

# I. Institutional Theory

## A. The Hypothesis of Perpetual Peace

1. First Premise: Non-Antagonistic Interest (Even In Anarchy)
2. First Deduction: The Balance of Power - Is A Balance of  $\neq$  the Status Quo - Can Range From WAR To Peace Depending On Domestic And International Factors

## B. The Hypothesis of the Cost of WAR

1. The Disutility of WARFARE - Second ~~First~~ Premise
2. Second Deduction: Hypothesis of  $\neq$  Better Bargain (Better Than  $\neq$  Status Quo) A Change of  $\neq$  Status Quo Through WAR
3. Cost of WARFARE - Cost (Probability) of Defeat, Cost of WAR Fighting, plus  $\neq$  Cost of WAR Termination

\* Dead Weight Efficiency Loss

C. Thus, Given the Disutility of WARFARE (Cost Only 0 Benefits)

1. Win Without WAR IS  
Always Preferable to WAR

And Win ( $W_{NW} > W_W$ )

2. Losing ~~Without~~ WAR IS  
Always Better Than Losing  
Through WAR

3. The Status Quo Pay-off  
Is Better For All Parties (States)  
Than WAR. As A Result, WAR  
Can Always Be Avoided Through  
Enforceable International Bargains

4. How IS WAR Ever-Possible

a. WAR STATES Preferences

b. Absent Bargaining Institutions  
and Enforcement Mechanisms

c. Incomplete Information  
and Bluffing (Preferences For WAR AND Peace)

# I. Institutional Explanations of WAR

A. Institutions - Patterned Rule-Based Organizations  
(States and International Institutions)

B Domestic Level Explanations  
1. Regime Types WAR STATES  
(Peace States)

4. WAR STATES Have a First Preference For WAR ( $4 > 3 > 2 > 1$ )

C. International Institutions  
1. Diplomacy, Treaties, Organizations  
2. Enforceability; Bargaining

D Information - Complete or Incomplete Information = Preferences For WAR AND Peace

1. Deterrence - Credible Because Believable Signals (Tripwire)

## II. Institutional Explanations - N.I.I

A. Regime Types - Is Peace  
A WAR STATE

1. Germany - WAR STATE  
C. WAR STARTER

2. Major Power Preferences

F. WAR AND Peace

a. 4 - Advantageous Peace

b. 3 - STATUS QUO

c. 2 - WAR

d. 1 - Defeat

2. Domestic Constraints on  
WAR Choices; Specifically, the  
Decision to Externalize Domestic  
Conflict Through WAR. Germany,  
Russia; Austria-Hungary

a. Audience Costs (Public

Opinion; Institutional Constraints  
(Parliamental WAR Credits)

b. International Networks of  
Negotiators (Congresses; Diplomacy

## III, International Level

A. International Networks  
of Negotiation Can Limit WAR  
(First, Second Balkan WAR)

B. Incomplete Information  
& Enforceability, Bargaining  
& Deterrence Failure

1. Austria-Hungary Chooses  
WAR Against Serbia -  
Chooses To Limit WAR - How?

2. Must Deter Russia's Intervention  
By Signalling Limitation (C.A. I+)

3. To Be Credible, Aus. Hungary  
Must Persuade Russia To  
Accept Strategic Vulnerability  
And Germany Must Do Nothing

4. Deterrence - Signalling, Rewards, Penalties