racial inequality than countries such as the United States.⁷⁹

Because racial actors are also classed and gendered (that is, they belong to class and gender groups), analysts must control for class and gender to ascertain the material advantages enjoyed by a dominant race. In a racialized society such as the United States, the independent effects of race are assessed by analysts who (1) compare data between whites and nonwhites in the *same* class and gender positions, (2) evaluate the proportion as well as the general character of the races' participation in some domain of life, and (3) examine racial data at all levels—social, political, economic, and ideological—to ascertain the general position of racial groups in a social system.

The first of these procedures has become standard practice in sociology. No serious sociologist would present racial statistics without controlling for gender and class (or at least the class of persons' socioeconomic status). By doing this, analysts assume they can measure the unadulterated effects of "discrimination" manifested in unexplained "residuals." Despite its usefulness, however, this technique provides only a partial account of the "race effect" because (1) a significant amount of racial data cannot be retrieved through surveys and (2) the technique of "controlling for" a variable neglects the obvious—why a group is over- or underrepresented in certain cate-

gories of the control variables in the first place.⁸⁰ Moreover, these analysts presume that it is possible to analyze the amount of discrimination in one domain (e.g., income, occupational status) "without analyzing the extent to which discrimination also affects the factors they hold constant."⁸¹ Hence to evaluate "race effects" in any domain, analysts must attempt to make sense of their findings in relation to a race's standing in other domains.

But what is the nature of races or, more properly, of racialized social groups? Omi and Winant state that races are the outcome of the racialization process, which they define as "the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group."⁸² Historically the classification of a people in racial terms has been a highly political act associated with practices such as conquest and colonization, enslavement, peonage, indentured servitude, and, more recently, colonial and neocolonial labor immigration. Categories such as "Indians" and "Negroes" were invented in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to justify the conquest and exploitation of various peoples.⁸³ The invention of such categories entails a dialectical process of construction; that is, the creation of the category "Other" involves the creation of a category "Same." If "Indians" are depicted as "savages," Europeans are characterized as "civilized"; if "blacks" are defined as natural candidates for slavery, "whites" are defined as free subjects.⁸⁴ Yet although the racialization of peoples was socially invented and did not override previous forms of social distinction based on class or gender, it did not lead to imaginary relations but generated new forms of human association with definite status differences. After the process of attaching meaning to a "people" is instituted, race becomes a real category of group association and identity.⁸⁵

Because racial classifications partially organize and limit actors' life chances, racial practices of opposition emerge. Regardless of the form of racial interaction (overt, covert, or inert), races can be recognized in the realm of racial relations and positions. Viewed in this light, races are the effect of racial practices of opposition ("we" versus "them") at the economic, political, social, and ideological levels.⁸⁶

Races, as most social scientists acknowledge, are not biologically but socially determined categories of identity and group association. In this regard, they are analogous to class and gender.⁸⁷ Actors in racial positions do not occupy those positions because they are of

X or Y race, but because X or Y has been socially defined as a race. Actors' phenotypic (i.e., biologically inherited) characteristics, such as skin tone and hair color and texture, are usually, although not always, used to denote racial distinctions.⁸⁸ For example, Jews in many European nations and the Irish in England have been treated as racial groups.⁸⁹ Also, Indians in the United States have been viewed as one race despite the tremendous phenotypic and cultural variation among nations. Because races are socially constructed, both the meaning and the position assigned to races in the racial structure are always contested. Who is to be black or white or Indian reflects and affects the social, political, ideological, and economic struggles among the races. The global effects of these struggles can change the meaning of the racial categories as well as the position of a racialized group in a social formation.

This latter point is illustrated clearly by the historical struggles of several "white ethnic" groups in the United States in their efforts to become accepted as legitimate whites or "Americans."⁹⁰ Neither light-skinned nor, for that matter, dark-skinned immigrants necessarily came to this country as members of X or Y race. Light-skinned Europeans, after brief periods of "not-yet white," became "white" but did not lose their "ethnic" character.⁹¹ Their struggle for inclusion had specific implications: racial inclusion as members of the white community allowed Americanization and class mobility. On the other hand, among dark-skinned immigrants from Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, the struggle was to avoid classification as "black." These immigrants challenged the reclassification of their identity for a simple reason: In the United States "black" signified a subordinate status in society. Hence many of these groups struggled to keep their own ethnic or cultural identity, as denoted in expressions such as "I am not black; I am Jamaican," or "I am not black; I am Senegalese."⁹² Yet eventually many of these groups resolved this contradictory situation by accepting the duality of their situation: In the United States, they were classified socially as black yet they retained and nourished their own cultural or ethnic heritage—a heritage deeply influenced by African traditions.

