

* Coercion and Commitment

A The Roots of Roman Order

(300 B.C. - 400 A.D. - Coercion or Contract)

1 The Empire (100 A.D.)

a 40 provinces; 70 million Pop

b 200,000 Legion Soldiers

200,000 Auxiliaries

c The Value of Roman Citizenship

B The Confucian Critique

of Coercive Rule (200 B.C.)

The Empire Cannot Be Ruled

From Horsesback

c. Winning A WAR,

Governing In Peace

I. The Coercion Hypothesis

A. The Paradox of Perfect Tyranny

1 Paradox: The Perfect Tyrant Is Perfectly Weak Because

a. Rule Depends Solely On Coercive Threats, No Benefits

b. Therefore, If x Tyrant Needs the Support of x Subjects (1. he in WAR) No Support will Be Given
 $2 \ 1 + 1 > 1$ (Tyrant)

c. No Incentive To Aid The Ruler

2. Means to Rule will
Be Met with Passive or
Active Resistance

3. The Perfect Tyrant Is
A Logical Impossibility

B. The Myth of Invincibility

1. Power Never Challenged

Has No (0) Reputation

2. But If Challenged,

the Myth Collapses

C. The Fact of Resistance

1. The Long History of Tax
Revolts

2. An Explanation for

Bargaining (Ruler's Incentive)

Neutral Nationalism

I. The Mobilization of Nationalism

As A Source of Aggressive WAR OR

A Source of Reform (Does WAR
Further or Betray the National Cause)

B. Nationalism Affirmative Belief In
the Moral Value and Independence
of the National Unit And National Survival

C. Is Nationalism Inherent in WAR-like

9. Nation. Political Collectivity of
Shared Historical Sentimental Experience
(Emotional & Rational Components)

D. Is Nationalism WAR-like -

Types of Nationalism

1. Institutional (Constitutional)
Nationalism (U.S.; France)

2. Ethnic (Germany; Japan)

3. Radical (Directed At Internal Enemy)

4. All three can be inward-looking;

Aggressive, or Isolationist -

Neutral Effects

I. The Cost of Sanctions

A. Mutual Punishment.

Source Stated Object

B In Order To Be Efficient

Sanctions Must Be

Enforceable & Selective

Cannot Be

1. Perous

2. Harm Those One Chooses
To Help

3. Do Not Mobilize Nationalist
Backlash