

Mid-Term

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Use Tunn It Za

Recommended: Andrade; Gumpster
I. The Paradox of ^Ase

Domestic Commitment.

The Bargaining Hypothesis

A. The Level of Domestic
Commitment Is A Function
of the Rational State
Subjects or Citizens
Have In the Survival,
Power, and Prosperity of
Their States.

B. The State Consists of a
Bundle of Benefits Dependent
on the State

Examples: Efficient Law
And Domestic Security
Economic Benefits (Property Rights)

C. The Benefits Bundle Is the Institutional Outcome of Long-Term Bargains Between Rulers and Ruled (Asset Binding)

1. Rulers Exchange Tangible, politically produced Benefits In Exchange for the Human and material resources necessary to fight war.

a. Bargaining can occur in formal bargaining institutions like parliaments or informally through social networks or the bureaucracy.

b. resources: taxation, debt, mass conscription

c. the escalation of the costs of war owing to the security dilemma logic erodes the underlying bargains real value

D. The Bargaining Logic Binds
The Interests of whole populations to
the Fate of States (It + the
state fails, the bargain fails)

1. Asset (Benefits) Binding Means
"The More you have, the more
you have to lose." And "The
Greater your binding, the greater
your commitment."

2. This explains the minimum
commitment threshold and

3. the willingness of populations to
pay for the costs of war-preparation
(permanent military establishments)
as well as the costs of war.

8. The Four Classic Bargains / see 2004

1. The Specialization Bargain

2. The Fiscal Bargain

3. The Conscription Bargain

4. The Security Bargain

II. The Specialization Bargain (1500-1660)

A. Gunpowder Warfare forces
Rulers Throughout Europe to make a
Strategic hard choice: Either

1. Invest in Permanent Specialized
Militaries necessary for gunpowder
warfare and accept greater
domestic resistance and the necessity
of greater domestic bargaining, or
2. Do not Invest and face Strategic
vulnerability (Prisoner's Dilemma)
3. Wherever possible, rulers invest

B. The investment is made possible
by the ruler's exchange of
high-value external and internal
security and enhanced legal rights
and privileges for the taxes and
debt necessary to compete militarily

1. Origins of permanent armies
& purpose-built navies.

- E. C. The Benefits Bundle in the Specialization Bargain**
1. Efficient legal systems that extend the rules courts & law to all subjects (courts of justice)
 2. This includes efficient property rights & contracts
 3. Policing (Internal Security)
 4. "Infrastructure" Investment (Canals, Highways, Ports & Markets)
 5. Privileges - Nobility, Merchant Monopolies

D. As in all the other bargains the domestic demand for these benefits pre-exists the rulers bargain, but the timing of the bargain is dependent on military factors, particularly specific war costs

1. England - Fighting Spain & France 1588-1660 (and beyond)

III. The Fiscal Bargain 1660-1800

A. Rulers Exchange An enhanced version of the specialization bargain for greater domestic resource mobilization including taxes and a permanent state debt

1. Origins of national banks
Like the Bank of England /
2. example of Asset Binding
(vs. Benefits Binding)

B. The Bargain Is Necessitated
by the development of true
Linear Warfare on land
and sea

1. armies and navies increase
by a factor 10x even though

Europe's population only double

? England National Wealth x 3 war costs x 1/6

IV. Re Conscription Bureaucracy 1800-1950's

A. Mass Militaries & Mass
Conscription along with the
Industrialization of Weaponry
Necessitate A Massive Increase
In the Costs of WARFARE AND
WARFARE Related Costs (Taxes,
Debt, Conscription Quasi-tax)

B. As A result, states trade high
value legal rights, social
rights, & political rights for
domestic resources & mass

Commitment

1. Civil & legal equality, legal
efficiency

2. Social Welfare Payments,
Labor Market Insurance, Health
& Education Rights

"Great Britain 1919. 'Home Fit
For Heroes'"

B.3 Political Rights -

Voting; Rights of Political
Association & Dissent

a. Italy Conscription &
Voting

b. Germany 1872- Unification
& Mass Voting

c. Russia. 1861-63 Abolition
of Serfdom

d. U.S. - G.I. Bill (post-1945)

V. The Security - States Burgare

(Major & Minor Powers)

Trade High Value Citizenship

Fo. A Dedicated Military -

Eccency & Permanent Readiness

A. Arms Expenditures Worldwide

B. Weapons Research & Development

C. Ever-Newer Weapons &

the Primacy of the Combat Soldier.

* The Spratly Islands

A. China vs. U.S.
- 1990's - 2000's

B. Explaining Behavior.

1. Structural

2. Institutional

C. The Security Dilemma