Although the content of racial categories changes over time through manifold processes and struggles, race is not a secondary category of group association. The meaning of black and white, the "racial formation," changes within the larger racial structure. This does not mean that the racial structure is immutable and completely

independent of the action of racialized actors. It means only that the social relations among the races become institutionalized (form a structure as well as a culture) and affect social life whether or not individual members of the races want it to. In Frederick Barth's words, "Ethnic identity implies a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an individual is allowed to play [and] is similar to sex and rank, in that it constrains the incumbent in all his activities."⁹³ For instance, free blacks during the slavery period struggled to change the meaning of "blackness," specifically to dissociate it from slavery. Yet they could not escape the larger racial structure that restricted their life chances and their freedom.⁹⁴

The placement of a group of people in a racial category stemmed initially⁹⁵ from the interests of powerful actors in the social system (e.g., the capitalist class, the planter class, and colonizers). After racial categories were employed to organize social relations in societies, however, race became an independent element of the operation of the social system. Here I depart from analysts such as Winthrop Jordan, Cedric Robinson, and Robert Miles, who take the mere existence of a racial discourse as manifesting the presence of a racial order.⁹⁶ Such a position allows them to speak of racism in medieval times (Jordan) and to classify the antipeasant views of French urbanites (Miles) or the prejudices of the aristocracy against peasants in the Middle Ages (Robinson) as expressions of racism. In my view, we can speak of racialized orders only when a racial discourse is accompanied by social relations of subordination and superordination among the races. The available evidence suggests that the racialization of the world-system emerged after the imperialist expansion of Europe to the New World and Africa.⁹⁷ Furthermore, this racialization led to the development of what Charles W. Mills calls *global white supremacy* (racial orders structured along the axis of "white," or European, and "nonwhite," or non-European) in the world-system.

What are the dynamics of racial issues in racialized systems? Most important, after a social formation is racialized, its "normal" dynamics always include a racial component. Societal struggles based on class or gender contain a racial component because both of these social categories are also racialized; that is, both class and gender are constructed along racial lines. In 1922, for example, white South African workers in the middle of a strike inspired by the Russian revolution rallied under the slogan "Workers of the world unite for a white South Africa." One of the state's "concessions" to

this "class" struggle was the passage of the Apprenticeship Act of 1922, "which prevented Black workers acquiring apprenticeships."⁹⁸ In another example, the struggle of women in the United States to attain their civil and human rights has always been plagued by deep racial tensions.⁹⁹

Nonetheless, some of the strife that exists in a racialized social formation has a distinct racial character; I call such strife *racial contestation*—the struggle of racial groups for systemic changes regarding their position at one or more levels. Such a struggle may be social (Who can be here? Who belongs here?), political (Who can vote? How much power should they have? Should they be citizens?), economic (Who should work, and what should they do? They are taking our jobs!), or ideological (Black is beautiful!).

Although much of this contestation is expressed at the individual level and is disjointed, sometimes it becomes collective and general and can effect meaningful systemic changes in a society's racial organization. The form of contestation may be relatively passive and subtle (e.g., in situations of fundamental overt racial domination such as slavery and apartheid) or more active and overt (e.g., in quasi-democratic situations such as the contemporary United States). As a rule, however, fundamental changes in racialized social systems are accompanied by struggles that reach the point of overt protest.¹⁰⁰ This does not mean that a violent racially based revolution is the only way of accomplishing effective changes in the relative position of racial groups. It is simply an extension of the argument that social systems and their supporters must be "shaken" if fundamental transformations are to take place.¹⁰¹ On this structural foundation rests the phenomenon labeled racism by social scientists.

I reserve the term *racial ideology* for the segment of the ideological structure of a social system that crystallizes racial notions and stereotypes. Racial ideology provides the rationalization for social, political, and economic interactions among the races. Depending on the particular character of a racialized social system and on the struggles of the subordinated races, racial ideology may be developed highly (as in apartheid) or loosely (as in slavery) and its content expressed in overt or covert terms.

Although racial ideology originates in race relations, it acquires relative autonomy in the social system and performs practical functions.¹⁰² In Paul Gilroy's words, racial ideology "mediates the world of agents and the structures which are created by their social prax-

is."¹⁰³ Racism crystallizes the changing "dogma" on which actors in the social system operate and becomes "common sense"; it provides the rules for perceiving and dealing with the Other in a racialized society. In the United States, for instance, because racial notions about what blacks and whites are or ought to be pervade their encounters, whites still have difficulty in dealing with black bankers, lawyers, professors, and doctors.¹⁰⁴ Thus, although racist ideology is ultimately false, it fulfills a practical role in racialized societies. (Because of the centrality of racial ideology in the maintenance of white supremacy, I dedicate Chapter 3 to a detailed discussion on this matter.)

