

# \* WAR - Types

A Systematic WAR -  
CAUSE - Balance Breakdown  
(WAR AS NO Bargain Available  
B. WARS OF Retribution  
(WAR AS Better than A

Bargain)

1. Major. Minor Power WAR

C. WARS OF Aggression

1. OFFER AND

Refusal

2. Major. Power (Advantage) /

vs Damaged Major. Power

a. b. c. d.

# IRAQ - 1991

## \* Major-Minor Power WAR

A. Minor Power Seizes Territory  
From Major-Power Ally

B. Major Power's Choice Starts  
From Indifference Between  
WAR and An Equivalent Bargain  
(Bargain = Minor Power withdraws from  
Territory)

C. Major Power will Choose  
Bargain If Bargain IS

Greater Than Indifference

Point + (Withdrawal Plus Reduction

In Military Force levels - Minor

Power will Not Choose If One

Bargain Preserves Sovereignty

Δ Is Confident of Ability To Resist  
At A Cost (Damage)

D. Minor Power's Choice Causes WAR OR  
Peace

# I. WAR AS Better Than A Bargain - Major- Minor-Power WAR

1. WARS of Retribution -  
Major Powers Attack Minor  
Powers to Force Minor Powers To  
Act In the Interests of the  
Attacking Major Power

2. The Problem - Such WARS  
Should Not Occur because

a. Minor Powers Cannot  
Defeat Major Powers - (But Can  
Inflict Damage)

b. Minor Powers Should Therefore  
Accept A Bargained Outcome  
Less Than the Cost of Defeat

c. Yet, WARS of Retribution  
Are Frequent (with or without Allies)

1. Finnish WAR - 1939-40 Finland  
Against U.S.S.R. (example)

## II. Explanation

### A. Major Powers' Pay-Offs

1. Costs of WAR Are

Equal To  $\times 6$  Costs of Damage

2. Cost of Defeat = 0

3. Benefits (Change of Minor Power Behavior)  $>$  Costs of WAR

### B. Thus, Major Powers Are

Indifferent Between WAR

and Equal Bargain - The Outcome

(WAR OR Peace) Depends On

Choice of the Minor Power (IF

Minor Power Chooses WAR, WAR Is

The Outcome, If it chooses to

Bargain, Peace Results

### C. Problem - When Would Minor

Power Choose WAR

### III. Minor Powers, Pay-Offs (Preferences) And Choices

A. If Minor Power Cannot  
WAGE A WAR That Will  
Damage Major Power And  
Prevent Defeat, It Will

Bargain (Bargain Greater than  $\frac{1}{2}$   
Indifference point for Major Power)

B. If Minor Power Has

The Reason / Expectation of  
Fighting without Being Defeated  
And Therefore Limiting Threat To  
Its Survival / It will Fight

C. Particular Because Any Bargain  
Threatens The Minor Power's  
Survival (Sovereignty)

1. Austria-Hungary's 1914

Ultimatum to Serbia - Serbia Fights

## IV Minor Power Fights

A. Depends on the Minor Power's Estimation of Domestic Population's Commitment to Fight - High, will Fight, Low - will Bargain -

1. Qualification - will Fight  
Eve. If Commitment is Low when Major Power will Attack Anyway

B. American Revolution

1775-1783 - British Strategy

1. 1775-1777 - New England Invasion

2. 1777-1779 - Mid-Atlantic

3. 1779-83 - South  
(Stacy is West (mit))

To Be Acceptable To  
The Major Power, The  
Benefits Must Exceed  
The Certain Benefits of WAR.  
Thus, the Bargain Must  
A. Be Strictly Enforceable  
B. And, Most Importantly,  
Prevent A Repetition of  
Minor Power Behavior.  
C. But This Entails A  
Partial Loss of Minor Power  
Independence  
1. Loss of Control over  
Foreign Policy  
2. Survival Threat

["We Will Never Surrender"]

## V. WARS of Refusal

A. Britain - 1940

B. Major Power Suffers  
Damage Against Major-  
Power Enemy (Fall of France 1940)

C. Enemy Offers

Attractive Bargain

D. Major Power Continues  
WAR Even Without Major Allies

E. Domestic Commitment Is  
Key Variable

# I. CAN YOU DO THIS IN Mathematical Form? Fc. Major Power

1. Costs of WAR = Costs of Status Quo
2. Costs of Defeat = 0
3. Benefits (utilidly expected) of WAR  
Are Greater Than Zero and Greater  
Than the expected Costs of Damage
4. The Major Power Is Indifferent  
Between WAR and An Equivalent  
Bargain
5. The Minor Power Is First Mover
6. If the Minor Power Chooses  
WAR, WAR IS THE RESULT
7. If the Minor Power Offers A  
Bargain Greater Than the Point of  
Indifference (Status Quo);  
Major Power Accepts