At this point it is possible to sketch the framework of the racialized social system. First, racialized social systems are societies that allocate differential economic, political, social, and even psychological rewards to groups along racial lines, lines that are socially constructed. After a society becomes racialized, a set of social relations and practices based on racial distinctions develops at all societal levels. I designate the aggregate of those relations and practices as the racial structure of a society. Second, races historically are constituted according to the process of racialization; they become the effect of relations of opposition among racialized groups at all levels of a social formation. Third, on the basis of this structure, a racial ideology develops. This ideology is not simply a "superstructural" phenomenon (a mere reflection of the racialized system) but becomes the organizational map that guides actions of racial actors in society. It becomes as real as the racial relations it organizes. Fourth, most struggles in a racialized social system contain a racial component, but sometimes they acquire or exhibit a distinct racial character. Racial contestation is the logical outcome of a society with a racial hierarchy. A social formation that includes some form of racialization will always exhibit some form of racial contestation. Finally, the process of racial contestation reveals the different objective interests of the races in a racialized social system.

Conclusion

My central argument in this chapter is that the commonsense understanding of racism, which is not much different than the definition

developed by mainstream social scientists or even by many critical analysts, does not provide an adequate theoretical foundation for understanding racial phenomena. With notable exceptions,¹⁰⁵ analysts in academia are still entangled in ungrounded ideological interpretations of racism. Lacking a structural view, they tend to reduce racial phenomena to a derivation of the class structure (as Marxist interpreters do) or the result of an irrational ideology (as mainstream social scientists do).

In the racialized social system framework, I suggest, as do Omi and Winant, that racism should be studied from the viewpoint of racialization. I contend that after a society becomes racialized, racialization develops a life of its own.¹⁰⁶ Although racism interacts with class and gender structurations in society, it becomes an organizing principle of social relations in itself. Race, as most analysts suggest, is a social construct, but that construct, like class and gender, has independent effects in social life. After racial stratification is established, race becomes an independent criterion for vertical hierarchy in society. Therefore different races experience positions of subordination and superordination in society and develop different interests. This framework has the following advantages over traditional views of racism:

Racial phenomena are regarded as the "normal" outcome of the racial structure of a society. Thus we can account for all racial manifestations. Instead of explaining racial phenomena as deriving from other structures or from racism (conceived of as a free-floating ideology), we can trace cultural, political, economic, social, and even psychological racial phenomena to the racial organization of that society.

The changing nature of what analysts label "racism" is explained as the normal outcome of racial contestation in a racialized social system. In this framework, changes in racism are explained rather than described. Changes are due to specific struggles at different levels among the races, resulting from differences in interests. Such changes may transform the nature of racialization and the global character of racial relations in the system (the racial structure). Therefore, change is viewed as a normal component of the racialized system.

The racialized social system framework allows analysts to

explain overt as well as covert racial behavior. The covert or overt nature of racial contacts depends on how the process of racialization is manifested; this in turn depends on how race originally was articulated in a social formation and on the process of racial contestation. This point implies that rather than conceiving of racism as a universal and uniformly orchestrated phenomenon, analysts should study "historically-specific racisms."¹⁰⁷ This insight is not new: Robert Park, Oliver Cox, Pierre van den Bergue, and Marvin Harris described varieties of "situations of race relations" with distinct forms of racial interaction.

*Racially motivated behavior, whether or not the actors are conscious of it, is regarded as "rational"—that is, based on the given race's individual interests.*¹⁰⁸ This framework accounts for Archie Bunker-type racial behavior as well as for more "sophisticated" varieties of racial conduct. Racial phenomena are viewed as systemic; therefore all actors in the system participate in racial affairs. Some members of the dominant racial group tend to exhibit less virulence toward members of the subordinated races because they have greater control over the form and outcome of their racial interactions. When they cannot control that interaction—as in the case of revolts or blacks moving into "their" neighborhood—they behave much like other members of the dominant race.

The reproduction of racial phenomena in contemporary societies is explained in this framework not by reference to a long-distant past but in relation to its contemporary structure. Because racism is viewed as systemic (possessing a racial structure) and as organized around the races' different interests, racial aspects of social systems today are viewed as fundamentally related to hierarchical relations among the races in those systems. Elimination of the racialized character of a social system entails the end of racialization, and hence of races altogether. This argument clashes with social scientists' most popular policy prescription for "curing" racism, namely education. This "solution" is the logical outcome of defining racism as a belief. Most analysts regard racism as a matter of individuals subscribing to an irrational view, thus the cure is educating them to realize that racism is wrong. Education is also the choice pill prescribed by Marxists for healing workers from racism. The alternative theory offered here implies that because the phenomenon has structural consequences for the races, the only way to cure society of racism is by

eliminating its systemic roots. Whether this can be accomplished democratically or only through revolutionary means is an open question, and one that depends on the particular racial structure of the society in question.

A racialization framework accounts for the ways in which racial and ethnic stereotypes emerge, are transformed, and disappear. Racial stereotypes are crystallized at the ideological level of a social system. These images ultimately indicate—although in distorted ways—and justify the stereotyped group's position in a society. Stereotypes may originate out of (1) material realities or conditions endured by the group, (2) genuine ignorance about the group, or (3) rigid, distorted views on the group's physical, cultural, or moral nature. Once they emerge, however, stereotypes must relate—although not necessarily fit perfectly—to the group's true social position in the racialized system if they are to perform their ideological function. Stereotypes that do not tend to reflect a group's situation do not work and are bound to disappear. For example, notions of the Irish as stupid or of Jews as athletically talented have all but vanished since the 1940s, as the Irish moved up the educational ladder and Jews gained access to multiple routes of social mobility. Generally, then, stereotypes are reproduced because they reflect a group's distinct position and status in society. As a corollary, racial or ethnic notions about a group disappear only when the group's status mirrors that of the dominant racial or ethnic group in the society.

The framework of the racialized social system is not a universal theory explaining racial phenomena in societies. It is intended to trigger a serious discussion of how race shapes social systems. Moreover, the important question of how race interacts and intersects with class and gender has not yet been addressed satisfactorily. Provisionally I maintain that a nonfunctionalist reading of the concept of social system may give us clues for comprehending societies *structured in dominance*, to use Stuart Hall's term. If societies are viewed as systems that articulate different structures (organizing principles on which sets of social relations are systematically patterned), it is possible to claim that race—as well as gender—has both individual and combined (interactive) effects in society.

To test the usefulness of the racialized social system framework as a theoretical basis for research, we must perform comparative

work on racialization in various societies. One of the main objectives of this comparative work should be to determine the specific mechanisms, practices, and social relations that produce and reproduce racial inequality at all levels—that is, uncover the society's racial structure. Although this systematic comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this book, I perform some of it in Chapter 4. In that chapter, for example, I compare the racial structure of the Jim Crow period with the one we have today. Unlike analysts who believe that "racism" has withered away, I argue that the persistent inequality experienced by blacks and other racial minorities in the United States today is due to the *continued* albeit *changed* existence of a racial structure. In contrast to race relations in the Jim Crow period, however, racial practices that reproduce racial inequality in contemporary America are (1) increasingly covert, (2) embedded in normal operations of institutions, (3) void of direct racial terminology, and (4) invisible to most whites.

In the next chapter I criticize the survey-based study of racial matters, a perspective that is central to the analysis and understanding of contemporary racial matters. Specifically, I argue that this tradition is wedded to an individualistic view of racial actors and thus cannot see the collective nature of racial ideas. I elaborate on the notion of racial ideology and provide practical guidance on how it can be used in research.

Notes

1. Ruth F. Benedict, *Race and Racism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1945), p. 85.
2. Pierre van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 11.
3. Richard T. Schaefer, *Racial and Ethnic Minorities* (Glencoe, IL: Scott/Foresman/Little Brown Higher Education, 1990), p. 16.
4. A review such as this one is necessarily incomplete. I leave out the important work of European writers such as Paul Gilroy and Pierre A. Taguieff as well as the work of Latin American writers such as Florestan Fernandes, Carlos Hansenbalg, and Nelson do Valle Silva.
5. Stanley Aronowitz, *The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
6. One of the best representatives of the orthodox Marxist view on race and racism is Victor Perlo, *Economics of Racism U.S.A.: Roots of Black*

Inequality (New York: International Publishers, 1975). But alongside this orthodox view, some African American Marxists like W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, and, more recently, Manning Marable and Robin G. Kelley have questioned the simplistic analysis of racism of their white counterparts. For particularly biting criticisms of the traditional Marxist view on racial matters see James Boggs, *Racism and the Class Struggle* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970); Robert L. Allen, *Reluctant Reformers* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1974); and Harold Cruse, *Rebellion or Revolution* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968).

7. Albert Szymanski, *Class Structure: A Critical Perspective* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 402.

8. Despite my multiple disagreements with Cox's approach to race, I regard his *oeuvre* as phenomenal, particularly considering that he did most of his work under Jim Crow. In his *Caste, Class, and Race* (New York: Doubleday, 1948), Cox developed a competent class analysis of post-World War II class matters in the United States and elsewhere. Although I disagree with the essence of his racial analysis in this book, I agree with much of his critique of Myrdal's work, the caste-school of race relations, and think that his analysis of lynching is brilliant. I also believe that he should receive more credit for his world-system analysis. On this latter matter, see his *The Foundations of Capitalism* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

9. Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race*, 393.

10. *Ibid.*, 330.

11. *Ibid.*, 336.

12. Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market Approach," *American Sociological Review* 37 (1980): 547–559. See also her "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation," in *The Sociology of Race Relations: Reflection and Reform*, edited by T. Pettigrew (New York: Free Press, 1980).

13. Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism," 343–344.

14. *Ibid.*, 347. This argument strikes me as blaming the victim in disguise. For two excellent alternative Marxist readings of why blacks did not join unions with their "brothers and sisters," see Philip Foner's excellent *Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619–1981* (New York: International Publishers, 1981) and David Roediger's *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London and New York: Verso, 1991). For a more recent book showing the racialized character of working-class politics, see Michael Goldfield's *The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: The New Press, 1997).

15. Bonacich downplays interpretations of this "resistance" based on racial prejudice against blacks. Therefore, she explains the race riots that occurred in the 1919–1940 period as expressions of class protectionism from whites facing "threats" from black workers. This interpretation naturalizes the racist white view symbolized in the statement "they are taking our

jobs" and ignores the racial aspect of class formation (see Roediger's *The Wages of Whiteness*, 1992). On this point, black historian Carter G. Woodson, *The Negro in Our History* (Washington, D.C.: The Associated Publishers, 1947), commented a long time ago that

as Negroes in the North and West, therefore, were pitted against the trades unions, they engendered much feeling between the races by allying themselves with the capitalists to serve as strikebreakers. In this case, however, *the trades unions themselves were to be blamed*. The only time the Negroes could work under such circumstance was when the whites were striking, and it is not surprising that some of them easily yielded then to the temptation. In those unions in which the Negroes were recognized, they stood with their white co-workers in every instance of making a reasonable demand of their employers. Some of these unions, however, accepted Negroes merely as a subterfuge to prevent them from engaging in strikebreaking. When the Negroes appealed for work, identifying themselves as members of the union in control, they were turned away with the subterfuge that no vacancies existed, while at the same time white men were gladly received. (My emphasis, 439)

16. Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism," 358. For a more nuanced Marxist analysis of race post-1930s, see Jill Quadagno's *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

17. A few European Marxists (e.g., John Solomos, Harold Wolpe, Robert Miles, and Paul Gilroy), following the pivotal work of Stuart Hall, have attempted to overcome the limitation of orthodox Marxism as it pertains to racial matters. Yet, despite providing some honest indictments of the class-reductionist reading of racial phenomena, these analysts share many of the limitations of orthodox Marxists. For example, they still give primacy to the class structure by conceiving the context of racialization as purely capitalist. They also stress a priori class as the central organizing principle of societies and, hence, regard race as a secondary element that fractures or stratifies classes. Finally, they still interpret racism as a fundamentally ideological phenomenon.

18. On this point, see Michael Omi and Howard Winant's biting critique in *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York and London: Routledge, 1994).

19. Some of the premier authors in this tradition are Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); Louis Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt, *Institutional Racism in America* (Patterson, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969); Mark Chesler, "Contemporary Sociological Theories of Racism," pp. 21-71 in *Towards the Elimination of Racism*, edited by Phyllis A. Katz (New York: Pergamon, 1976); David Wellman, *Portraits of White Racism* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Rodolfo Alvarez,

Kenneth G. Lutterman, and Associates, *Discrimination in Organizations: Using Social Indicators to Manage Social Change* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1979).

20. Carmichael and Hamilton, *Black Power*, 3.

21. Chesler, "Contemporary Sociological Theories of Racism," 22.

22. See, particularly, Knowles and Prewitt, *Institutional Racism in America*.

23. This point has been raised by Miles, *Racism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).

24. My emphasis. Ture and Hamilton, *Black Power*, 5.

25. If everything is or can be conceived as "racist," then the term has no boundaries; phenomena of clearly class, gender, or pertaining to any other form of social association are reduced to race. In political terms, the assumption that all whites are racists led to a suicidal political strategy, particularly for blacks in the United States, where coalition politics were basically dismissed (see chapter 3 in Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). Yet, Miles goes too far here. This view did help blacks to mobilize, organize, and rally behind the (ill-defined) notion of black power.

26. For an example of the negative racialization experienced by the Irish in Ireland, see Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race* (London and New York: Verso, 1994).

27. This point has been raised by Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*.

28. Despite the radicalism of Carmichael and Hamilton's approach, their book is written within the pluralist view of power so popular among political scientists. That is why they seem content with advocating for a power-sharing nationalist electoral strategy as if this were possible in a social formation where power is structurally based and organized around racial, class, and gender group-level domination. For a fascinating critique of myopic nationalist perspectives (whether Afrocentric, Islam-centered, or elite-based), see Rod Bush, *We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1999). See also Wahneema Lubiano, "Black Nationalism and Black Common Sense," pp. 232-252 in *The House That Race Built*, edited by Wahneema Lubiano (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997).

29. Joan W. Moore, "Colonialism: The Case of the Mexican-Americans," *Social Problems* 17 (1970): 463-472; Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

30. Blauner advanced several definitions of racism in his book. The most comprehensive regarded racism as "a principle of social domination by which a group seen as inferior in alleged biological characteristics is exploited, controlled, and oppressed socially and psychically by a superordinate group." *Racial Oppression in America*, 84.

31. Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America*, 22.

32. *Ibid.*, 21.

33. Ibid., 23.

34. On race cycles, see Robert E. Park, *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950). On ethnic patterns, see Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970).

35. Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America*, 10.

36. On this matter Blauner stated,

The liberal-humanist value that violence is the worst sin cannot be defended today if one is committed squarely against racism and for self-determination. Some violence is almost inevitable in the decolonization process; unfortunately racism in America has been so effective that the greatest power Afro-Americans wield today is the power to disrupt. (*Racial Oppression in America*, 104)

37. Blauner was very aware of this limitation and said so in the introduction to his book. What was needed was a "new theoretical model ... based on the combined existence of historical interaction and mutual interpenetration of the colonial-racial and the capitalist class realities" given that "America is clearly a mixed society that might be termed colonial capitalist or racial capitalist." *Racial Oppression in America*, 13. Barrera attempted to deal with this limitation by suggesting that there is an interactive class and race structure and that racial minorities constitute subordinated segments or fractions of all the classes in the structure. *Race and Class in the Southwest*.

38. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (University of Chicago Press, 1987), and *When Work Disappears* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).

39. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 61.

40. Ibid., 23.

41. Ibid., 64.

42. In Winant's recent book, *Racial Conditions*, the fundamentally political character of racialization is attributed to the fact that "elites, popular movements, state agencies, cultural and religious organizations, and intellectuals of all types develop *racial projects*, which interpret and reinterpret the meaning of race. . . . These projects are often explicitly, but always implicitly, political" (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 24.

43. The other important theoretical spring of radical writings on race in this period has been Stuart Hall.

44. One of the earliest statements on the constructionist character of race is found in Max Weber, "Ethnic Groups," in *Economy and Society*, edited by Herbert Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978).

45. In *Racial Conditions* (1994), Winant comes close to enunciating a structural conception of race. He criticizes the purely ideological conception of race because it fails to (1) appreciate the significance that a construct can acquire over a thousand years of existence and (2) recognize that race

shapes our identity and everyday experiences (16). However, Winant eschews a truly structural reading of race because he thinks such a reading would reify the category. As I argue in this chapter, an *objective* understanding of race (similar to the case of class or gender) based upon the notion that these social groups have different interests does not necessarily entail freezing the content or meaning of the category itself.

46. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 55.

47. Omi and Winant define *racial projects* as "simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines." *Racial Formation in the United States*, 56.

48. Ibid., 66.

49. This problem is partially addressed in Howard Winant's *Racial Conditions* through the Gramscian concept of *hegemony*, which he defines as "a form of rule that operates by constructing its subjects and incorporating contestation" (113). According to Winant, this form of rule prevails in most "modern" societies and organizes, among other things, cleavages based on class, race, and gender.

50. Joe R. Feagin and Hernán Vera, *White Racism* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), p. 7. Feagin and Vera's emphasis.

51. Joe R. Feagin, *Racist America* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 6.

52. This is the argument of authors in the dependency and world-system tradition. It is also the argument of Cedric Robinson in *Black Marxism* (London: Zed Press, 1983) and of Charles Mills.

53. See his work in Steven Shulman and William Darity, Jr., *The Question of Discrimination: Racial Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989). For the opposite argument, see Michael Reich, *Racial Inequality: A Political-Economic Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

54. For a critique of the moral interpretation of racial matters, see Lawrence Bobo, James Kluegel, and Ryan Smith, "Laissez-Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiblack Ideology," pp. 15-42 in *Racial Attitudes in the 1990s*, edited by Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

55. See Tony Brown, "'Being Black and Feeling Blue': The Mental Health Consequences of Racial Discrimination," *Race & Society* 2, no. 2 (2000): 117-131.

56. Examples of this approach are Howard Schuman et al., *Racial Attitudes in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, *The Scare of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

57. This is the finding of analysts such as Sniderman in his various books as well as that of Glenn Firebaugh and Kenneth E. Davis, "Trends in Antiblack Prejudice, 1972-1984," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 251-274.

58. See John Rex, *Race, Colonialism, and the City* (London: Routledge, 1973) and *Race Relations in Sociological Theory* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986).

59. This has been Howard Schuman's argument for a long time. For statements of this argument, see any of the editions of *Racial Attitudes in America*.

60. There is now an explosion of survey-based authors fighting this individualistic tradition. See, for example, Donald R. Kinder and Lynn Sanders, *Divided by Color* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) and most of the authors in *Racialized Politics*, edited by David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

61. This tradition is very old but was clearly stated in Theodore W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950). See also Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (New York: Doubleday, 1958). For excellent critiques, see Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America*, and David Wellman, *Portrait of White Racism*.

62. Roy Brooks, *Rethinking the American Race Problem* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford: University of California Press, 1990); Robert C. Smith, *Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995).

63. For early statements of this view, see David O. Sears and Donald R. Kinder, "Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles," pp. 51-88 in *Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership*, edited by Werner Z. Hirsch (New York: Praeger, 1971). For a mature review of the symbolic racism tradition, see David O. Sears, "Symbolic Racism," pp. 53-84 in *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, edited by P. A. Katz and D. A. Taylor (New York: Plenum, 1988). See also Pettigrew, *The Sociology of Race Relations*.

64. This question is used by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and has been employed by Schuman et al., *Racial Attitudes in America*, 66.

65. This point has been made by Oliver Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race*; Marvin Harris, *Patterns of Race Relations in the Americas* (New York: Walker, 1964); John Rex, *Race Relations in Sociological Theory*; and Pierre van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967).

66. Winthrop Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968); Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America* (Boston: South End Press, 2000 [1983]); Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London: Zed, 1983).

67. Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*.

68. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*, 176.

69. This quote comes from Yehudi O. Webster's book *The Racialization of America* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), p. 84.

70. By *structure* I mean, following Joseph Whitmeyer, "the networks of (interactional) relationships among actors as well as the distributions of socially meaningful characteristics of actors and aggregates of actors." "Why Actors Are Integral to Structural Analysis," *Sociological Theory* 12

(1994): 153-165. For similar but more complex conceptions of the term, which are relational and that incorporate the agency of actors, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); and William H. Sewell, Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (1992): 1-29. I reserve the term *material* to refer to the economic, social, political, or ideological rewards or penalties received by social actors for their participation (whether willing, unwilling, or indifferent) in social structural arrangements.

71. All racialized social systems operate along white supremacist lines. See Mills, *Blackness Visible* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

72. I make a distinction between race and ethnicity. Ethnicity has a primarily sociocultural foundation, and ethnic groups have exhibited tremendous malleability in terms of who belongs. In contrast, racial ascriptions (initially) are imposed externally to justify the collective exploitation of a people and are maintained to preserve status differences. The distinction I make was part of a debate that appeared recently in the *American Sociological Review*. For specialists interested in this matter, see Bonilla-Silva, "The Essential Social Fact of Race," *American Sociological Review* 64, no. 6 (1999): 899-906.

73. Herbert Blumer was one of the first analysts to make this argument about systematic rewards received by the races ascribed the primary position in a racial order. See Herbert Blumer, "Reflections on Theory of Race Relations," pp. 3-21 in *Race Relations in World Perspective*, edited by A. W. Lind (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1955). Du Bois's argument about the psychological wages of whiteness has been used recently by Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America*; and by David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*.

74. This point has been made by Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*; Winant, *Racial Conditions*.

75. I am referring to cases such as Haiti. Nonetheless, recent research has suggested that even in such places, the abolition of slavery did not end the racialized character of the social formation. See Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Haiti, State Against Nation: Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990).

76. For a similar argument, see Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, *Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour, and the Anti-Racist Struggle* (London, England: Tavistock, 1992).

77. For an early statement on this matter, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Toward a Theory of Minority-Majority Group Relations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967). For a more recent statement, see Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

78. Nineteenth-century nation-building processes throughout Latin America included the myth of racial democracy and color- or race-blindness. This facilitated the struggles for independence and the maintenance of white supremacy in societies wherein white elites were demographically insignificant. For discussions pertinent to this argument see the excellent

collection edited by Michael Hanchard, *Racial Politics in Contemporary Brazil* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999).

79. See my "The Essential Social Fact of Race," *American Sociological Review* 64, no. 6 (December 1999): 899–906.

80. On this point, see Warren Whatley and Gavin Wright, *Race, Human Capital, and Labor Markets in American History*, Working Paper #7 (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Afroamerican and African Studies, University of Michigan, 1994). For an incisive discussion, see Samuel L. Myers, Jr., "Measuring and Detecting Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era," pp. 172–197 in *Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods*, edited by John H. Stanfield II and Rutledge M. Dennis (London: Sage Publications, 1993).

81. Michael Reich, "The Economics of Racism," in *Racial Conflict, Discrimination, and Power: Historical and Contemporary Studies*, edited by William Barclay, Krsihma Kumar, and Ruth P. Simms (New York: AMS Press, 1976), p. 224.

82. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 64.

83. On the invention of the white race, see Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race*, Vol. I (London: Verso, 1994). On the invention of the "Indian" race, see Robert E. Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian* (New York: Vintage, 1978). On the invention of the black and white races, see Winthrop Jordan, *White over Black*.

84. A classic book on the ideological binary construction of the races in the United States is Thomas Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963). For an analysis of the earlier period in the Americas, see Tzevetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1984).

85. On this matter, I stated in my recent debate in the pages of the *American Sociological Review* with Mara Loveman that "'race,' like 'class' or 'gender,' is always contingent but is also socially real. Race operates 'as a shuttle between socially constructed meanings and practices, between subjective and lived, material reality' (Hanchard 1994: 4)." (901). Michael G. Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

86. This last point is an extension of Poulantzas's view on class. Races—as classes—are not an "empirical thing"; they denote racialized social relations or racial practices at all levels. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: Verso, 1982), p. 67.

87. For a full discussion, see my "The Essential Social Fact of Race." For a similar argument, see Teresa Amott and Julie Matthaei, *Race, Gender, and Work: A Multicultural Economic History of Women in the United States* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1996).

88. Frederick Barth, "Introduction," pp. 9–38 in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, edited by F. Barth (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).

89. For the case of the Jews, see Miles, *Racism and Racism After "Race Relations"* (London: Routledge, 1993). For the case of the Irish, see Allen, *The Invention of the White Race*.

90. For a recent excellent discussion on ethnicity with many examples from the United States, see Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World* (London: Pine Forge Press, 1998).

91. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness*. See also Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

92. For identity issues among Caribbean immigrants, see the excellent edited collection by Constance R. Sutton and E. M. Chaney, *Caribbean Life in New York City: Sociocultural Dimensions* (New York: Center for Migration Studies of New York, 1987).

93. Barth, "Introduction," 17.

94. A few notable discussions on this matter are Ira Berlin, *Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro in Antebellum South* (New York: Pantheon, 1975); John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of the Negro Americans* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974); August Meir and Elliot Rudwick, *From Plantation to Ghetto* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970).

95. The motivation for racializing human relations may have originated in the interests of powerful actors, but after social systems are racialized, all members of the dominant race participate in defending and reproducing the racial structure. This is the crucial reason why Marxist analysts (e.g., Cox, Reich) have not succeeded in successfully analyzing racism. They have not been able to accept the fact that after the phenomenon originated with the expansion of European capitalism into the New World, it acquired a life of its own. The subjects who were racialized as belonging to the superior race, whether or not they were members of the dominant class, became zealous defenders of the racial order. For an interesting Marxist-inspired treatment, see Bush, *We Are Not What We Seem*.

96. Jordan, *White over Black*; Robinson, *Black Marxism*; Miles, *Racism After "Race Relations"*.

97. Bernard M. Magubane, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990); Richard Williams, *Hierarchical Structures and Social Value* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For two recent valuable contributions, see Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800* (London: Verso, 1997); and Ian Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

98. Hillel Ticktin, *The Politics of Race: Discrimination in South Africa* (London: Pluto, 1991), p. 26.

99. The classic book on this is Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (New York: Bantam, 1984). See also Nancy Caraway, *Segregated Sisterhood: Racism and the Politics of American Feminism* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1991).

100. This argument is not new. Analysts of the racial history of the United States have always pointed out that most of the significant historical changes in this country's race relations were accompanied by some degree

of overt violence. See Harold Cruse, *Rebellion or Revolution* (New York: William Morrow, 1968); Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom*; and James W. Button, *Blacks and Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Southern Communities* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

101. This point is important in literature on revolutions and democracy. On the role of violence in the establishment of bourgeois democracies, see Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966). On the pivotal role of violence in social movements, see Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage, 1979).

102. The notion of relative autonomy comes from the work of Poulantzas (*Power and Social Classes*) and implies that the ideological and political levels in a society are partially autonomous in relation to the economic level; that is, they are not merely expressions of the economic level.

103. Paul Gilroy, "There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack": *The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 17.

104. See Ellis Cose, *The Rage of a Privileged Class: Why Are Black Middle Class Angry? Why Should America Care?* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Lawrence Otis-Graham, *Member of the Club: Reflections on Life in a Racially Polarized World* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).

105. In addition to the work by Joe R. Feagin and Hernán Vera already cited, see Lawrence Bobo, J. Kluegel, and R. Smith, "Laissez Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a Kinder, Gentler, Antiracist Ideology," and, particularly, Mary R. Jackman, *Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994).

106. Curiously, historian Eugene Genovese made a similar argument in his book *Red and Black*. Although he still regarded racism as an ideology, he stated that once it "arises it alters profoundly the material reality and in fact becomes a partially autonomous feature of that reality." *Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and Afroamerican History* (New York: Pantheon, 1971), p. 340.

107. Hall, "Race Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance," in *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*, edited by UNESCO (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), p. 336.

108. Actions by the Ku Klux Klan have an unmistakably racial tone, but many other actions (choosing to live in a suburban neighborhood, sending one's children to a private school, and opposing government intervention in hiring policies) also have racial undertones.